



Daily Report

East Europe

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27 March 1992

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Inter-European Affairs

At a Central European foreign ministers meeting regional cooperation was discussed and the participants decided to end the "Hexagonale" and form the "Central European Initiative," a group which will comprise Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, and Italy, and Slovenia and Croatia as observer members, Budapest radio and MTI report. The foreign ministers agreed that they do not want "to expand the former Hexagonale" into an organization which may be "rivaling the CSCE." The Central European Initiative will focus on security cooperation and disarmament and economic ties, including the expansion of communications and transportation links. The Croatian officials attending the meeting pointed out that the Adria oil pipeline, which connects Omisalj port to supply Czechoslovakia and Hungary, may "be ready to renew operations within days," according to MTI. The pipeline was shut down as a result of the "civil war" in Yugoslavia, and its reopening "hinges on a political decision."

Czechoslovakia

CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, interviewed on Prague television on 26 March, discussed the progress on Nagorno-Karabakh made during the recent CSCE meeting in Helsinki. He stated his concern that the conflict might become "a huge fuse that could spread the conflict" throughout the whole territory of the former Soviet Union. While he cautioned against creating "any illusion that the conflict will be resolved quickly," he expressed the belief that "the will" for a solution exists on the part of Azerbaijan and Armenia, who are prepared to "sit around a table and discuss the matter" together with the other members of the Helsinki process.

Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky, reacting to yesterday's decision by the Hungarian National Assembly to authorize the government to withdraw from the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project, was cited by CSTK on 26 March as saying that "we do not see any reason why the project should not be put into operation," and that the decision of the Hungarian parliament "does not mean that we shall not put Gabcikovo into operation." Carnogursky went on to claim that the work on the dam in Slovakia was already 90 percent completed.

Bulgaria

The Podkrepa Miners Trade Union has presented the government with the following demands: 1) to halt the "total closure of uranium mining"; 2) to maintain domestic lead and zinc production and not move it abroad; and 3) to ensure that the minister of industry and trade resign, according to BTA. Miners reportedly want the government to address the issues of retraining miners and providing them with social insurance if the government goes ahead with these plans. In response to government inaction thusfar over miners' demands, Dimitur Mladenov, chairman of the Central Strike Committee of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union, announced in Madan that the committee had decided to begin a strike at 2000 GMT on 26 March, Sofia radio reports. Dimitur Dimov, chairman of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union, arrived in Madan and briefed the committee on the Council of Ministers' negotiations. The Central Strike Committee decided not to wait for Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov to arrive before announcing their decision. When Dimitrov finally arrived, talks were conducted and an agreement was reached to "pay miners the wages and downtime payment that are due to them for the November-March period." The newspaper PODKREPA quoted Dimov as saying the strikes will end when Dimitrov accepts Minister of Industry and Trade Ivan Pushkarov's resignation.

Regional Foreign Ministers Issue Joint Statment

*AU2403165192 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1600 GMT 24 Mar 92*

[Text] A few minutes ago, we received by fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the text of the statement of the foreign ministers of Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania, and Ukraine. The ministers of foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania, and Ukraine, who met in Helsinki on 23 March 1992, expressed profound concern with the dangerous evolution of the situation in the Republic of Moldova rayons on the left bank of the Dniester River, with the continuation of acts of violence and the losses of human lives, and in connection with the threat posed by this evolution for the democratic processes in the states in that region. The declaration adopted by the CIS heads of state in Kiev on 20 March 1992 contains the key elements of a political solution of the crisis.

The ministers also emphasized the importance of the Romanian Government's declaration of 16 March, which points out the need to put an end to the acts of violence and find a peaceful solution of the conflict. The ministers confirmed that their governments will take further steps to prevent bloodshed and the involvement of other states' citizens in this conflict; where such an involvement has occurred, they will take steps to ensure their immediate return to their places of origin. In this respect, the ministers took note of the statement made on 8 March by the spokesman of Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which Romanian citizens are in no way involved in the conflict and did not participate in armed incidents.

Guiding themselves by the goals and principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, the participants in the meeting consider the observation of the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova as a basis for their policy vis-a-vis relations with this state, which is a member of the United Nations, and for a solution to the conflict. To ensure a cease-fire in the area and restore the legitimate organs of the local power, the ministers spoke out for the fast disarmament of all illegal groups and prevention of their access to arms. They called on the sides involved in the conflict to show restraint and renounce the use of force as a means to solve the conflict.

The ministers emphasized the importance of observing human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in accordance with UN and CSCE principles and with the generally acknowledged norms of international law. The necessary conditions will be ensured to facilitate the return of refugees and grant them the appropriate humanitarian aid.

The ministers agreed to coordinate their efforts to solve the conflict and, with this in mind, to set up a mechanism for political consultations, including at the level of

ministers of foreign affairs. They decided that the first meeting of the ministers should take place in April.

CSCE Foreign Ministers Addressed on Yugoslavia**Serb Rights Said Guaranteed**

*LD2503201592 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1909 GMT 25 Mar 92*

[Text] Helsinki, Mar 25 (TANJUG)—Croatia is prepared to guarantee to the Serbs in its territory all rights envisaged under a plan put forth by the European Community-sponsored Brussels conference on peace for Yugoslavia, the vice-premier of that breakaway Yugoslav republic and head of its delegation to the Helsinki follow-up to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Mate Granic, said in Helsinki today.

Speaking at a press conference, Granic said that Croatia "has already agreed everything with the Serb minority ... and there remains only for the agreed to be incorporated in the Constitution."

Asked when that might be expected to happen, Granic could not give a specific answer. He admitted, however, that there were "some open questions," and mentioned the future status of the Serb Krajina as a crucial open question.

Serbs living in Croatia proclaimed their Republic of Serb Krajina last year, in the parts of Croatia where they constitute the majority population, in response to Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. They hope to remain in Yugoslavia after Croatia's secession, an aspiration expressed in their referendum.

The United Nations is sending a protection force to Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), the brunt of which is to be deployed in Krajina, which has in the past year been torn by fierce armed fighting. UNPROFOR troops are to be deployed by the end of April.

The authorities in Krajina, which covers nearly one-third of Croatia's territory over which Croatian authorities have no control, have decided that federal laws be operational in their territory for the duration of the United Nations operation. Croatia insists on the operation of the "Croatian legal system" in Krajina. Granic said that Croatia had decided to give the "Serb minority in Croatia" full local autonomy and five seats in the 365-seat republican parliament. Serbs account for 12.2 percent of Croatia's population.

The downgrading of the Serbs from a constitutive nation to an ethnic minority has been at the core of the Serbs' conflict with Croatian authorities. A solution to the problem of the status of the Serbs in Croatia was the condition for Croatia's recognition by the European Community. Croatia applied to the EC for recognition late last year. Despite the fact that a commission, set up by the Conference on Yugoslavia under the guidance of

French jurist Robert Badinter, to establish which of the Yugoslav republics met the conditions for international recognition, had not given the green light for Croatia's recognition (precisely because of an unsatisfactory position of the Serb people), Croatia was recognized by the EC member states on January 15, and by some 30 others since.

Bosnia, Macedonia Recognition Urged

*LD2503193792 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Mar 92*

[Text] In Helsinki today, Croatian Vice Prime Minister Mate Granic expressed the wish that the EC recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia during the next community foreign ministers' council meeting, due to be held in Brussels on 6 April. Concerning Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina border problems, Granic confirmed that a discussion on the border line is out of the question; the only discussion is to be on border supervision. Dr. Granic expressed the wish that a demilitarized zone be established, adding that this problem will have to be clarified soon.

Among other things, Granic asked for the return of refugees, whose number he estimates at 700,000. When they return we will be able to organize an election under international supervision, Granic stressed. As far as the problem of minorities in Croatia is concerned, he said they will be entitled to local autonomy, a special educational system, and at least five representatives in the Sabor. He recalled that Croatia wants to become an EC associate member as soon as possible.

Yugoslav Delegate Cautions Slovenia, Croatia

*LD2603230592 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2126 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Helsinki, March 26 (TANJUG)—Head of the Yugoslav delegation to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) ministerial session Milivoj Maksic said here today that Slovenia's and Croatia's admittance to this forum in no way entitled them to shirk their obligation to participate in the quest for a comprehensive solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

Maksic, who is acting foreign minister, told TANJUG that, when they decided to admit these two breakaway Yugoslav Republics to their ranks, the CSCE ministerial council specified that it would in no way influence the Brussels Conference on Yugoslavia or prejudice its outcome. When they joined the CSCE, Slovenia and Croatia undertook to abide by its basic documents, a fact which bodes well for Serbs in these republics, their future status and individual and collective rights, since they will be finding themselves separated from their parent republic, said Maksic.

The CSCE standards are applied in guaranteeing the rights of the national minorities in our lands, and the CSCE mechanisms are the most efficacious way for the attainment of the rights of our peoples in other states, he stressed. The principles and criteria of the CSCE have firmly been established as the only realistic and possible standard to be applied on relations among states and in the settling of vital questions of human and national rights within states, said Maksic.

Interests and ambitions can be attained only if they conform with CSCE standards, he explained and added that regrettably, even here the strong endeavour to set themselves up as the exclusive arbiters of what is or is not in conformity with the CSCE standards. The first aspiration of this session was to trace the shape of CSCE mechanisms which should guarantee peace and security on our continent, said Maksic. He drew attention to the fact that some countries are endeavouring to pave the way for their dominance in Europe and a position of arbiter on all matters on the continent. This attitude entails a risk of violating the principle of equality of states and creating new divisions, cliques and centres of power, said Maksic.

Croatian 'Propaganda' Protested

*LD2603170392 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1530 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Helsinki, March 26 (TANJUG)—Acting Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milivoj Maksic appealed to the participants of the ministerial session at the fourth CSCE follow-up conference here today to do everything in their power to prevent the CSCE becoming a testing range for confrontation and propaganda rivalries. Maksic's appeal at the end of the three-day session was prompted by a paper distributed to the ministers last night by the delegation of the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia.

The paper said that Yugoslavia "started the war against Croatia" and was chiefly to blame "for the loss of human lives and large-scale devastation." Noting that history would tell who was the victim in the Yugoslav conflict, Maksic said that until this had happened, reports from Yugoslavia prepared by European community observers and members of the United Nations' peace mission could be distributed through the EC and CSCE chairmen to all CSCE member countries in order to help them gain an objective picture about developments in Yugoslavia.

The UN Security Council has ruled that UN peace-keeping troops are to be deployed in areas within the administrative boundaries of Croatia where Serbs constitute the majority population. Human rights violations in these areas—which later escalated into mass persecution and crimes against civilians—have triggered a Serb rebellion and intervention by the Yugoslav People's Army.

'Central European Initiative' Replaces Hexagonale

*LD2103121792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 21 Mar 92*

[Excerpt] Foreign ministers are continuing to consult on Central European regional cooperation in Vienna but the termination, once and for all, of the Hexagonale group has already been announced. A completely new mode of cooperation between the countries of Central Europe will be shaped. Our Vienna correspondent, Peter Zentai, reports:

[Zentai] The Hexagonale has come to an end and the Central European Initiative [Koezep-Europai Kezdemenyek—KEK]—into which Croatia and Slovenia have been elected as members, or more precisely, members with observer status—has been born.

The foreign ministers of seven countries—Hungary and the CFSR are represented only by foreign state secretaries—are still negotiating at this time on the kind of new initiatives the KEK will put forward, ranging from transportation to environmental protection and security policy. Ukraine and other successor states to the former Soviet Union could possibly become members of the KEK soon.

Regarding security policy: While the foreign ministers are exchanging views about this issue in Klagenfurt, disarmament experts from 24 countries signed the Open Skies agreement in Vienna, establishing conditions for military reconnaissance flights by signatories to the agreement over each other's countries. [passage omitted]

Details of Organization Explained

*LD2103193192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 21 Mar 92*

[Excerpts] The Hexagonale has ceased to exist, while in its place the Central European Initiative has been set up. [passage omitted] Our Vienna correspondent Peter Zentai reports on the consultations among the foreign ministers of the Central European regional cooperation.

[Zentai] [passage omitted] State Secretary Tamas Katona stressed in the interview he gave to our radio that the organization is open, but that for the time being it would not be advisable to admit with full rights every Central European state which lies along the Danube. On the other hand, it is worth bringing all of them into the specific economic, transport, environment protectional, and cultural programs.

Miklos Nemeth, who was likewise present, told our radio on behalf of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the bank will weigh the possibilities for financing the Central European programs from political viewpoints, and that it will only support, for example, the construction of the Trieste-Budapest-Kiev

freeway, if there is an obvious democratic transformation within the countries concerned, and if they observe the nationality and minority rights just as much as, for instance, press freedom.

Katona on 'Scope of Participants'

*LD2403150992 Budapest MTI in English 1834 GMT
22 Mar 92*

[Text] Klagenfurt, March 22 (MTI)—As far as Yugoslavia's legal successors are concerned, the Central European Initiative (CEI) will accept the results of the peace process, and is eager to see that, beside Croatia and Slovenia, the other four sovereign republics also join their regional cooperation as independent states, Tamas Katona, Hungarian state secretary of foreign affairs, told MTI during the Klagenfurt conference of the foreign ministers of the Central European Initiative (CEI) on Saturday.

The participants agreed that they did not wish to expand the former Hexagonale and set up an organization rivaling with the CSCE. Should the scope of participants be extended, the CEI would no longer be able to work effectively and hold regular, one-day consultations, they said.

Nevertheless, the Central European Initiative would like to involve some neighbouring countries in some of its work groups. The foreign ministers, for instance, discussed the idea of extending the planned Trieste-Budapest motorway to the Ukrainian border or even to Kiev. In general, CEI gives priority to the construction of motorways bypassing big cities. Under another motion, which was not discussed in Klagenfurt, the CEI and the Danube states should set up a working committee in charge of river navigation.

The CEI committee of telecommunications and work group for migration will involve in their work some neighbours of the CEI member states, Katona said.

There are good chance for financing some concrete plans: The London-based European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has set up a special secretariat to deal with this issue. The participants welcomed the brief lecture EBRD Deputy President Miklos Nemeth delivered on this topic, the state secretary said. Katona said the foreign ministers agreed on the need of strengthening cooperation with the emerging regional formations at the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.

Adria Pipeline Reopening Addressed

*LD2503184592 Budapest MTI in English 1707 GMT
25 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 25 (MTI)—Logistically the Adria oil pipeline running through Croatia, shut down because of the war there, might be ready to renew operations within days, Croat officials said. The announcement was welcomed by the energy work group of the Central

European Initiative CEI (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia), which met in Warsaw this week.

The measure, however, hinges on a political decision (in the meeting, the former Yugoslavia was represented by Croat and Slovene delegates). The Adria pipeline, connects the Omisalj port to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Oil supply through it stopped last summer because of the Yugoslavian civil war.

The CEI participants agreed to observe the European energy charter principles signed last December, and work jointly towards connecting the electricity grids of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to West European by 1995.

The work group analysed three options for consolidating Central Europe's natural gas supply, namely the transportation of:

- liquefied Algerian gas by sea, or via a new pipeline in Italy;
- North Sea gas from Britain through an undersea pipeline, and then through Denmark and Poland;
- Iranian gas through a pipeline.

Nemeth on Possible EBRD Assistance

*AU2503184992 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 23 Mar 92 p 1*

[Interview with former Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, deputy chairman of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, by Gyorgy Jozsef Farkas; place and date not given: "I Also Represent My Country in London—Central European Initiative From the Hexagonale"]

[Text] The heading says "Central European Initiative" on the official documents passed at the foreign ministerial session of the former Hexagonale cooperation in Klagenfurt [Austria]. Along with the foreign ministers of seven countries, Miklos Nemeth, representing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], also participated in the discussions held in Klagenfurt on 21 March. Miklos Nemeth gave an interview to our newspaper.

[Farkas] How were relations established between the Hexagonale and the EBRD?

[Nemeth] We were approached with the question whether we would be able to help prepare programs that span the borders, prepare the implementation studies, and help find certain financing sources. The actual negotiations started one year ago, following the conference in Bologna, and we have now managed to set up a small, but very well-trained secretariat. This helps the EBRD prepare and finalize the various programs of the Initiative, and when it finds projects worth financing then it makes a suggestion on the financial solution. From this moment, our links with the Central European Initiative become very close.

[Farkas] To a large extent, the EBRD has only dealt with the plans of various countries so far....

[Nemeth] This is true. However, it is due to the Italian Government and personally to Foreign Affairs Minister Gianni de Michelis that the new secretariat can start to operate because this is a kind of "alien body" in our bank. The board—the directing organization—did not even allow a separate budget for it. However, the joint implementation of the various programs were considered to be so important by Rome that the parliament voted for a more than 3 million-ECU [European currency unit] fund in the budget debate, and the secretariat can start its operation on the basis of this.

[Farkas] Are there any concrete ideas on the assistance?

[Nemeth] That will come a little later. It was Austrian Foreign Affairs Minister Mock who pointed out how much depends on choosing the right one from the many ideas. This is how we will have to prove the feasibility of the model. Various infrastructure projects on highways and energetics have also emerged, for example, the issue of a Kiev-Budapest-Trieste transport route, or the linking of the eastern and western energy systems. However, these have not yet been examined by the banking experts.

[Farkas] I will use this occasion to ask you how your life and work is in London?

[Nemeth] I am in entirely new circumstances in London, and I am actually the only one representing our region—naturally, also including Hungary—in the highest level leadership of the bank. I may say that the experience and knowledge I have on this region and the problems of transition are definitely useful for the bank. As a representative of the East-Central European region, I have done everything I can to help the group of countries in question, including Hungary. This is what I also want to do in the future.

PD's Berisha Demands Recognition of Kosovo*LD2503145392 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1350 GMT 25 Mar 92*

[Text] Brussels, Mar 25 (TANJUG)—The leader of the Democratic Party [PD] of Albania, Sali Berisha, said that the Province of Kosovo, a part of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, should be recognized as a republic.

After the victory of his party at the parliamentary elections in Albania, Berisha said he supported all demands of "brothers in Yugoslavia concerning their right to self-determination."

In an interview with the Brussels daily LA LIBRE BELGIQUE and BBC Europe, Berisha said that ethnic Albanians in Kosovo "should have the same rights as all other Yugoslav nations", adding that his party counted on European cooperation on the issue. He recalled such rights have already been given to the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia, obviously forgetting that ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia are a national minority, that they have all rights as guaranteed by international acts, and that neither the Yugoslav Constitution nor international law allow national minorities to pass decisions on secession.

The political parties of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, where they are the majority population, urge for the province to be given the status of a republic, its secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia and annexation to Albania. Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia boycotted last year's census, but an estimated 1.6 million live in Kosovo, as compared to Serbia's 10 million population.

Berisha Stresses 'Great Achievement' at Rally*AU2603200892 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1830 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] As our Kolonje correspondent Vehbi Zymberi reports, the Democratic Youth Forum organized a rally in Rilindja Square in Erseke at 1100 GMT yesterday as part of the meetings organized with Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Sali Berisha. The speakers stressed the great PD achievement in the elections, expressing hope for the start of a new era of great hope for the people, especially the young. We call on all young people of Kolonje, the speakers said, to vote for the PD candidates in the runoff elections.

A long column of cars and buses then set off from the town center to Qafa e Qarit on the border between the districts of Kolonje and Korce in order to welcome Sali Berisha and to escort him to Erseke. Thousands of people from the town and surrounding villages came to the rally in Rilindja Square at 1600. Kujtim Hysaj, deputy chairman of the Kolonje PD Branch, opened the rally and introduced Berisha.

I have not come here in search of votes, Berisha said, because I am convinced that the people of Kolonje will vote for the PD parliamentary candidate. I have come to

say that we will share our victory, and there is no force that can divide our people in their common joy. We will also share our joy with the members of the Socialist Party and the other opposition parties because they are our sisters and brothers. The victory of democracy is the victory of the people. After dwelling on the tasks now facing the PD, he thanked those present at the rally and the people of Kolonje, who have throughout their history given birth to distinguished personalities who have fought for democracy. This time too, the people of Kolonje will make their contribution toward strengthening democracy and the country's life. Eduard Selami, secretary of the PD Managing Council; and Eduard Sheko, member of the Managing Council of the Kolonje PD Branch, also spoke.

After the rally, Berisha visited the Erseke hospital before setting off for Permet.

Commission Announces 22 Mar Election Results*AU2603183792 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1430 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Communique issued by the Central Electoral Commission in Tirana on 26 March]

[Text] The first round of elections for deputies to the People's Assembly was held throughout the Republic of Albania on 22 March. The elections were held in accordance with Electoral Law No. 7,556 of 4 February 1992, in an orderly fashion, calmly, without incidents, and to modern European and international standards. The elections took place in the presence of observers from the Albanian political parties, a large number of observers from various foreign parties and international organizations, and Albanian and foreign reporters. A total of 1,826,142 voters took part in the first round, or 90.35 percent of those registered on the electoral rolls.

On the basis of the protocols that the Central Electoral Commission has received from the constituencies, 89 deputies have been elected as follows:

The Democratic Party [PD] has gained 79 deputies. The Socialist Party [PSSH] has gained six deputies. The Human Rights Union has gained two deputies. The Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party have each gained one deputy. Of the deputies elected in the first round, 86 are men and three are women. By profession, most deputies are teachers, engineers, economists, academics, agronomists, lawyers, journalists, etc. The candidates who won in the first round are:

Berat District: Agron Musaraj (PD) with 11,605 votes or 66 percent; Abdi Baleta (PD) with 12,051 votes or 63.75 percent; Fatos Nano (PSSH) with 12,462 votes or 59.77 percent; Tefik Ajazi (PSSH) with 8,560 votes or 53.67 percent.

Diber District: Safet Xhulali (PD) with 11,960 votes or 70.30 percent; Agron Coku (PD) with 11,827 votes or

67.76 percent; Natasha Shehu (PD) with 10,644 votes or 62.28 percent; Bashkim Gazidede (PD) with 12,161 votes or 67.21 percent.

Durres District: Nevruz Cela (PD) with 15,154 votes or 78.66 percent; Bashkim Kopliku (PD) with 15,994 votes or 76.21 percent; Vedat Sazani (PD) with 13,930 votes or 54.74 percent; Azem Hajdari (PD) with 16,855 votes or 87.19 percent; Rustem Gjata (PD) with 12,219 votes or 70.11 percent.

Elbasan District: Engjell Dakli (PD) with 14,906 votes or 81.44 percent; Agim Hoxha (PD) with 15,427 votes or 77.13 percent; Robert Ndrejka (PD) with 11,844 votes or 69.79 percent; Gezim Mema (PD) with 9,872 votes or 57.43 percent; Skender Gjinushi (Social Democratic Party) with 13,236 votes or 80.97 percent; Ibrahim Celiku (Republican Party) with 11,366 votes or 61.33 percent.

Fier District: Rexhep Uka (PD) with 11,157 votes or 66.86 percent; Bujar Nepravishta (PD) with 11,556 votes or 65.88 percent; Ljazar Lengu (PD) with 8,681 votes or 56.67 percent; Hasan Halili (PD) with 10,507 votes or 70.48 percent; Mitro Cela (PD) with 9,786 votes or 59.17 percent; Daim Rrapaj (PD) with 6,871 votes or 50.28 percent; Fadil Cepele (PD) with 8,729 votes or 56.04 percent; Kastriot Islami (PSSH) with 8,080 votes or 53.07 percent.

Gramsh District: Bashkim Koci (PSSH) with 10,538 votes or 54.78 percent.

Gjirokastra District: Kosta (?Makariazi) (Human Rights Union) with 11,850 votes or 62.88 percent.

Kavaje District: Sali Berisha (PD) with 16,701 votes or 97.53 percent; Halit Shamata (PD) with 16,343 votes or 91.09 percent; Luan Skuqi (PD) with 11,447 votes or 79.38 percent.

Korce District: Gezim Agastra (PD) with 15,967 votes or 71.45 percent; Bahri Bregu (PD) with 12,349 votes or 74.14 percent; Teodor Keko (PD) with 11,205 votes or 63.99 percent; Eduard Selami (PD) with 14,953 votes or 77.98 percent; Natasha Lako (PD) with 13,363 votes or 78.08 percent; Petrika Minga (PD) with 12,502 votes or 75.15 percent; Sotirag Stratobardha (PD) with 6,473 votes or 53.70 percent.

Kruje District: Sadedin Balla (PD) with 14,194 votes or 72.93 percent; Rushen Golemi (PD) with 13,420 votes or 71.71 percent; Alfred Sarreqi (PD) with 14,419 votes or 75.45 percent.

Kukes District: Mustafe Mustafa (PD) with 8,465 votes or 52.82 percent; Shefqet Hoxha (PD) with 9,621 votes or 62.64 percent; Skender Jaku (PD) with 8,253 votes or 60.49 percent.

Lezhe District: Rudolf Marku (PD) with 12,528 votes or 72.01 percent; Tonin Alimehilli (PD) with 11,793 votes or 72.47 percent.

Lushnje District: Tritan Shehu (PD) with 12,907 or 68.54 percent; Izet Shehu (PD) with 8,256 votes or 52.36 percent; Ihsan Cabej (PD) with 12,828 votes or 68.97 percent; Kujtim Gina (PD) with 9,666 votes or 53.50 percent.

Mat District: Shyqyri Cela (PD) with 11,003 votes or 56.59 percent; Agim Cupi (PD) with 10,686 votes or 64.58 percent.

Mirdite District: Ndue Gjika (PD) with 6,117 votes or 50.99 percent; Zef Brozi (PD) with 6,526 votes or 58.15 percent.

Pogradec District: Arben Mece (PD) with 14,609 votes or 66.66 percent; Jemin Gjana (PD) with 8,669 votes or 54.25 percent.

Puke District: Simon Puta (PD) with 6,385 votes or 55.89 percent; Marash Ibraj (PD) with 4,960 votes or 53.22 percent.

Sarande District: Thoma Mico (Human Rights Union) with 16,820 votes or 93.16 percent.

Skrapar District: Bashkim Caka (PSSH) with 7,732 votes or 65.97 percent; Ilir Meta (PSSH) with 6,182 votes or 58.30 percent.

Shkoder District: Pjeter Arbnori (PD) with 14,407 votes or 80.26 percent; Ahmet Osja (PD) with 14,426 votes or 85.57 percent; Ali Spahia (PD) with 15,119 votes or 84.89 percent; Gezim Luli (PD) with 12,551 votes or 77.50 percent; Dode Kacaj (PD) with 11,923 votes or 71.47 percent; Menduh Derguti (PD) with 14,819 votes or 80.52 percent; Pjeter Pepa (PD) with 13,844 votes or 79.50 percent; Kol Tonaj (PD) with 8,955 votes or 62.80 percent.

Tirana District: Ylli Vejsiu (PD) with 17,160 votes or 73.81 percent; Arben Imami (PD) with 17,734 votes or 73.43 percent; Dylber Vrioni (PD) with 13,160 votes or 71.61 percent; Skender Shkupi (PD) with 11,655 votes or 63.39 percent; Tomor Malasi (PD) with 12,881 votes or 71.99 percent; Dashamir Shehu (PD) with 15,586 votes or 78.68 percent; Aleksander Meksi (PD) with 13,678 votes or 75.96 percent; Maksim Konomi (PD) with 11,502 votes or 71.17 percent; Shaban Memia (PD) with 11,580 votes or 66.88 percent; Emanuel Heba (PD) with 12,795 votes or 69.46 percent; Petrit Kalakula (PD) with 13,411 votes or about 76 percent; Ferdinand Petrela (PD) with 10,238 votes or 64.42 percent.

Tropoje District: Besnik Mustafaj (PD) with 12,674 votes or 58.06 percent.

Vlore District: Ibrahim Vasjari (PD) with 10,111 votes or 67.15 percent; Abedin Elmazi (PD) with 12,099 votes or about 68 percent; Dhimiter Anagnosti (PD) with 10,571 votes or 55.36 percent; Afrim Jupi (PD) with 8,477 votes or 63.07 percent; Gramoz Pashko (PD) with 9,684 votes or 72.17 percent; Roland Tafili (PD) with 6,460 votes or 52.75 percent.

The second round of elections for deputies to the People's Assembly will be held on Sunday, 29 March. The following candidates will compete in this round:

In Berat: Peri Dishnica (PD) with 7,328 or 45.37 percent, and Xhemal Dauti (PSSH) with 7,518 votes or 46.54 percent.

In Elbasan: Gago Rrota (PD) with 5,774 votes or 37.13 percent, and Ndrim Hysa (PSSH) with 5,459 votes or about 36 percent.

In Gjirokastra: Genc Rruli (PD) with 8,564 votes or 47.22 percent, and Leontiev Cuci (PSSH) with 5,842 or 32.20 percent.

In Kolonje: Sotir Kokeri (PSSH) with 6,703 votes or 45.05 percent, and Uran Butka (PD) with 6,796 votes or 45.68 percent.

In Librazhd: Pellumb Malaj (PD) with 5,270 votes or 34.45 percent, and Qemal Alla (PSSH) with 5,819 or 38.04 percent.

Also in Librazhd: Kurt Xhepa (PD) with 7,073 votes or 43.83 percent, and Fatos Zharri (PSSH) with 6,892 votes or 44.71 percent.

In Permet: Vasil Gjika (PD) with 8,532 votes or 42.91 percent, and Ethem Kolleshi (PSSH) with 9,269 votes or 46.62 percent.

In Sarande: Gramoz Ruci (PSSH) with 4,691 votes or 30.72 percent, and Ridvan Peshkepja (PD) with 5,370 votes or 35.16 percent.

Also in Sarande: Limoz Dizdari (PSSH) with 3,493 votes or 25.68 percent, and Leka Toto (PD) with 6,332 votes or 46.54 percent.

In Tepelene: Blerim Cela (PD) with 5,476 votes or 45.39 percent, and Ethem Ruka (PSSH) with 4,686 votes or 38.83 percent.

Also in Tepelene: Sadik Bejko (PD) with 4,292 votes or 39.51 percent, and Xhafer Ruci (PSSH) with 4,720 votes or 43.45 percent.

The percentages of votes gained by the parties and the independent candidates according to the protocols of the constituency commissions is as follows:

Democratic Party	1,046,193 votes	62.0872 percent	79 deputies
Socialist Party	433,602 votes	25.7325 percent	6 deputies
Social Democratic Party	73,820 votes	4.38 percent	1 deputy
Republican Party	52,477 votes	3.11 percent	1 deputy
Human Rights Union	48,923 votes	2.90 percent	2 deputies
Agrarian Party	10,648 votes	0.63 percent	0 deputies
Communist Party	8,264 votes	0.49 percent	0 deputies
Christian Democratic Party	5,906 votes	0.35 percent	0 deputies
Independent Candidates	3,976 votes	0.24 percent	0 deputies
Ecology Party	823 votes	0.04 percent	0 deputies
Popular Alliance	284 votes	0.01 percent	0 deputies
Universal Party	121 votes	0.0072 percent	0 deputies EOT

On the basis of the Electoral Law, it emerges from the above results that the future People's Assembly will consist of 140 deputies. The composition of the constituency and polling station commissions remains the same for the second round, and the permits issued to Albanian and foreign observers for the first round remain valid. The electoral rolls for the second round will be compiled on the basis of the rolls for the first round.

After the second round, the Central Electoral Commission will announce the final results of the elections to the People's Assembly, including the candidates that will be elected to additional seats on the basis of the lists of candidates for the proportional representation of parties with deputies in the parliament.

Intellectuals Reject Socialists' Appeal

92P20200A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 15 Mar 92 p 1

[Article: "In Response to the Appeal of ZERI I POPULLIT"]

[Text] On 11 March 1992, the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT published an open letter, "Do Not Listen to That Voice... It Is the Voice of Discord," which said, among other things: "Dear Intellectual! Tell the people the truth. Do not lose your bearings; prove that you are mature and that you are the leaders of true democracy in Albania. In these difficult moments, the people need you more than ever." In response to the appeal of the Socialist Party organ we are publishing the following statement:

The Homeland Calls Us—Statement of a Group of 182 Intellectuals

We have become accustomed to seeing this pathetic appeal written in the pages of school books or textbooks by means of which the histories of the people of the world are told. This appeal, repeated over the centuries in various places and times, as a rule, was issued by either by sovereigns or by republicans in cases when the country was threatened by an external danger. However, history teaches us that, sometimes, internal struggles, outside the front line and outside the law, have brought the people more tragedies and damage than any foreign invasion. The long internal conflicts in Latin America, Asia, and, recently, in the former Soviet republics and in what used to be Yugoslavia are evidence of this fact.

Is our Albanian society of today faced with the danger of serious exploding tensions or is concern about such a danger unfounded and used only as a means of pressure to frighten people, for specific electoral aims?

A calm analysis, without partisan passions, reveals that on the eve of the elections in our country, all the political, social, and economic elements which are needed for an explosive "missile" with a national impact have been gathered together. The question is whether we will put the detonating spark to this "missile" or throw firefighting water on it. There is a widespread opinion that the free will of the people which will be expressed in the 22 March elections will resolve the deep crisis and that the exercise of this will is the golden key to the solution of the crisis. If this is the case, we should all sleep peacefully and await the elections along with the resolution of the crisis.

However, an objective analysis of the events which we are witnessing and the actions which we are observing indicates that the 22 March elections, in themselves, do not mean an automatic resolution of the crisis, regardless of the results of the elections. On the contrary, we are deeply convinced that: regardless of the results of the elections, there will be in Albania: either peace and quiet, and economic progress, or chaos, anarchy, and bitter political and social conflicts.

Here are our arguments in support of the above prediction:

1. It is true that, in countries with democratic traditions, the results of elections are accepted and respected by all. But this cannot be said and required in a place where the fierce dictatorship created a deep gap between the political awareness of the city and that of the village, which was expressed in the 31 March elections.

2. The disillusionment of the city by the political embarrassment of the village, after 31 March, almost resulted in tragic political conflicts. The fact that this did not happen was to the credit of the opposition which told the citizens, on the one hand, to have patience and, on the other hand, to hope for new, early elections.

3. In each country in which the government is determined by elections, the winning of two-thirds of the seats in parliament by a party will ensure its longevity and stability and will make it fully responsible for everything happening within the borders of the country which it governs.

Since this did not happen with the victorious Workers' Party government, it means that the 31 March results did not express the will of the most conscientious part of the population, its most politically active part, concentrated in the city.

4. The very evolution of the victorious party, the changing of its name and program and the rapprochement of this program with the opposition show that the opposition had the great historical merit not only to predict the road which the country must follow but also to have the courage to place itself, not without danger, at the forefront of the democratic processes.

Therefore, the real democratic opposition has the moral right to seek to be in the forefront of the leadership of the country.

5. The transformations which we are experiencing are so deep that we are correct in labelling them and treating them as revolutionary. History teaches us that all victorious revolutionary movements began in the cities; that the city has been their locomotive; that the village followed them later. On the basis of these undeniable facts of history, no political force has the moral right to play on the political inertia of the village and to use it to remain in power, disregarding the serious consequences which this persistent obstinacy might have for the fate of the country, because no government can govern without the support of the cities.

6. There is every hope because, this year, great changes have occurred in the mind of the peasant in the direction of his political emancipation. In him can be seen a revival of his traditional patriotism which was the spiritual basis of the involvement of our peasants in the armed movements for freedom, such as in the time of the Turkish rule and in the last world war against the occupier. However, if, to the great disadvantage of the country, the current chaotic situation is being brought about by forces which are now in power and presented to the peasants as a consequence of democracy and if the peasantry falls into this trap and, by its vote, hands over the government, once again, to those who brought the country to this state, then the country will undergo a long period of economic difficulties and political unrest, from which no one will emerge as victor.

According to all appearances, the urban population, which, on 1 April 1991, was persuaded by the appeals of the opposition for peace and quiet, because of the confidence and authority which the opposition enjoyed, might not be so disciplined this time. The events of recent days are the first signs of such a possibility. For example, in Pogradec and elsewhere, after a concealed and trained hand directed some irresponsible crowds

where it wanted them, unfortunately, a part of the population, desperate in their suffering, who were not convinced by the appeal of the opposition political forces, got caught up in the destructive rampages. We remind the instigators of these disturbances of the saying "he who sows the wind reaps the storm."

7. As was said earlier, an absolute majority in parliament would have been a good thing for the governing of the country, if the composition of the parliament were the faithful reflection of the real ratio of forces in the country. The period of almost one year since the Workers Party (later, the Socialist Party) was more than enough time for controlling this power-holding political force.

Unfortunately, the picture which it has left behind is quite different from what we would like. The disturbing pictures of the devastation which we saw on our television screens are evidence that this devastation, in a few months, exceeded the devastation caused by World War II in a four-year period. None of the people who lived through the war years and the years before and after the war recall any mob attacks on storehouses, shops, and schools. Now, we feel more like we are at war. The shocking devastation of schools in the center of Tirana for two days in a row, before the eyes of the forces of order, speaks clearly about state terrorism. While indignantly protesting this situation we conclude that one thing has been proven absolutely:

The political forces which came to power as a result of the 31 March elections, currently grouped in the Socialist Party, are no longer able to govern the country.

Therefore, how should we interpret the great insistence which this party exhibits, by means of the press and of its leaders, on winning once again?

Can we take seriously its claims that it will establish peace and order if it wins the elections?

Why hasn't it established the promised law and order by now since it is the absolute holder of legislative, executive, and juridical power? Wouldn't this be a proof of its strength and the best election propaganda in its favor?

The discussions about whether or not there are secret forces which devise or carry out scenarios are not very important for us. The indisputable fact is that:

The actual situation is depressing and nothing is being done about it. Like everywhere in the democratic world, the persons who are in power must bear the responsibility for this situation.

In our statement:

First of all, we call upon all the people not to repeat the mistake of 31 March but to vote for the opposition. In particular, we call upon the younger generation, to remain steadfast in their role as a vanguard of the

movement for democracy and to become the spirit of the campaign for the victory of the opposition. By voting for the opposition, they will bring to power a new government which will enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the active part of the population, an essential condition for political and social stability. Once the opposition comes to power it will be profoundly interested in establishing peace and order because it will be necessary to prove that democracy is not anarchy but peace and order. For the opposition, the achievement of this goal is linked with its very existence.

Voting for the opposition means that foreign aid will no longer be aid to keep up our spirits but a true commitment to build out of the ruins a new, efficient economy which will facilitate the gradual integration of our economy into the European economy.

Second, we call upon all honorable socialists, at the grassroots or in management bodies, to accept the idea of becoming a constructive opposition, which the country needs to protect every political and government group from degeneration. The current propaganda of the socialist press, which has become wholly offensive and illogical, should be stopped; it should be replaced by noninflammatory propaganda which will present the projects and programs of the party as an opposition party. This will result in the immediate reduction of existing political tensions; it will calm down the entire election campaign and will create real conditions for calmly accepting the results of the elections. We, the intellectuals signing below, would like, with all our hearts, to find in the ranks of the socialist leadership real men, true patriots, who would solemnly state their intention to become a constructive opposition, allowing the current opposition to test its governing skills.

This would be an historic act!

The people who would carry out this action would go down in history. A retreat, when the interest of the country requires it, is true heroism. An attack, when it wounds the country, is a criminal act

We are not asking the socialists to accept defeat in a duel, but to accept an invitation for conciliation, for shunning a duel, and for progress in a fraternal manner.

One thing is certain. The noble retreat which we propose to you will create the most powerful moral basis for the union and reconciliation of all those strata and groups which currently feel that they are in a state of hostility.

We will all win as a result of this!

Albania and the entire community of Albanians in the world will be victorious.

Members of the Academy of Sciences:

1. Bajram Preza; 2. Bedri Dedja; 3. Besim Daja; 4. Petrit Gace; 5. Selaudin Bektishi; 6. Teki Bicoku; 7. Ylli Popa

Professors:

8. Agim Popa; 9. Bujar Hoxha; 10. Fehmi Shehu; 11. Pandeli Cina; 12. Koco Gillozheni; 13. Panajot Boga; 14. Petraq Petro; 15. Selim Islami; 16. Shejket Ndoqi; 17. Viron Kola

Doctors, Docents, Senior Scientific Collaborators, Masters of Science:

18. Afrim Tabaku, K. Sh. [Master of Science], Laboratory Head; 19. Adrian Shehu, K. Sh.; 20. Agim Berdulla, Docent; 21. Agim Budo, K. Sh.; 22. Agim Karcana, Docent, Department Head; 23. Agim Shehu, Docent; 24. Akile Kero, K. Sh., Laboratory Head; 25. Arben Dushi, K. Sh.; 26. Arben Santo, Docent, Department Head; 27. Arben Tashko, Docent, Faculty Dean; 28. Artan Goda, Docent; 29. Alfred Pritanji, K. Sh.; 30. Agron Lufi, Docent; 31. Angjelin Shtjefni, K. Sh.; 32. Baftjar Nevruzi, K. Sh., Assistant Doctor [as published]; 33. Bashkim Resuli, Docent; 34. Bedri Bylyku, K. Sh.; 35. Besnik Gjonec, K. Sh.; 36. Eduart Gjika, K. Sh.; 37. Burhan Cela, Docent; 38. Durim Bebeci, Docent; 39. Enver Faja, Docent, Chief Architect; 40. Esat Emiri, Docent; 41. Fatos Adami, K. Sh.; 42. Fatos Harito, K. Sh.; 43. Fatos Klosi, Docent, Department Head; 44. Fatmir Elmazi, K. Sh.; 45. Fedhon Meksi, K. Sh.; 46. Flamur Zela, Docent; 47. Frida Shahini, K. Sh.; 48. Gezim Hajdari, K. Sh., Department Head; 49. Gezim Mukli, Docent; 50. Gezim Pepi, Doctor; 51. Gjergj Caushi, K. Sh.; 52. Hasan Karagiozi, Docent; 53. Hysen Agolli, Docent; 54. Ilo Mele, K. Sh.; 55. Ismail Demneri, Docent; 56. Ismail Sulo, K. Sh.; 57. Isuf Reci, Docent; 58. Isuf Sukaj, Docent; 59. Jakup Agalliu, Docent, Assistant Dean; 60. Jani Teta, K. Sh.; 61. Jolanda Koci, K. Sh.; 62. Kasem Bokshi, Docent; 63. Koste Koci, Docent, Department Head; 64. Kudret Velca, Doctor; 65. Kristo Pano, Docent; 66. Luan Karcana, B. V. Sh. [Senior Scientific Collaborator]; 67. Luigi Gjoka, K. Sh.; 68. Llazar Xhajanka, B. V. Sh.; 69. Mahmut Shushku, K. Sh.; 70. Maks Cikuli, K. Sh.; 71. Mehdi Agolli, Docent; 72. Mentor Petrela, K. Sh.; 73. Muharrem Dragovaja, Docent; 74. Muharrem Seleri, Docent; 75. Mihal Prifti, K. Sh.; 76. Murat Manehasa, Doctor; 77. Myzafer Cela, Docent; 78. Nikolla Kocani, K. Sh.; 79. Nestor Therecka, Docent; 80. Nikolla Qafoku, K. Sh.; 81. Nikolla Verdha, Docent; 82. Petraq Marango, K. Sh.; 83. Pellumb Carcani, B. V. Sh.; 84. Petrit Barani, K. Sh.; 85. Petrit Xhaka, Doctor; 86. Petrit Rama, Doctor; 87. Petrit Dodbiba, K. Sh.; 88. Petraq Vasili, Docent; 89. Pirro Veizi, K. Sh., Department Head; 90. Pjerin Preka, K. Sh., Department Head; 91. Pal Xhumari, K. Sh.; 92. Pellumb Karagiozi, Docent; 93. Pjerin Radovani, K. Sh.; 94. Qemal Mandia, Docent; 95. Qevqep Kambo, Docent; 96. Rajmond Sharko, K. Sh.; 97. Rajmond Ikonomi, B. V. Sh.; 98. Rahmi Korbi, Docent, Faculty Dean; 99. Ramiz Topi, K. Sh.; 100. Robert Magapi, K.

Sh.; 101. Roland Pinguli, Docent; 102. Sefedin Xhemalce, Docent; 103. Sotir Rrapo, K. Sh.; 104. Sul Kodra, Docent; 105. Sulejman Zhguli, Doctor; 106. Skender Duresi, Doctor; 107. Skender Malja, B. V. Sh.; 108. Skender Koca, Docent; 109. Skender Xhiku, Docent; 110. Spiro Boci, Docent; 111. Spiro Duka, Docent; 112. Shyqyri Subashi, Docent; 113. Taqo Adami, B. V. Sh.; 114. Tatjana Dishnica, K. Sh.; 115. Tatjana Harito, K. Sh.; 116. Vladimir Spaho, K. Sh.; 117. Ylli Bujati, K. Sh.; 118. Ylli Kolonja, Docent; 119. Thoma Kristo, Doctor

Intellectuals In the Arts and in the Cultural Field:

120. Ali Abdihojha, Writer; 121. Arben Kallamata, Journalist; 122. Ali Oseku, Painter; 123. Andrea Varfi, Writer; 124. Alush Shima, Painter; 125. Agim Qirjaqi, Actor; 126. Agim Zajmi, Painter; 127. Alfred Bualoti, Actor; 128. Ahmet Pasha, Actor; 129. Artan Seja, Actor; 130. Bashkim Ahmeti, Painter; 131. Bashkim Dervishi, Painter; 132. Englantina Mandia, Writer; 133. Edi Hila, Painter; 134. Fatos Kola, Sculptor; 135. Gazmend Leka, Painter; 136. Hektor Pustina, Assistant; 137. Kin Dushi, Writer; 138. Kujtim Cashku, Film Director; 139. Kol Jakova, Writer; 140. Leka Bungo, Film Director; 141. Llazar Siliqi, Writer; 142. Mehmet Elezi, Journalist; 143. Merkur Bozgo, Actor; 144. Miltiadh Kutali, Art Teacher; 145. Neshat Tozaj, Writer; 146. Niko Progra, Painter; 147. Naxhi Bakalli, Painter; 148. Ndrim Xhepa, Actor; 149. Ramadan Sokoli, Musicologist; 150. Rikard Ljarja, Film Director; 151. Taulant Pustina, Painter; 152. Tefik Caushi, Researcher; 153. Vehbi Skenderi, Writer; 154. Vasan Lame, Actor

Well-Known Intellectuals in Production and Other Fields:

155. Ana Kolevica, Teacher; 156. Anastas Suli, Psychiatrist; 157. Argjend Tafaj, Clinic Head; 158. Ardian Muco, Teacher; 159. Bedri Myderrizi, Physician; 160. Elmaz Cocoli, Physician; 161. Evan Koco, Teacher; 162. Enis Buletini, Biochemist; 163. Fatos Hazizaj, Biochemist; 164. Gezim Kallciu, Chief Engineer; 165. Gazmend Velcani, Surgeon; 166. Grigor Gjika, Lawyer; 167. Gjergj Minga, Laboratory Head; 168. Idajet Cocoli, Teacher; 169. Idajet Farka, Factory Director; 170. Kristaq Luarasi, Mining Engineer; 171. Mihal Hanxhari, Former Director; 172. Mihal Hobdari, Engineer; 173. Mihal Tase, Physician, Chief of Services; 174. Mirush Strazimi, Engineer; 175. Muzafer Janina, Cardiologist; 176. Pavlo Koca, Teacher; 177. Niko Leka, Teacher; 178. Sami Manehasa, Mining Engineer; 179. Sezai Disha, Engineer; 180. Sitki Bushati, Physician; 181. Vita Adami, Engineer; 182. Zija Shkodra, Historian

Note: Out of haste, the group charged with alphabetizing the names of the signers of the statement of the 182 intellectuals omitted the following names: 1. Besim Elezi, Profesor, Department Head; 2. Manol Konomi, Lawyer; 3. Myslim Islami, Docent, Museum Director; 4. Spiro Qirko, Cardiologist; 5. Veli Zogu, Cardiologist, Surgeon. We apologize for the omission.

Miners Announce Decision To Strike 26 March*AU2603193492 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Today at 1730 GMT in front of the crowd gathered at the Gorubso Shareholders Building in Madan, Dimitur Mladenov, chairman of the Central Strike Committee, announced that the decision to begin the strike was adopted by the committee late last night. The decision will be enforced at 2000 GMT when the third miners' shift begins.

The announcement was made in connection with the arrival in Madan of Dimitur Dimov, chairman of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union, who briefed the Central Strike Committee on the negotiations conducted with the Council of Ministers on 25-26 March. The Central Strike Committee decided not to wait for the arrival of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, who was supposed to arrive in Madan and negotiate with the Strike Committee between 2000-2100.

Dimitrov Arrives, Meets Miners*AU2703092892 Sofia BTA in English 0907 GMT
27 Mar 92*

[Text] Sofia, March 27 (BTA)—The miners in Madan (southeastern Bulgaria) called a strike late last night and the night shift refused to go down into the mines. They did not wait for Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov's arrival. The government is particularly concerned because the miners threatened to take their wives and children into the mines. That is why Prime Minister Dimitrov and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Vekil Vanov left for Madan yesterday afternoon with the intention to spare no effort in reaching a compromise. They were delayed because they stopped over at the Maritsa-Iztok Coal Mining Complex for a meeting with employees, the national radio announced.

After his arrival in Madan, the prime minister answered many questions put by the miners and started negotiations with the strike committee. The negotiations among the Miners Trade Union with the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, the government, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the sectoral industrial association will continue in Sofia today. An agreement has been reached to pay miners the wages and downtime payment that are due to them for the November-March period.

At the same time miners at the Chelopech Mine and Podkrepa's regional branch in the Maritsa-Iztok Complex announced yesterday that they will not go on strike because a strike is no solution to the problems of ore-mining in this country.

The PODKREPA daily quotes Dimitur Dimov, president of the Podkrepa Miners Federation, as saying that the strike will be called off if the prime minister accepts the resignation of Minister of Industry and Trade Ivan Pushkarov. The

Podkrepa Labour Confederation will convene a confederative council on April 6 to review its position on the cabinet's policy.

Miners Justify Continuing Strike*AU2703130892 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1102 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Text] During yesterday's meeting between the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union Federation and the government, no mention was made in the demands made by the Central Strike Committee of any increase in miners' wages. This is pointed out in a statement by the federation received by the national radio.

The federation does not defend unprofitable production enterprises and does not oppose the market economy. As a principal representative of the miners in Bulgaria [passage indistinct], we are obliged to put a number of questions, such as this, for example: Is there a sound economic justification for the total closure of uranium mining, and what are the government's intentions concerning social insurance and retraining the workers in this sector?

As for the accusations leveled against the miners, they are made [passage indistinct]. The framework agreement for which the government is a guarantor has not been fulfilled for the last seven months. For these reasons, the Central Strike Committee of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union Federation is renewing the nationwide strike until the issue is resolved of the miners' basic rights to a job and a living.

Burgas Petrochemical Workers Stage Token Strike*AU2703131492 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1102 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Text] Today the Podkrepa trade union members at the Burgas Petrochemical Combine showed understanding toward the government's problems and the situation in the country and, instead of starting the effective strike that had been planned as of today, declared a four-day token strike. They insist that the Council of Ministers appoints a new board of directors for the Neftekhim Joint Stock Company, because the existing management has not managed to cope with the serious situation facing the Burgas Combine. The independent trade union at Neftekhim expresses solidarity with their demands.

KNSB Reacts to Zhelev Letter to Podkrepa Miners*AU2603165992 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian
23 Mar 92 p 1*

[Letter from leadership of Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria; place and date not given: "The Country's Interests Stand Above Short-Term Political Goals"]

[Text] To the miners, metalworkers, and power workers who are members of the Confederation of Independent

Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB], through Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria.

Dear colleagues:

We have learned from the mass media that the respected president of the republic has conveyed his gratitude for the labor achievement of the Bulgarian miners during the energy crisis. To speak honestly, it is a little disconcerting to be thanked just for doing one's job, but never mind, that is presidential policy.

What is highly disturbing, however, is that the president expresses his gratitude... through a Podkrepa Miners Federation. If anyone uninformed of the internal party flirtations within the Union of Democratic Forces learns about this expression of thanks, he will naturally think that you, the KNSB miners, were on effective strike during the energy crisis, or at least that you only pretended to work! As far as we know, this is completely at variance with the truth.

We cannot say whether the president is aware that you, the KNSB miners, are at least 10 times as many as the Podkrepa miners, or whether he it has dawned on him that it would be a sad day for Bulgaria if you KNSB miners decided to strike. However, we do know that when it is a matter of a duty done, when the matter concerns Bulgaria, you cannot be divided into different groups!

Accordingly, dear colleagues, in the belief that our country's interests stand above short-term political goals, and in the hope that a minor technical error has been made, permit us to thank you in the name of the Bulgarian president for the same achievement for which the Podkrepa miners have already received his thanks.

You must be aware that history is not written by the politicians of today, but by tomorrow's historians.

Diana Damyanova, Prof. Svetoslav Stavrov, and Ivan Neykov
deputy chairmen of the KNSB.

Ganev 'Criticizes' Dimitrov in TV Interview

AU2603170292 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
23 Mar 92 p 1

[Dimitrana Aleksandrova report]

[Text] In a television interview Stoyan Ganev suggested the appointment of two new deputy prime ministers—for economic reform and for local administration.

The foreign minister criticized Filip Dimitrov, who maintains that he should not have permanent deputies—the so-called "linear" cabinet.

The prime minister has not changed his view that each minister should do his job without having a person responsible for each branch, but it would be no wonder if changes are made. The leaders of the parliamentary

group of the Union of Democratic Forces normally defend Stoyan Ganev, an informed source commented.

"I do not want to be the prime minister's deputy," Stoyan Ganev said.

BSP Deputies Urge Zhelev To Veto Land Law

AU2603194992 Sofia BTA in English 1916 GMT
26 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 26 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev today received MP's [member of parliament] of the parliamentary group of the opposition Socialist Party (the former communists). They set forth their objections to the amendments to the Land Act, describing the act as unfair, the spokesman for the president said.

The socialist MP's called on the president to exercise a suspensory veto and to return the act for reviewing. They invited Mr. Zhelev to visit their constituencies and familiarize himself with the farmers' problems on the spot.

The amendments passed last week after heated debates, (the Land Act itself was passed by the Grand National Assembly last year). Under the amendments the land will be returned to its owners in its physical boundaries. Bulgarian citizens abroad will also get their land back. The land which can be obtained through legal transactions is limited to 30 hectares. The cooperative farms set up in the 1950's and 1960's and the existing farming cooperatives will be liquidated. According to MP's of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces the amendments will help introduce market principles in agriculture.

Radio, TV Unions Attack Committee's Decisions

AU2603090392 Sofia BTA in English 2107 GMT
25 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 25 (BTA)—This evening the Radio and TV trade unions issued a strongly worded declaration against the decision of parliament's Radio and Television Committee, which will be put to the vote at the National Assembly, that Bulgarian Radio and Bulgarian Television be wound up and two new institutions, national television and national radio, be established in their place. If parliament approves this decision, all employees of the two electronic media will be dismissed and there will be new appointments.

The trade unions accused the parliamentary committee of incompetence and threatened to demand the resignation of its chairman, Mr. Mikhail Nedelchev MP of the Union of Democratic Forces. Basically, the trade unions argue that the decision comes at a time when private broadcasting is not yet allowed and people with a unique occupation may become unemployed.

"You proved incapable of solving this problems as politicians and as Bulgarians," the declaration reads and calls into question the defensibility of selling frequencies to five foreign radio stations: the Voice of America, Radio France International, the BBC, Radio Free Europe and Deutsche Welle. The leadership of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists also issued a declaration objecting to the Committee's decision.

Calfa Discusses Transpetrol, Power Sharing

AU2703101792 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 24 Mar 92 pp 1, 14

[Interview with CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa by Branislav Janik; place and date not given: "The Transpetrol Company Is Allegedly a Purely Legal Matter"]

[Text] Prague—Yesterday we published the first installment of the interview with Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa dealing with disunity within the government. Today, we are publishing the second installment of this interview.

[Janik] I will return to the problem of the Transpetrol company. Was this one of those "disharmonious tones?" In Bratislava, the president expressed quite a critical stance on this problem....

[Calfa] Having changed the Constitution, we also changed state ownership. That is, we have federal ownership and republican ownership. According to the power-sharing law, the federation was left with what is necessary for its functioning, and all the rest belongs to the republics. At the same time, there is a sentence that a Federal Assembly law will define the ownership of crude oil pipelines, gas pipelines, and their distribution networks. That is, the constitution does not assert that they are either federation or republican property, it states that a law will decide it.

[Janik] But this law does not exist as yet....

[Calfa] It is true that such a law should have been passed immediately. Unfortunately, this is not what happened, and the matter remained suspended in a vacuum, so to speak. Instead of a law, deputy ministers of industry decided on the establishment of the Transpetrol company. However, the Federal Assembly issued a resolution in December, stating that this establishment was unconstitutional, since the Constitution states that it is the Federal Assembly, and not the republics, who has the right to decide this matter.

[Janik] Is the long-lasting and complicated dispute over the Transpetrol company dragging on too long? It was established in February, parliament issued a resolution in December, and the company is still functioning.

[Calfa] Yes, it has dragged out for a long time, there is no denying it. Parliament called on the Federal Government to settle the matter in conformity with the Constitution. This is why we prepared a bill that could solve this. The Slovak Government in fact rejected our bill, defending its position by saying that the bill should have been based on the assumption that whatever does not belong to the federation belongs to the republics, and that we must accept what the republics have agreed upon, and include it in the draft. In short, the republics' property is involved here, and the Transpetrol company is a company in which the republics have a share. I am not going to give lengthy explanations of legal questions to the NARODNA OBRODA readers. According to the

law we can do one thing: expropriate the existing Transpetrol company and establish a new one. This is speculation from a purely legal point of view.

[Janik] Maybe. Why, then, are we considering the participation of the federation in the new company?

[Calfa] This is a matter of strategic importance for the country and its economy. We are not concerned with the fact that we have taken something away from the republics, but we are afraid of what might arise in certain extreme situations.

[Janik] Please do not be angry, but I too am a little sensitive to the words "jeopardy, danger, and crude oil flows in one direction—from Slovakia." Do you really perceive this problem in this way?

[Calfa] It is difficult for me to speak in favor of one or the other republic, since I am immediately criticized for that by one or the other. However, I believe that there should be one company on the whole of the territory. I am responsible for the entire CSFR. It is really true that crude oil flows to the CSFR in one direction—through one set of pipelines. You will certainly recognize the fact that if there is only one pipeline, then there is a permanent danger during each breakdown. We are trying to eliminate this danger by building pipelines going in the other direction. I do not perceive this problem as a problem between the Czech and the Slovak Republics.

[Janik] What is the official standpoint of the Czech Government? Federal Economy Minister Dlouhy said that the Czech Government adopted the Federal Government's standpoint. But five days later Czech Deputy Prime Minister Strasky said that he was surprised by the Federal Government's decision.

[Calfa] At the first meeting, a coordinator, Czech Minister Sabata, in charge of communication with Federal and Slovak Governments and of foreign relations, was present as usual. He adopted a standpoint that an agreement between the two republics on the Transpetrol company should be given priority. Czech Privatization Minister Jezek was also present though, and he supported Minister Dlouhy's standpoint, who had presented the proposal. At that moment, Minister Sabata was silent; he was not opposed to the proposal. We understood this as consent. When Minister Sabata informed the Czech Government, they apparently were not satisfied with Minister Jezek's standpoint. This may be the reason why Mr. Strasky is speaking about a surprise. I spoke with Prime Minister Pithart, and we reached an agreement that only one member of the Czech Government will present its standpoint in the future.

[Janik] What is your personal opinion on the Transpetrol company case?

[Calfa] At a government meeting I said that despite the fact that a purely legal solution is involved here, this solution would not be accepted and would create a huge national problem. All the Slovak political parties will

take advantage of this situation, saying that the federation interprets the law to Slovakia's detriment. Well, the government was not unanimous during the vote, yet the majority won.

Dienstbier on CSCE Nagorno-Karabakh Mission

*LD2703001792 Prague Federal 1 Television Network
in Czech 2130 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Studio interview with CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier by unidentified correspondent on 26 March—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Minister, you attended the CSCE meeting in Helsinki at which the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was discussed. Czechoslovakia has been entrusted with an important mission in the resolution of this conflict. Do you think that there exists at present a political will on the part between Armenia and Azerbaijan to settle the conflict?

[Dienstbier] I spoke several times with both the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers. In Helsinki we had talks with them, but this time jointly. Previously, it was only I who had talks with them. Afterward, when it became necessary to reach a consensus and a compromise solution regarding the formulation of a communique, I, along with Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Margaret Uglass—that is the former, the current, and the future chairman—sat with them for two and a half hours. We succeeded in drafting a text that both sides were willing to accept. Therefore, the will exists here, and I believe that the most important thing is to ensure that both sides in the conflict understand that no amount of violence can resolve this problem.

[Correspondent] Despite this, the precedents are not good—for instance, the question of the settlement of the conflict in Yugoslavia. Do you think that the CSCE mechanisms can be more effective this time?

[Dienstbier] Above all, we must not create any illusion that the conflict will be resolved quickly. The thing is to ensure that a negotiating process begins and that all sides agree that they will sit around a table and discuss the matter, along with eight other participants in the Helsinki process. Moreover, the CSCE will be operating here in the role of a coordinator jointly with NATO. We are even in contact with Iran, which is trying to mediate in the conflict.

[Correspondent] Could you tell us how you assess Iran's initiative? Do you not see in it a danger that this important initiative could help to ensure a more marked influence for Islam in this area?

[Dienstbier] What kind of influence for Islam? After all, the Azerbaijanis are Muslims. If you have in mind the influence of Islamic fundamentalism then this is different question. At present no one has as yet succeeded in resolving this conflict, and we are now going to

attempt it as coordinators in cooperation with the United Nations and all others.

[Correspondent] Another thing: A number of other regional conflicts are emerging in the former Soviet Union. Do you think that there exists a rather strong likelihood that they could grow into a more extensive conflict?

[Dienstbier] It is exactly when I hear some people ask why we bother about Karabakh that one needs to understand that each such conflict may be a huge fuse that could spread the conflict throughout the whole territory, not only of the former Soviet Union but the whole arc from the Balkans up to the heart of that collapsed state in which democratic forces today are endeavoring very intensively and very hard to build a democratic society. This is why it is terribly important that problems such as Karabakh are tackled at their very inception, or that they are at least isolated. I have asked for certain conditions before undertaking my trip, which I hope will be met. As I have said, I do not have any great illusions, but it is necessary that all sides sit around one table; if we achieve this then it will be a success. The biggest outcome of the compromise reached at Helsinki was that Nagorno-Karabakh representatives will take part in the talks.

[Correspondent] Minister, thank you for your visit to our studio and for your assessment.

More Diplomatic Activity With CIS Recommended

*LD2603224792 Prague CSTK in English 2028 GMT
26 Mar 92*

[Text] Prague March 26 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak Cabinet recommended at its session today to intensify diplomatic activity with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The cabinet took note of proposed amendments to agreements on trade-economic relations and scientific-technological cooperation between the Czechoslovak Government and those of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, and Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The draft amendments concern the most-favoured-nation clause to be applied to products coming from these countries.

The cabinet agreed with an amendment to the 1990 trade agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which provides for payments in convertible currencies in bilateral trade so far maintained on the clearing basis in USD.

The cabinet decided that Czechoslovakia will ask for postponement of its yearly membership fee in the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) worth \$2.4 million. The cabinet asked Economics Minister

Vladimir Dlouhy and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier to seek more efficient ways of the country's participation in the FAO.

Greater German Investment in Slovakia Advocated

*LD2603210192 Prague CSTK in English 1914 GMT
26 Mar 92*

[Text] Prague March 26 (CSTK)—Deputies of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (Parliament) and the German Bundestag today said the development of French-German relations after World War II could serve as a model for relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Parliamentarians, discussing here concrete ways of implementing the Czechoslovak-German Friendship Treaty, signed in Prague February 27, met with the head of the Czech-Slovak President's Office, Karel Schwarzenberg.

Schwarzenberg said Czechoslovak-German relations should be improved not only at parliamentary level, but particularly at the level of regions and communities. Schwarzenberg called for greater German investments in Slovakia, adding that German companies have shown little interest in them so far.

Czechoslovak and German Parliamentarians met in Dresden on March 2 in order to clarify some terms contained in the treaty.

No Agreement Reached on Polish Debt Settlement

*AU2603170092 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 24 Mar 92 p 1*

[Interview with Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay by correspondent HYK in the "On the Telephone" column; place and date not given]

[Text] [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] What is the latest development regarding the settlement of the Polish debit balance toward Czechoslovakia?

[Baksay] Talks on converting the CSFR's surplus from transferable rubles to dollars were held in Warsaw a few days ago. The Czechoslovak credit balance stands at 283.6 million transferable rubles. Another part of the surplus is made up of the credit balance of noncommercial payments, on the size of which no agreement has been reached thus far. According to our estimates, it amounts to 45.7 million transferable rubles, which means that the CSFR's total credit balance toward Poland is 329.3 million transferable rubles. The two sides assumed that it would be possible to eliminate this surplus by means of Polish goods deliveries to the CSFR, even at ruble prices (for example, deliveries of Polish cargo ships for the Czechoslovak seagoing fleet). The deadline set for these deliveries was 15 March 1992. In view of the fact that the proposed method did not result in the elimination of the surplus, the Czechoslovak side proposed that the two sides agree on a coefficient for

converting the Czechoslovak credit balance from transferable rubles to U.S. dollars. Owing to different approaches to the conversion coefficient, however, no agreement has been reached. The talks will continue in the near future and both sides will seek an adequate solution to the problem of Czechoslovak accounts receivable in Poland.

Trade Official Denies Arms Exported to Burma

*AU2703102992 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 25 Mar 92 p 3*

[Interview with Stefan Glezgo, director of the Office for Control Over Military Trade, KOVOM, in the CSFR Ministry of Foreign Trade, by Ivo Horak; place and date not given: "I Have Not Issued a Permit"]

[Text] [Horak] In a recently published article "The Omnipol Does Business With Burma," LIDOVE NOVINY carried information about an Omnipol contract with the Burma junta. Four days later, on a BBC program, Vaclav Havel denied exports of military material to Burma, and his spokesman, Michael Zentovsky, said that the president receives this type of information from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. Does this mean that you do not know about the trade with Burma?

[Glezgo] I can only confirm that the CSFR has not and does not export arms to Burma. I have held my post since April 1991, and during my entire term I have not given Omnipol permission to deal with Burma.

[Horak] Can you tell us what specific information you have about Omnipol and the PROTOTYPA company contract with Burma signed prior to your assuming office?

[Glezgo] It concerns a contract on providing technical assistance in modifying a submachine gun manufactured in Burma that was signed in 1990. Two modified prototypes were returned to the Burmese side at the beginning of January 1991. Since April 1991, the "Principles for Permitting Foreign Trade Activities, Issuing Licenses in the Military Material Sector, and Founding an Inter-Resort Commission," approved by the government in March 1991, have been implemented. Having assessed in the Inter-Resort Commission the Omnipol submission asking for permission to continue in negotiations regarding the technical assistance to Burma, we assumed a negative stand in November last year.

[Horak] How do you proceed in the instances when you learn in the press or from other sources about deals between Czechoslovak companies and the "problem" countries? What have you done in this case?

[Glezgo] We verify whether such deals actually took place, i.e. whether the companies received permits to conduct them. In this particular instance, we found that no Czechoslovak company received a permit to do business with Burma. If the business actually took place

after April 1991, it is evident that a crime was committed. Of course, that is in the jurisdiction of a different body....

State Bank Lowers Discount Rate by 0.5 Percent

AU2603200392 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech
25 Mar 92 p 1

[JAK report: "The State Bank's Representatives Did Not Show Up"]

[Text] Prague—The Czechoslovak State Bank (SBCS) Banking Council decided at its meeting in Brno on Monday [23 March] to make the following changes in the SBCS' interest policy:

- The SBCS will reduce its discount interest rate by 0.5 percent to 9.0 percent as of 25 March.
- It will abolish the interest ceiling, which currently stands at 17 percent, as of 1 April 1992. This ceiling is determined by the maximum deviation between interest on loans and the discount rate, .

According to SBCS Governor Josef Tosovsky (without political affiliation), the State Bank is prepared to reintroduce the interest ceiling if the banks use this opportunity to excessively increase their interest rates.

Vaclav Klaus (Civic Democratic Party), CSFR deputy prime minister and finance minister, met with the directors general of the most important CSFR commercial banks in Prague on Monday. According to a CSTK report, restriction limits and the level of current interest rates were the subject of their discussions.

Yesterday, Klaus told our reporter that SBCS (which is our central bank) representatives were also invited to the meeting. However, they "did not, unfortunately, show up." According to Klaus, the outcome of the Prague meeting will not have an immediate effect. A qualitative agreement was reached; that is, it is necessary to reduce interest rates (both deposit interest rates on citizens' deposits and credit interest rates). A simultaneous adjustment would, in the opinion of Klaus, have to be made to both these interest rates. "We agreed to meet in Bratislava in the first week of April. We should all prepare quantitative figures before the meeting so that our discussions will be specific," said Klaus.

Last week, Tosovsky expressed his disagreement with Klaus' apparent disapproval of SBCS restrictions, through which the bank shows little respect for the extraordinary need for money to administer purchases and sales within the framework of large and small-scale privatization. The federal deputy prime minister and finance minister said the following: "One of the biggest problems I now have is to precisely hit the spot in our economy where this inflexible point is, the point at which the purchases and sales curve changes its shape. We are continually waiting for this moment so that we can react to it in time—no sooner, no later—in the

government's economic policy and the bank's monetary policy. We are seeking an opportunity in which expansion (in this case, for example, credit expansion) will have a chance; that is, when it is manifested more in an increase in real economic activity rather than in mere price increases. We are drawing closer to this point, which—with all probability—we have not reached yet. There is a certain duality in our economy. On the one hand, we have a state sector, while on the other hand, we are developing the private sector. In view of this duality, it is necessary to give very careful consideration to credit policy. We are holding a discussion on the pace of the increase in the money supply in the economy. The argument about the need for money for transactions associated with large and small-scale privatization is only one of the several arguments we have. But this would require a detailed expert economic explanation," stated Klaus.

Bankruptcy Seen for 90% of Investment Funds

LD2603211292 Prague CSTK in English 1718 GMT
26 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 26 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak parliament's plan and budget committees today turned down a government bill on investment companies and investment (privatization) funds.

Milos Zeman, chairman of the House of Nations Plan and Budget Committee, told CSTK the major shortcoming that cannot be removed is that the bill has been submitted several months after hundreds of investment funds came into being. According to the federal finance ministry officials, 90 per cent of investment funds are estimated to go bankrupt. Admitting the necessity to have a law on investment funds to prevent speculation, Zeman, known as an opponent of coupon privatization, said the basic mistake is privatization through coupons as such.

In the coupon privatization, thousands of state-owned companies will be turned into private joint-stock ones partially by selling off coupons each worth 1,000 crowns (\$33) to individuals over 18 years of age who, after registration, may trade their coupons for company shares or the shares of investment privatization funds.

The registration ended on February 29 and the preliminary round, in which individuals can trade their coupons for shares of investment funds, is currently under way. Individuals can trade coupons for shares of particular companies in the first round to be started May 18.

Carnogursky Says Gabcikovo Dam Work To Continue

LD2603221792 Prague CSTK in English 2051 GMT
26 Mar 92

[Text] Prague, March 26 (CSTK)—The Gabcikovo Dam on the territory of Slovakia must be completed, Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky told CSTK here today. "The decision of the Hungarian Parliament of March 24, that

their government has been authorized to withdraw from the interstate agreement with Czechoslovakia on the construction of the Gabčíkovo Dam is nothing new for us. It does not mean that we shall not put Gabčíkovo into operation," he told a public meeting. "We are forced to complete the Gabčíkovo Dam...as the Hungarian side has violated the 1977 agreement and stopped work on the dam complex," he went on to say.

According to the Slovak Premier, work on the dam has been completed at 90 per cent on the territory of Slovakia. "We do not see any reason why the project should not be put into operation," he stressed, adding that the advantages of Gabčíkovo will be greater than its disadvantages.

The Hungarian Parliament has authorized the government to withdraw from the 1977 Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement as well as from agreements concluded on its realisation unless Czechoslovakia discontinues as of April 30 all work allegedly at variance with the agreement.

Under the 1977 agreement, the Gabčíkovo (Slovakia)-Nagymaros (Hungary) project included the construction of two dams on the Danube River to prevent annual floods in the area and improve navigation. In 1989, the Hungarian side stopped all work on the project for environmental reasons and since then the two sides have been deadlocked in controversies over the project.

Carnogursky on Possible Coalition Partners

AU2503191792 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with Christian Democratic Movement Chairman Jan Carnogursky by Alena Melicharkova in the "Election Interviews" column; place and date not given: "We Want Our Own Little Star and Chair"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Melicharkova] In the event of a successful outcome of elections for the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], with whom would you consider a government coalition possible?

[Carnogursky] Let us consider only parties that are represented in the Slovak National Council today. I would not be willing to enter into a coalition with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] as long as Vladimir Meciar occupies the leading position there. I have two reasons for that: Vladimir Meciar has proved to be a destabilizing element, and I am convinced that he would introduce unease into the next government. In my opinion, he also jeopardizes compliance with civic rights in Slovakia, which is a priority for us, by the manner of his arguments and the aims he proclaims. I must say that the Slovak National Party, too, raises the question in me whether it would be a suitable coalition partner, especially in view of the fact that, apparently, its policy would drive Slovakia into internal and external conflicts.

[Melicharkova] What about left-wing parties?

[Carnogursky] A few weeks ago I said that I do not rule out anyone, not even the Party of the Democratic Left. I regard as very useful for the development of Slovakia the fact that Alexander Dubcek and the Social Democratic Party, which might set the tone on the Slovak left in some ideological form, have come to an agreement. The Slovak political scene has thereby drawn closer to the European political scene, which is something Slovakia badly needs.

Slovak Parliament Debates Meciar's STB Ties

LD2503164492 Prague CSTK in English 2115 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 24 (CSTK)—Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), was registered in STB [Czechoslovak Secret Police] secret police files under No. 31 048 as a secret STB collaborator under the code-name "Doctor," according to a report of the Slovak parliament defence and security committee, discussed in the Slovak parliament today. The report, dealing with the activities of the Slovak Interior Ministry after November 17, 1989, was read by the committee chairman, Frantisek Javorsky. (Meciar was Slovak interior minister from January 1990 to June 1990.)

The report said the committee had received information from the Federal Security and Information Service (FBIS) in Bratislava that two file cards with Meciar's name had been found at the federal Foreign Ministry. The report said Meciar's screening by the federal parliament commission investigating the events of November 17, 1989 did not uncover his name in the files as pages containing information about his links to the STB had been torn out of the register. According to the report, Meciar is suspected as having abused his powers as Slovak interior minister in order to take revenge on a Slovak policeman who had voiced objections to Meciar's appointment as interior minister.

HZDS deputy Milan Secansky told the Slovak parliament session Meciar authorized him to declare that all accusations against him are untrue and fabricated. HZDS deputies have proposed that the parliament session should not take note of the report.

Slovak Parliament Discusses Environment, Energy

AU2703102892 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Mar 92 p 2

[JUR report: "About Ecology, Power Generation, and State Security"]

[Excerpt] Although deputies voiced the promised protests against the vote of confidence in the minister for the administration and privatization of national property, I. Miklos, nobody asked that it be repeated.

The opening of the second day of talks was dedicated to the environment in Slovakia. The deputies observed that

the condition of the environment has not appreciably improved, and the local improvements are a result of the decline in industrial production.

The Slovak Commission for the Environment currently monitors 15 regions that accumulated a particularly large number of various ecological problems. Generally negative effects are evidenced in Bratislava and Kosice. The worst air pollution in Slovakia, resulting from the mining and processing of lignite with high arsenic content, is in the Upper Nitra Valley. The situation in the Ziar basin and the Sered-Sala region is only marginally better. The last on the list of the threatened regions are the High and Low Tatras and Velka Fatra with an excessive concentration of tourism in just a few localities. This fact is not always considered in discussions concerning Olympic games in Slovakia.

The Commission for the Environment insists that one of the fundamental criteria in drafting concepts of the economic sectors development should be the environmental criterion. The endeavors not to further devastate the environment and to create conditions for quick meaningful solutions should prevail. A radical change of attitude is needed particularly in energy generation, which is responsible for 64 percent of the discharge pollution. Metallurgy is another major polluter—according to realistic estimates, it annually releases 40,000 tonnes of solid emissions into the atmosphere. Among the enterprises that have the most negative impact on the environment are Slovak National Uprising Works in Ziar nad Hronom, East Slovakia Steel Mills Kosice, Sered Nickel Metallurgical Plant, and Kovohuty [Metallurgical Plants] Krompachy. The Slovak Republic Industry Ministry resort is not far behind—it needs 16 billion korunas for its environmental program.

The energy concept for the Slovak Republic up to the year 2005 also caused an extensive discussion. The Slovak National Council notes three reasons for the backwardness of the Slovak power production as compared to the developed industrial countries. The first of them is the power-demanding economic structure, then the disregard for the value correlations by the policy of "cheap energy" in the past, and the neglect of the impact on the environment. In addition, Slovak Republic Economy Minister Belcak pointed out the vulnerability of the Slovak energy supply stemming from the dependence on a single supplier of strategic raw material. At

this time, the Slovak Republic obtains 68 percent of the inputs by imports from the former USSR and shipments from the Czech Republic.

The energy concept contains activities that will reduce the power consumption in the manufacturing sector by 25 percent in comparison with 1990. At the same time, however, in the tertiary sphere it will increase by 13 percent. The deputies recommended to the government that new sources be created only after all possibility of energy saving and alternative sources are exhausted. They confirmed the correctness of the orientation to the non-nuclear program. [passage omitted]

Magyar Parties Disagree Over Election Coalition

*LD2603225392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 92*

[Excerpts] Following the RUDE PRAVO case last week, in connection with the elections, a new scandal is beginning to evolve in Czechoslovakia again. Peter Nyaradi reports from Prague.

[Nyaradi] [Passage omitted] The representatives of the four Magyar parties are unable to create a sensible coalition, even though none of them has a serious chance alone. It would be logical that they should form a coalition in Slovakia. On behalf of the more conservative wing, the Coexistence and the Christian Democratic Movement are only willing to join the Magyar Civic Party—the first Hungarian grouping in Slovakia, which evolved from the Independent Magyar Initiative—if it breaks away from the present Slovak government coalition. In connection with this, Hungarian radio interviewed Deputy Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Gabor Zaszlos, who is an independent and not a member of any party.

[Begin Zaszlos recording] The opposition points at the deficiencies of the government. Yet the party participating in the government not only takes part in governing itself, but takes responsibility for it as well. In my view, admitting its faults and internal differences, it has been right to take part in the work of the government. As a result of the policy of the Independent Magyar Initiative, Magyars have had the opportunity to put forward a deputy prime minister and deputy ministers. In whose interest is it to classify our representatives as good, better, or best Magyars, when both electors and common sense demand a coalition? [end recording]

IMF Credit of \$440 Million Approved*LD2503171292 Budapest MTI in English 1843 GMT
24 Mar 92*

[Text] Budapest, March 24 (MTI-ECONews)—The board of governors of the International Monetary Fund yesterday approved the 1992 credit programme for Hungary, a move which also opens the way for credits from other international institutions. Frigyes Harshegyi, vice-president of the National Bank of Hungary (NBH), told ECONews today.

Hungary will be entitled to an IMF credit of \$440 million in 1992, to be drawn in quarterly tranches. There will be reviews in the first and third quarters, with routine credit calls in the second and fourth quarters, Mr. Harshegyi said. Hungary is scheduled to be granted another \$100 million world bank loan under the second structural readjustment programme, and the Japanese Eximbank is extending the same amount under a co-financing scheme.

Talks with the World Bank have now made considerable progress on a programme under which the World Bank would extend Hungary \$200 million to speed up privatization. The NBH could possibly draw half this amount this year.

Also available this year is a tranche of a three-year EC credit of 870 million ECU, the availability of which depended on the IMF decision. This means the NBH can get a total credit of about \$1 billion from official sources this year, Mr. Harshegyi said. This amount will almost cover NBH capital repayment obligations maturing from the end of March: \$1.5 billion will mature between the end of March and the end of the year.

Ukraine's First Embassy Opened in Budapest*LD2603170992 Budapest MTI in English 1614 GMT
26 Mar 92*

[Text] Budapest, March 26 (MTI)—Special ties are signalled by Hungary being the first country an independent Ukraine opened an embassy in, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk said at the opening of the country's embassy today.

Tarasyuk recalled Hungary was first to establish diplomatic ties with the Ukraine, to open an embassy in Kiev and to sign a treaty with them. These steps signal Hungary's Government was first to understand the profound changes that happened in Ukrainian society and political life. In his address, Hungary's acting foreign affairs deputy state secretary Ivan Baba said his government will continue supporting the Ukraine's push to join Europe and find its place there. The Ukraine can always rely on Hungary as a partner and a friend, Baba said.

About a withdrawal of nuclear armaments from the Ukraine, Tarasyuk said Kiev halted the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons because it doubted they were being disassembled and destroyed.

Shooting on Yugoslav Border Protested*LD2503175692 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 25 Mar 92*

[Text] We have fresh news. MTI reported a short time ago that the Yugoslav Army has again fired shots into Hungarian territory. On this occasion, shots were fired toward the Hungarian side in the region of (Puespökböly) at two people who were working in the fields between 50 and 100 meters from the Hungarian border. There were no injuries. Yugoslavia's ambassador in Budapest was summoned to the Foreign Ministry over the affair, and a protest note was submitted regarding the grave violation of Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Trade Relations Expanding With Israel*AU2603165292 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 23 Mar 92 p 11*

[Beck report: "Expanding Hungarian-Israeli Trade Relations"]

[Excerpts] There are some who, on hearing about the development of Hungarian-Israeli economic relations, perhaps try to dismiss it by saying that a small country has a small market and the Hungarian economy needs more and bigger markets in order to implement its industrial restructuring more dynamically. Such people probably do not consider the fact that, despite its small size, Israel represents a \$13 billion import market. Israel has another advantage, something that Hungarian enterprises have not yet made use of, namely that this small country can also play the role of a flexible transit market. Through its trade channels we could export a large amount of Hungarian goods to other countries, if there are enough Hungarian goods. [passage omitted]

In view of the information we already have about trade in 1991 and the beginning of 1992, it is worth taking a closer look at it. Therefore, we asked Laszlo Pados, head of the Hungarian trade mission in Israel, to give us more details.

"Indeed, we can talk about considerable achievements in Israeli-Hungarian economic and trade relations. Trade figures clearly show the development. Our bilateral trade turnover in 1988 stood at \$31.6 million, and this sum increased to \$76 million in 1991. This amount only covers our direct trade turnover, and it does not contain the almost \$14 million income of the MALEV [Hungarian Airlines] in 1991, as well as the \$6-8 million deriving from increased tourism. Compared with 1990, our direct bilateral turnover showed a 46 percent increase in 1991." [passage omitted]

Within our direct trade turnover, Hungary exports mainly packing materials, chemical products, synthetic materials, steel and compound steel, sheet metal, and aluminum cable. There has been great demand for Hungarian pharmaceutical ingredients as well as for gold that we reimport in the form of jewelry. This list is far

from complete, because we can also include the waste-wood panels, glass, various machines, sodium and halogen bulbs, porcelain insulators, forestry and garden machines, and kitchen equipment. [passage omitted]

Our imports increased 39 percent in 1991, but I must add that the structure of our imports has not changed compared with that of 1990. We import mainly engineering, chemical, and light industry products, as well as smaller amounts of food industry and agricultural products. Medical equipment makes up 25 percent of our imports of engineering industry products, and our import of instruments has also increased considerably. We also import agricultural machines, irrigation systems, and small garden machines, as well as telephone-exchange spare parts, security installations, and educational technology. There are more than 600 firms involved in our bilateral trade. [passage omitted]

Constitutional Court President Explains Role

AU2603163592 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 21 Mar 92 pp 1,4

[Interview with Constitutional Court President Dr. Laszlo Solyom by Andras Sereg; place and date not given: "Low Level Criticism Qualifies Its Authors"]

[Excerpts] The Constitutional Court has been the focus of various debates since it was established two years ago. Political attacks, however, do not bother the judges much, because they continue to make their "grave" decisions. In an interview granted to NEPSZABADSAG, Laszlo Solyom declared that he does not deal with crude attacks, because the Constitutional Court is a body that stands above everyday political interests, and its activity is determined by the Constitution.

We asked Laszlo Solyom about the various opinions about the activity of the Constitutional Court.

[Sereg] Mr Solyom! The Constitutional Court comes under political attack after almost every major decision. The same happened on the latest occasion, when you ruled the Zetenyi-Takacs bill [making prosecutable crimes that were committed under the communist regime between 1944 and 1990 and have gone unpunished for political reasons] completely unconstitutional. How do you deal with these attacks?

[Solyom] We do not deal with crude attacks and political emotions. There is no need for this because the Constitutional Court is a body that stands above everyday political interests and party conflicts, and its activity is determined by the Constitution and the principle of constitutionalism. We have always been open to real professional criticism, and we are still open to such criticism. Unfortunately, we rarely find a real analysis, let alone professional criticism. Low-level criticism evaluates the authors of such criticism, not us.

[Sereg] Even though there might not have been any serious analyses, some observations have nevertheless

been made, like the fact that the Constitutional Court is the only forum in Hungary whose decisions cannot be appealed.

[Solyom] As I already said, the Constitutional Court is subordinated to the Constitution. If parliament modifies the Constitution, this applies to us too. [passage omitted]

[Sereg] The Justice Ministry recently began to formulate its concept on modernizing the court structure. According to this concept, a two-tier appeal system within a Court of Appeals would replace the current one-tier system of appeals. Will the Constitutional Court continue to stick to its authority as "court of last resort" if the aforementioned reorganization takes place?

[Solyom] In my opinion, the number of levels in our system of appeals is a matter of expedience. As for the authority of the Constitutional Court, this would only decide whether a given court decision has violated constitutional law or not. This would only affect a very small percentage of court cases. [passage omitted]

[Sereg] Many politicians evaluate the Constitutional Court according to whether a given decision is detrimental to their party or not. Moreover, they even change their opinions sometimes.

[Solyom] Politics is another matter. I would not like to get involved in this. In my opinion, some of the criticism is not honest at all, because a politician can only benefit from making political use of an issue that is constitutionally questionable from the outset. After the decision, these politicians can point at the judges and blame them for not allowing the implementation of things that these politicians worked out so well.

[Sereg] Can you defend yourself from political attacks?

[Solyom] Only by making predictable and consistent decisions. We already have a "harvest" of two years behind us.

[Sereg] One of the key issues today is what is possible and what is impossible in a constitutional state.

[Solyom] The Constitutional Court mentioned the idea of a constitutional state precisely in its decision on the Zetenyi-Takacs bill. We declared that a constitutional state means that the entire legislative material is coordinated with the Constitution and the state bodies act according to this Constitution. It also means that concepts and leading principles of the Constitution cover the entire society. This was not the case for 40 years. In the old regime, politics could transcend the law at any time, because there were no constitutional guarantees. Today some people are asking us to do the same thing again, and after that we can have the constitutional state. I did not take an oath to do this, but to definitely stick to the Constitution. [passage omitted]

Free Democrats Criticize Government's Term

AU2503193192 Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET*
in Hungarian 23 Mar 92 p 3

[Report by Sumegi: "The SZDSZ on the Two Years of the Antall-Government—The Lost Opportunity"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], and Tamas Bauer personally, prepared a study on the two years of the Antall government entitled "The Lost Opportunity." The author spoke about the "government's necrology," as Miklos Gaspar Tamas [chairman of the National Council of the SZDSZ] called the study. According to this, the Hungarian nation has gone through the greatest disappointment of its history in the last two years. It is not the lack of a fast economic upturn that they are questioning, but the fact that after two years it is still impossible to see the direction of the change. Agricultural reorganization was subjected to ideological considerations and, today, there is greater uncertainty in the villages than ever in the last few decades. Two years after the elections, the Antall government does not have a privatization concept. It postponed the national budget reform initiated by its predecessors, therefore, there is no change in the structure of the budget. Unemployment that is starting to affect masses found the government unprepared, and the reduction in the social aid program indicates social insensitivity.

Instead of the freedom of education and culture and ideological pluralism, the Antall government is trying to force a new kind of ideological hegemony on intellectual life, Bauer said. Rather than consistently separating the state and the churches, it is rebuilding the links. In parliament, the government regularly abuses its majority position; the prime minister could not care less about the public, and he treats the press as an enemy. Denying the principle of power sharing, the government tries to control the central bank, courts, large enterprises, and the trade banks. A situation resembling the former party state is developing in many areas.

According to Tamas Bauer, the government will not fulfill the reforms that the country expected of it. Rather, it is fulfilling a hidden program that aims to extend its own power. According to Miklos Gaspar Tamas, the "two?, three?, or four?" years of the government's operation will place another heavy burden on the next government. Answering reporters' questions, he said that it is only possible to use democratic tools with a democratically operating partner, and there are limits on the opposition's actions. However, Attila Karoly Soos thinks that there is no need to panic, because the movements of the civil society indicate a resistance to the government's mistakes.

Free Democrat Official Views Party's Position

AU2503132292 Budapest *NEPSZABADSAG*
in Hungarian 21 Mar 92 p 7

[Interview with Gabriella Beki, executive member of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "The 'Horses' Are Not Pulling in the Same Direction"]

[Excerpts] I interviewed Gabriella Beki about the position of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the party's alleged internal crisis, and its relations with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. Beki is the party's organizing secretary, and she is an economist and sociologist by profession. She has worked at the National Health Education Institute and taught sociology at the Semmelweis Medical Science University. Beki was one of the organizers of the Rakpart Club and a founding member of the SZDSZ.

[Pogonyi] In his preparatory material written for the 29 February session of the National Council, Miklos Tamas Gaspar, chairman of the National Council of the SZDSZ, stated that the party's "isolation and unpopularity was at a peak." I would add that in my view as well, the paralysis of the party is palpable. It is common knowledge that according to the latest survey of the Hungarian Gallup Institute barely 17 percent of the potential voters would cast their votes for the SZDSZ. Do you agree with Tamas's diagnosis that "bitter isolation" characterizes the party?

[Beki] Judging popularity is controversial. There are areas where the SZDSZ's popularity is growing, or at least, the party is considered to be an alternative.

[Pogonyi] How can this be measured?

[Beki] We know about newcomers, and new local groups have been formed; in Borsod County for example.

[Pogonyi] Is it mainly in the crisis-stricken areas where the SZDSZ's popularity is growing?

[Beki] Yes, peripheral areas still see the SZDSZ as an alternative.

[Pogonyi] Why is it that an increasing number of intellectuals and experts of the SZDSZ have retired from active politics even though they have not completely turned their backs on the party?

[Beki] Undoubtedly, the SZDSZ is being written off by certain intellectual—so-called authoritative—circles in Budapest. I would link this to the disputes within the party and the noisy nature of the election for the chairmanship. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Has the SZDSZ been diluted?

[Beki] I would not say that, quite the contrary! No one openly states that the SZDSZ is an elite party with small membership, even if this is what they think. Janos Kis also says that we should be able to "handle" the various

views within the party. The main question is what kind of style the leadership should have to hold the party together.

[Pogonyi] What kind of leadership would you consider to be good?

[Beki] In the autumn, I voted for Peter Tolgyessy to be the new chairman because he presented the attitude of a leader who pays attention to the aforementioned phenomena. He is not angry with the loud radicals; his aim is to hold the membership together in the party as in a large pool. Some of the members are still on the level of anti-communism, while others consider the MDF the main enemy. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Let us return to the SZDSZ's internal problems for a moment. The publicity around the private meeting between [Prime Minister] Antall and Tolgyessy did not turn out very well from the SZDSZ's point of view, and it only increased the party's internal debates.

[Beki] It certainly was not good for the party—not the meeting but the storms around it. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Have you been losing members?

[Beki] Not in connection with this. At the moment, we have some 32,000 members, and the number of people who have left since our establishment is 1,500. Altogether, this is 5 percent. There are also many members who do not announce their resignation but simply drift away.

[Pogonyi] Tamas Bauer recently wrote in discussion material that the current leaders of the SZDSZ have a strong inclination to try to make an agreement with the MDF. Do you also think that some kind of rapprochement is necessary?

[Beki] Not at all, and the SZDSZ leaders do not have such inclinations, either. I find the excitement ridiculous regarding the expectations for some new pact after the Antall-Tolgyessy meeting. It should be seen that even if Tolgyessy had such intentions, he could not implement them. Do not forget that the factions of both parties voted for the 1990 pact. I emphasize that Tolgyessy does not have such intentions.

[Pogonyi] According to Bauer, the SZDSZ is similar to a beautiful woman offering herself and smiling mysteriously but guarding her chastity in words.

[Beki] This is not how I see the party, although the wording has a point.

[Pogonyi] How then do you see the SZDSZ?

[Beki] It definitely does not want to approach the MDF, however, the time has not arrived for approaching the left and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], either.

According to the current leadership, and mainly Tolgyessy, we must keep our distance in both directions.

[Pogonyi] According to Miklos Gaspar Tamas, the MSZP is a tactical ally of the SZDSZ.

[Beki] By no means. It is a different matter that we vote similarly on certain issues in parliament.

[Pogonyi] To what extent can you be an alternative to the MDF?

[Beki] It is increasingly apparent that the MFD government is statist and relies on personal connections. The SZDSZ opposes this. At half term of the electoral cycle, we will prepare an analysis on our alternative role. [passage omitted]

Young Democrats, Goncz Most Popular in Poll

LD2603182792 Budapest MTI in English 1206 GMT
26 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 26 (MTI)—According to a recent poll, the Federation of Young Democrats (FYD) is the most popular party, President Arpad Goncz the most popular politician, and prime minister the best-known politician in Hungary today.

The poll was conducted between March 7 and 16 by media on the commission of "HETI VILAGGAZDASAG" (WORLD ECONOMIC WEEKLY). Should there be an election today, 44 per cent of the 1,200 Hungarian voters asked would go to the polls. In December 1991, this figure stood at 40 per cent and in November at 36 per cent. Twenty nine per cent of them would vote for the FYD (last December 20 per cent), 15 per cent for the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the biggest governing party (last December 18 per cent), and 9 per cent for the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), the strongest opposition party (last December 15 per cent). On the average, the supporters of the governing parties are 55 years old, and those of the opposition 43 years old.

Asked about whom they would like to see filling senior political posts in the years to come, most respondents mentioned Arpad Goncz, FYD leader Viktor Orban, and Janos Palotas, an independent entrepreneur. President Gyula Horn of the Hungarian Socialist Party has retained his 5th place. The popularity of Gabor Demszky (AFD), the mayor of Budapest, has improved by 9 percentage points since last December. Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's popularity index stood at 43 per cent, as compared to 46 per cent last December. President Laszlo Surjan of the Christian Democratic People's Party, which forms part of the governing coalition, achieved 52 per cent, 1 per cent down on the December 1991 figure. The popularity index of Istvan Csurka, an HDF politician, stood at 27 per cent, while Jozsef Torgyan, president of the Independent Smallholders' Party, had to register another 2-per-cent drop to 17 per cent since last December.

Olszewski, PSL's Pawlak View Restructuring

*LD2603213392 Warsaw PAP in English 1717 GMT
26 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 26—Prime Minister Jan Olszewski met here Thursday [26 March] with leader of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) Waldemar Pawlak.

After the meeting, the government spokesman said that the cabinet was determined to hold talks aimed at broadening the ruling coalition by all reform-minded groupings.

Pawlak reported that the talks focused on possible reconstruction of the government and its coalition and reflection of the assumptions of the socioeconomic policy in the budget.

"We have pointed to the fact that the government assumptions were not fully incorporated into the budget for it does not guarantee means and methods necessary to unblock the economy and boost enterprises, (...) funds for agriculture are also insufficient," Pawlak said.

Asked about the PSL endorsement for the government draft budget, Pawlak announced that differences in opinions are to be explained during the next meeting with Jan Olszewski, scheduled for Friday [27 March]. "In our opinion the draft needs to be remodelled by Sejm committees to suit social and economic goals we want to achieve," he added.

The PSL leader refused to comment on the PSL participation in the possible government reconstruction. "Those issues remain open," he said and added that solutions should be looked for after the assessment of hitherto talks with various political groupings.

The possible incorporation of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) into the coalition Pawlak termed as a "risky" move in view of the latest political changes within the congress.

Talks Held on Government Coalition Inconclusive

*LD2603225192 Warsaw PAP in English 2212 GMT
26 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 26—Leaders of three major political parties held on Thursday [26 March] over two-hour inconclusive talks on expanding the ruling coalition. Wieslaw Chrzanowski of the Christian National Union (ZCHN), Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the Centre Alliance (PC) and Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the Democratic Union (UD) decided that they would probably continue negotiations on forging the so-called great coalition. On Friday they are going to meet with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski.

According to Chrzanowski concrete decisions would be made after the meeting with the premier. Asked whether his party would accept new members in the coalition, he

replied: "I have never been interested in suspense stories. When one enters the coalition, one cannot as its member make commitments on its behalf."

However, Chrzanowski added that on Friday [27 March] his party would take a stance on a possibility of admitting the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD) to the coalition. On his part Tadeusz Mazowiecki stated: "We find ourselves at the turning point—the to-date talks have made us realize that it is necessary to explain whether the premier is willing to keep his offer of creating the great coalition and what its composition should be."

Asked about a possibility of joining the coalition by the Congress of Liberals, Jaroslaw Kaczynski said that he was not able to answer this question at the moment. However, he stressed that "the Union (UD) is accepted," adding that all opinions are premature.

Commission Presents Versions of Electoral Law

*LD2403224992 Warsaw PAP in English 1704 GMT
24 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 24—The State Electoral Commission worked out and conveyed to the president, the premier and the Sejm and Senate speakers three versions of a new draft law on elections to the Sejm.

Under the first, deputies are to be elected by a majority vote in two and three mandate electoral districts.

The second is based on the proportional majority principle where multi-seat electoral districts would be united with single mandate simple majority sub-districts.

The third version is closely related to the one applied in last elections, proportional voting in multi-mandate districts with national list of candidates for deputies.

KPN Determined To Win Next Election

*LD2403181192 Warsaw PAP in English 1230 GMT
24 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 24—The Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] will most probably decide that in order to realize its goals it has to govern or co-govern Poland, KPN leader Leszek Moczulski said Tuesday [24 March] while speaking about preparations for the party's 4th congress due March 28-29.

According to Moczulski, the congress will have to decide whether Poland's present situation calls for revolutionary solutions, new elections or formation of a new majority in the Sejm (lower house of parliament). "Since most KPN activists are of the opinion that the present Sejm is not able to form a majority, the Confederation's most important task is to get ready to win next parliamentary election," Moczulski declared.

Moczulski also stressed that his party had not joined the government coalition because it wanted a different economic programme, a more clearly defined political line

in all matters, and decisions on bringing to account criminals of the Stalinist and martial law period as well as people guilty of current economic scandals.

"We are not interested in a government merely declaring that it will prosecute economic offenders. We expect that when we join the government the first strong attack against the offenders will take place within a week or two. This is also true of political, economic and international matters, the KPN leader stressed.

Solidarity Leader on Differences With Government

LD2503215892 Warsaw PAP in English 1507 GMT
25 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 25—Spokesman for the "Solidarity" union Andrzej Adamczyk said that the first stage of talks between the "Solidarity" union and the government held Wednesday [25 March], showed divergence of stands concerning economic issues and lack of grounds to negotiate on social policy issues. According to Adamczyk, complete lack of understanding and willingness to negotiate demonstrated by the government side proved that the authorities, contrary to previous statements by the prime minister, have had no intention of consulting legal acts, including assumptions of the socioeconomic policy, with the unions.

Solidarity's Silesian Branch Urges New Program

LD2703090292 Warsaw PAP in English 2334 GMT
26 Mar 92

[Text] Katowice, March 26—Leader of the Silesian branch of NSZZ "Solidarity" trade union Alojzy Pietrzyk said in Katowice on Thursday [26 March] that the economic plan of Prime Minister Jan Olszewski meets the union's pro-efficiency and antirecession expectations though its implementation is far from perfect.

Pietrzyk stressed in his reporting and programmatic expose at the 4th general meeting of delegates of the Silesian region, that "Solidarity's" absence in the process of reforming this country was a major mistake.

The delegates called for developing a new programme for the NSZZ "Solidarity" trade union, tailored to the needs of the new situation. They will also elect new authorities of the regional "Solidarity" branch during the further two days of the meeting.

The meeting was interrupted for a while by a false information that a bomb had been planted in the conference room.

Center Alliance Condemns Members for Disloyalty

LD2603180292 Warsaw PAP in English 2356 GMT
25 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 25—The Centre Alliance (PC) Parliamentary Caucus on Wednesday [25 March] condemned four of its members for being "glaringly disloyal

to their party and its parliamentary floor group." A resolution adopted by the extraordinary meeting of the Caucus claimed that steps taken by deputies: Andrzej Anusz, Kazimierz Barcik, Andrzej Kostarczyk and Piotr Wojcik "threatened with a split in the party."

At the same time the Caucus warned Senator Ireneusz Choroszuca and deputies Przemyslaw Hniedzewicz and Stanislaw Weglowski against their failure to observe the Caucus' voting discipline in the Sejm (lower house) and against disclosing the PC's confidential information.

Commenting on the PC resolution Andrzej Anusz said it shows that there are decisive differences between PC leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Prime Minister Jan Olszewski. "One can hardly help feeling that Kaczynski is looking for a pretext to walk out on the coalition and build a counter-alliance," Anusz charged. In his opinion the so-called split in the PC may serve as a pretext.

The PC Caucus Presidium next met with the prime minister. It was agreed that Jan Olszewski will meet with the PC floor group next week. "At the same time we shall make efforts to bring about a meeting between Olszewski and Kaczynski," the Caucus' leader Marek Dziubek said.

Dziubek added that the Wednesday meeting was designed to prepare good climate for the future meeting so that it would positively shape mutual relations between Kaczynski and Olszewski he declared PC's support for the government's request for special powers but only after they are precisely defined.

The government press office added that the PC Caucus reiterated its stand on the socio-economic programme and draft budget presented by the government.

Prime Minister Jan Olszewski also met with the group of PC deputies rallied around Hniedzewicz to inform them about his meeting with the Presidium of the PC Caucus.

In their statement the four deputies said the Caucus's resolution is an attempt to remove from the PC those persons who come out against the nondemocratic conduct of leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski whose actions lead to a split in the party.

Government Holds Talks With Farmers Solidarity

LD2603172492 Warsaw PAP in English 1257 GMT
25 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 25—At Wednesday's [25 March] meeting between representatives of labour and agriculture ministries and Chairman of the Private Farmers Solidarity Roman Wierzbicki, special teams were formed to discuss unemployment in rural areas, social security for farmers as well as professional rehabilitation for disabled farmers. Deputy Minister of Labour Bartlomiej Piotrowski and the Farmers Solidarity chairman were both satisfied at the outcome of the talks. The teams will start to operate next week and a plenary session to sum up their work is expected before Easter, according to Wierzbicki.

Olechowski Said Not Insistent on Special Powers

LD2403143592 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Excerpts] All today's papers report extensively on yesterday's meeting between Prime Minister Olszewski and Finance Minister Olechowski and journalists devoted to the problems of this year's budget. [passage omitted] The majority of the solutions will require legislative changes. As a sidenote, GLOB 24 daily observes that government members have been expressing the firm view that the passing of the budget must be linked with granting the Council of Ministers special powers. Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski says that it is all the same to him whether the government received the power to issue decrees or whether a quick legislative path is created in parliament. According to GLOB 24 this is an important change in the approach of the government, which up to now has firmly insisted on decrees. This may facilitate the rounding up of votes essential to pass the budget.

Former Officials Arrested for Arms Smuggling

LD2703091392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 27 Mar 92

[Text] The arrest of former high-ranking state functionaries by the German police for the smuggling of arms to Iraq is the dominant theme in the press today. The six arrested Polish citizens include Jerzy Napiorkowski, former deputy finance minister; Jerzy Brzostek, former construction minister and head of Warsaw subway construction, and Wojciech Baranski, former Polish ambassador to Cuba.

The American correspondent of ZYCIE WARSZAWY reports that the CIA had known as early as November 1991 about the operations of the network smuggling arms from East Europe and more or less knew the composition of this network. GAZETA WYBORCZA writes that its correspondent succeeded in obtaining a copy of the arrest order issued by a Frankfurt-am-Main court for Rajmund Szwander, deputy director of the Lucznik armaments plant in Radom. From this order, it transpires that the arms on which the contract signed at the beginning of March in Frankfurt was based were to have been supplied to Germany from Poland and the territories of the former Soviet Union.

POLSKA ZBROJNA reports on its reporter's conversations with the management of the Lucznik enterprise and with the ministries of industry and trade and foreign economic cooperation. The reporter's interlocutors know nothing of the catch in Frankfurt. The author of the article, however, citing a credible source of information, writes that the eventual transaction may have been quite completely legal. Rajmund Szwander, deputy director of the Lucznik plant, received the agreement of his boss to extend his stay in Germany. The subject of his talks in Frankfurt is not clear.

Meanwhile, writes POLSKA ZBROJNA, losses at Lucznik are being added up. The termination of a contract

with the American IBC company will prevent the sale of 40,000 pistols; approximately 5 million zlotys could have been received for each of them. The enterprise in Radom is in an appalling financial situation.

In view of this, was Rajmund Szwander, deputy director of this firm, attempting to rescue the enterprise? In turn, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, citing information from its correspondent, writes that the New York prosecutor is seeking the extradition of the Poles detained in Germany.

Poll Reveals 33 Percent Ready To Emigrate

LD2503094892 Warsaw PAP in English 2147 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 24—33 per cent of respondents to a poll carried by the Demoskop Sounding Agency on March 14-18 said they were ready to emigrate from Poland within the coming five years if they had such a possibility. In a similar poll in January last year only 17 per cent voiced their willingness to leave Poland. The greatest number of potential emigrants, 62 per cent, was noted among young people, aged 18 to 24, and the youth between 15 and 17 years old (50 per cent). In the January poll, 38 per cent of respondents in the former group wanted to emigrate while the latter was not polled. The poll was conducted among 937 people aged 15 to 69 from 200 localities throughout Poland.

Skubiszewski on Talks With Lithuania's Saudargas

LD2603183192 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1510 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] Yesterday, Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski spoke in Helsinki with the Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs. What was this discussion about? Roman Czejarek reports.

[Czejarek] The details of my talks with Algirdas Saudargas, the foreign affairs minister of Lithuania, will remain a secret, Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated a few minutes ago. [Words indistinct] at the news conference that has been going on at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1600. Despite many questions, journalists discovered only that talks between the two ministers was very frank, and that the Polish Government is deeply disturbed at the situation that has arisen in Lithuania over the last week. Minister Skubiszewski stated that he has appealed to the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic once again to consider the matter of the elections to the dissolved councils of the Salcininkai and Vilnius regions that have been deferred until September. For the time being, the Polish Government will only be diplomatic bringing pressure to bear on our northeastern neighbor. Apart from persuasion, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is counting on the possible assistance of the international organizations that concern themselves with the rights of national minorities. Just before leaving the news conference—it is still going on—I asked Minister Skubiszewski what the reaction of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be to the remarks of the Lithuanian

charge d'affaires yesterday morning on Polish radio first program's "Sygnaly Dnia" [Signals of the Day] program. I recall that the official representative of the Lithuanian authorities then stated that the reports in the Polish press, radio, and television on the events in the north-east—that is, in Lithuania—are greatly exaggerated, and that our Ministry of Foreign Affairs promised him that it will correct the incorrect information. Of course, we will not be saying sorry to anyone, replied Minister Skubiszewski. Such a solution is not even theoretically on the agenda as the mass media are after all independent of the ministry. However, by virtue of the great importance of the matter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be presenting a special statement in the near future, he stated.

Ties Established With Azerbaijan, Tajikistan

LD2503174592 Warsaw PAP in English 1355 GMT
25 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 25—The Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday [25 March] that Poland established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Tajikistan.

Kazakhstan Poles Want To Return to Ukraine

LD2503143692 Warsaw PAP in English 1904 GMT
23 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 23—Chairman of the Union of Poles in the Podole region (currently within the boundaries of the Ukraine) Edward Trzcinski and Chairman of the Podole Committee for Repatriation Andrzej Pietruczanis ending their five-day visit to Poland, said on Monday [23 March] that about 40 per cent out of the 90,000 Poles living in Kazakhstan are interested in returning to the Ukraine region of Grodek.

The two stated that during meetings with deputies of various parliamentary clubs and with speaker of the Sejm (lower house) Wieslaw Chrzanowski they received moral support for their initiative to repatriate about 16,000 Poles from Kazakhstan to the Ukraine.

Trzcinski and Pietruczanis declared that they were not satisfied with the Monday talks at the Polish Foreign Ministry. "Our point of view was not treated seriously there," they stressed. They also revealed that they have appealed to the Polish government to withdraw from negotiations on the future treaty with the Ukraine until free and democratic elections to the parliament are held in the republic.

Union of Poles in Belarus Leader Assesses Trip

PM2603110292 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA
in Polish 17 Mar 92 p 4

[Interview with Tadeusz Gawin, chairman of Union of Poles in Belarus, by correspondent Zbigniew Rozanski; place, date not given]

[Text] [Rozanski] You came to Warsaw on a visit and called at the offices of the "Polish Community" organization [for contacts with poles abroad]. What was the subject of your talks there?

[Gawin] We talked about the planned construction of a Polish cultural center in Grodno. The director of the Energopol enterprise was among those taking part in our talks, and it has been decided that construction work will begin soon. The Polish community in Belarus, which I represent, are very interested in having a center of their own.

[Rozanski] Where will you find the funds to finance such a major project?

[Gawin] We have sponsors in Belarus, but our main contributor and helper will be the Polish Community association. With the money raised we plan to build a large, multi-function building, featuring a conference hall and a number of facilities which will make it possible to carry out a varied program of activities for children, young people, and adults.

[Rozanski] How long do you expect the construction work to take? Have you set a deadline for the completion of the center and the launching of your Union's activities there?

[Gawin] Yes, we have set a date and we expect to inaugurate our activities there in two years' time.

[Rozanski] How large is your organization now?

[Gawin] We have branches in the following oblasts: Grodno, Minsk, Brest, Gomel, and Vitebsk. Altogether, we have more than 16,000 members, and new members are registering in the Union each month. We are also thinking of setting up new regional branches to enable our members to maintain more direct links with the Union leadership.

[Rozanski] What work do you carry out in the sphere of education?

[Gawin] We already run a school network with two first grades where Polish is the main language of instruction. I realize this is not enough. But you must remember that all Polish schools in Belarus were closed back in 1948. This is why the restoration of a Polish education network is still encountering major difficulties. For instance, we have too few Polish teachers; there is a serious shortage of premises, books, teaching aids, and so on.

[Rozanski] How successful are you in helping Belarusians of Polish descent to find their Polish roots?

[Gawin] These things are not easy at all. For nearly half a century those people were told that there are no Poles in Belarus, that they were of pure Belarussian blood. Now it is our task to clarify and correct these points and to try to provide opportunities whereby these people can rediscover their Polish roots. I believe that we already have attained considerable achievements in this field. As

I have already said, we are opening new local branches of our Union, with new members applying for registration every month. This, among other things, testifies to the gradual rebirth of Polish national identity in Belarus.

[Rozanski] The Union of Poles in Lithuania sends its own, Polish deputies to Lithuanian parliament. Is the same true of Union of Poles in Belarus? Do you have representatives in parliament?

[Gawin] The election to the Belarussian parliament was held before our Union was established. We will nominate our parliamentary candidates in the next election. We also intend to be represented in other local government and administrative structures—for instance, town and parish councils, and so on. In other words, we want to have our people at all levels of the administrative apparatus. There are ten Poles in the Belarussian parliament now. Three of them are our members and they are indeed most closely involved in defending Polish rights and interests.

[Rozanski] Let us return briefly to the question of Polish education in Belarus. Are two grades of Polish school not insufficient in the circumstances?

[Gawin] We are at present working—in cooperation with the Belarussian Education Ministry—on a plan for a full-scale Polish school system. There are considerable difficulties here, but we are doing our best to overcome them. However, we still have to work hard to persuade Poles living in Belarus to send their children to Polish schools. Not all of them are in favor of such a move, because children and young people who graduate from schools in which Russian is the language of instruction are as a rule in privileged positions as regards their future careers; for example, they have a better record of university admissions, and so on.

[Rozanski] It seems clear that your Union needs well-educated people. How do you intend to resolve this problem? Do you send your talented young people to be educated and trained in Poland?

[Gawin] Since 1989 we have been sending our talented young people to attend a variety of schools, courses, and training schemes, as well as full-time university courses, in Poland. They come back with diplomas, degrees, and a number of other proficiency certificates. We are most grateful to our original homeland for this help. The first of larger groups of university-trained graduates will be coming back to Belarus in 1993. They will strengthen our ranks, and this should make our work among Poles in Belarus very much easier. Our only worry about these schemes is that a proportion of the young people who left to study in Poland will subsequently decide to settle there permanently. This applies especially to a number of our girls who have found Polish husbands in Poland. It remains to be hoped that they will be good ambassadors of the idea of forging ever tighter links with our original homeland.

Skubiszewski Points Out CSCE's Usefulness

*LD2603222992 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1830 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Minister, now that the cold war period is over do such organizations as the CSCE have a reason to exist?

[Skubiszewski] Their *raison d'être* exists. These are organizations which have a certain power of persuasion, a capability of bringing diplomatic influence to bear. It is under the auspices of the CSCE that the conference devoted to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is to take place; at the present time no other organization is willing to act in this matter. Moreover, as far as operational capacities are concerned, Poland suggests—and I restate here the proposal made by President Lech Walesa—that peacekeeping troops should be set up within the framework of the CSCE or indeed under its auspices. But what is perhaps the most important matter of all is that we should concentrate now on executing that which has so far been decided within the framework of the CSCE. We have decided many good things, but the situation as far as execution is concerned is very uneven, and this is something to which attention must be paid.

Roman Opens FSN Convention; Iliescu Note Read

*AU2703103992 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1000 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Text] The proceedings of the National Convention of the National Salvation Front [FSN] began at the Polivalenta Hall of Bucharest some 40 minutes ago. Mr. Petre Roman declared open the proceedings of the third convention of that party and thanked all participants and the representatives of the press, radio, and television. Among the guests are Mr. Bertrand [name indistinct], representative of the French Socialist Party, and Mr. Santiago (?Celestre), representative of the Socialist Party of Spain. Mr. Petre Roman said that messages had been received from social democratic parties in various countries in the world.

The meeting then voted on the agenda proposed by the Commission for the Organization of the National Convention. Mr. Petre Roman suggested that the proceedings should adopt a declaration to the nation on the anniversary of the great union with Bessarabia. The agenda also includes a report on the Front's current political problems, a report on the FSN government, reports of the FSN groups in the Deputies' Assembly and Senate, and other documents.

When the agenda was submitted to the vote, Mr. Ionel Roman of the Group for the Front's Unity asked—on behalf of the mandate entrusted to him by 12 county conventions and the Bucharest Municipality convention—that the first point of the agenda should be to stipulate support for Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidature for the position of Romania's president. This point was not, however, included in the agenda. The reason given for its rejection was that the decision on the Front's candidate for the presidential elections will be adopted on the third day of the proceedings.

A message to the National Convention from Mr. Ion Iliescu, president of Romania, was then read. The message emphasizes that, in his capacity as founding member and former president of the Front, Mr. Ion Iliescu appreciates the tenacity with which steps were taken, under difficult conditions, to implement the declared goals of 22 December 1989. Now, on the eve of general elections, Mr. Ion Iliescu called on the FSN to overcome differences and promote constructive actions, by renouncing intolerance, which negates the right to democracy. At the end of the message, Mr. Ion Iliescu wishes success to the Front's National Convention.

A few moments ago, Mr. Petre Roman read the FSN's declaration to the nation on the anniversary of Bessarabia's unification with the country. Then, the report of the Commission for the Organization of the National Convention was heard. At this time, Mr. Petre Roman is presenting the report on FSN's current political problems.

Roman Denies Misapplication of Funds Allegations

*AU2603151592 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 0500 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Excerpts] The two chambers of parliament held separate sessions yesterday. [passage omitted]

During the Senate session, Senator Dragos Luchian presented a report of the commission set up to investigate allegations of serious acts of corruption committed between January 1990 and December 1991 and eliminate suspicion, mistrust, and false presentation in this connection. [passage omitted]

Senator Dragos Luchian said that what the commission reported are thoroughly checked matters and involve the squandering of funds without heed to the requirements for the priorities of financing certain economic objectives of the reform. It was emphasized that the funds resulting from the sale of housing were going to be divided, in accordance with the law, into equal shares between the government, the prefects' office, and the City Hall of Bucharest, respectively.

The report notes that 50 percent of the funds realized from the sale of housing and amounting to more than 32 billion lei were spent unlawfully; of these funds approximately 25 billion lei are missing for restructuring objectives because they represent embezzled funds, a fact that is punishable under the Penal Code.

In connection with these sums, which were spent in disregard of the law and the prerogatives of Parliament, the report notes, among other things, the granting of 2.5 billion lei as a loan to the company (?IRUC) S.A., the allocation of a further 2 billion lei as a down payment toward a contract for the purchase of 115 railroad cars and sleepers from the former GDR, and the covering of certain losses amounting to more than 2.6 billion lei registered by the Railroad Company S.A.

In conclusion, the report asks the Senate to examine whether it would be opportune to notify the prosecution bodies in order to establish the penal responsibility of the culprit.

After this report had been read, the senators did not express their opinion on its contents and no decision was made during the plenary session.

In connection with this report, late last night Mr. Petre Roman made the following televised statement:

The report drafted by a Senate Commission and read in parliament commits the serious injustice of offering conclusions that do not correspond to the facts. Competent government authorities will in due course express their opinion on this deliberate confusion and lack of truth. Afterward, I would like to present a comprehensive and conclusive analysis of certain intentions that are at variance with parliamentary dignity.

For the time being, I would like to quote three examples that will eliminate any doubt: The report contains incriminations, but the truth is as follows:

1. In connection with the restructuring of the company (?IRUC) there is a particularly positive thing, namely, that after the loan of 2.5 billion lei was granted to set up a joint venture with a foreign partner, the new enterprise was able to manufacture high performance electronic components;

2. The purchase of railroad cars and sleepers from the former GDR on the basis of credits was necessary, as was repeatedly explained, in order to ensure travel on international railroads where current Romanian cars do not match required standards. As a matter of fact, the 2 billion fund allocated for this purpose has not yet been spent;

3. The use of funds to pay wages to Romanian railroad personnel was in keeping with a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice, given the serious and tremendous threat that the national economy would be blocked by the disruption of railroad traffic as a result of a strike by the railroad trade unions.

It is absolutely incomprehensible how this report was presented without those involved being invited. In actual fact, such initiatives within the Senate have hampered and continue to hamper the government in its activity for the benefit of the country.

Stolojan Comments on Charges

AU2603170692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1532 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 26/3/1992—On Thursday, March 28 the weekly news conference of the government's spokeswoman was held at the Victoria Palace with the unexpected participation of Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan. He announced he had to make a series of specifications in connection with the report of the Senate's Inquiry Commission presented on March 25.

In fact, Premier Stolojan specified, the Roman government engaged two real expenses—one concerning high technology now under way, and the second concerning the acquiring of a number of railway cars to be used on external routes, an operation which has not been yet initiated because of the lack of hard currency.

The rest of the expenses, the prime minister explained, had already been made in the economy. The loss of the Romanian railways had existed, it had not been engaged by the government. The other expenses for unfinished investments financed from the budget—for the mining sector, defence, Interior Ministry and other sectors—were uncovered in 1989. Therefore, they existed and they should only be covered from the resources got in 1991, the premier added.

The Senatorial Inquiry Commission asked the government to make again the budgetary fund. This is possible,

Mr. Stolojan emphasised, if this is the wish, with the exception of the about 2.5 billion lei for high technologies. The prime minister underscored that the book-accounting situations could be made again but he repeated that the expenses had been engaged in the economy.

The head of the executive informed the press that the Ministry of Economy and Finances was preparing a report in connection with the 35-billion-lei fund, a report which would be analysed by the government and then released.

Campeanu Discusses PNL Election Strategy

AU2503182992 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 18 Mar 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Radu Campeanu, president of the National Liberal Party, by Sorin Rosca-Stanescu; place and date not given: "I Do Not Have an Arrangement With Mr. Iliescu"]

[Text] [Rosca-Stanescu] Some of your public statements give the impression that the opposition might regroup for the next general elections.

[Campeanu] The opposition has to remain united. There has to be a coalition until the general elections and even more so afterward. However, we view this alliance in even broader terms, to also include an agreement on our goals in governing. We will have to talk very openly with the other parties.

[Rosca-Stanescu] In your opinion, why did the State Department simultaneously invite more leaders of the united opposition to Washington?

[Campeanu] The State Department undoubtedly regards these parties as being, if not the future of Romania, at least the true guarantors of democratization. Our meeting will take place under favorable circumstances, as the U.S. Government decided to propose to Congress—through President Bush—that Romania should be granted the most favored nation clause.

[Rosca-Stanescu] Mr. President, talking to more opposition leaders, I finally realized that there is a kind of a vicious circle within the Democratic Convention [CD]. None of the parties can possibly find out the exact number of citizens voting for it. Tendencies to overestimate one's power may make negotiations within the CD difficult. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that the opposition has to remain united during the general elections, too.

[Campeanu] Of course, it is only natural that each party would claim that it received more votes. In our opinion, we can speak of two large parties, namely of the National Liberal Party [PNL] and of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]. All other parties had their organizations in towns, mostly in the larger ones. I am sure that if the recently founded public opinion poll

institute ESOP would start taking nationwide polls on how large each party's audience is, this would help very much to clear up the situation. In spite of the fact that there is something basically wrong with opinion polls in Romania—specialists say, this could be eliminated to a great extent, but not altogether—namely, that very often those questioned in such polls do not sincerely say what they think. After the last 45 years, people tend to hide the truth out of fear. We will have to get used to such polls, which are quite routine abroad. You see, opinion polls taken by ESOP in Bucharest have conveyed results that were very close to reality.

[Rosca-Stanescu] The PNL was the first party that successfully cooperated with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. As I learned, there has been a dispute among your people about the fact that your alliance with the UDMR has led to the loss of a number of votes, especially in Transylvania. Do you intend to go alongside the UDMR, in spite of this situation, considering the fact that—although it is quite heterogeneous—this party proved that it really struggles for democracy in Romania?

[Campeanu] We were the first to sign a common statement with the UDMR in 1990. This statement, although quite disputed at that time, contained the principles of sovereignty, integrity, and dignity of the country. It is true, people in our party are discussing the position of the UDMR and its behavior during this year's local elections. The UDMR has run on its own lists wherever it was sure to win many votes. Yet we, the other parties, won extremely little by running together with the UDMR. Let us say, this is not a fundamental criteria, but we are getting more and more distressed. It is not only that we do not agree, but it is really distressing to hear the statements made either by Reverend Tokes—who, as soon as he is abroad, thinks it useful to make assertions that are sometimes really provocative, one of which I had to answer myself during an international conference in The Hague—or by someone else. Recently, on 14 February we again heard two such statements made by Hungary's National Defense Minister and by the under secretary of state for ethnic minority problems. We consider such statements completely out of place and as having definitely harmed us. We responded with a statement of our own and we asked the UDMR to define its position. They did not do so. Under such circumstances, we—I am talking in the name of PNL only—do not see any way to continue to subscribe to positions we consider anti-Romanian, even anti-European.

[Rosca-Stanescu] Without intending to cause a rift between you and Mr. Nicolae Manolescu [president of the Civic Alliance Party, PAC], I would like you to comment on the repeated assertions of the PAC president, namely that as long as the bourgeoisie and the social class of farmers are missing, neither the PNL nor the PNTCD has a mass base.

[Campeanu] Back in the days when the PNL was founded there was no bourgeoisie. We generated it.

Remember the speech of Bratianu. He said in Parliament: "Get rich!" This is what we also say: "Get rich!" But only in a law-abiding way. This is how bourgeoisie should be generated. The bourgeoisie is that middle class of people that no society can do without. The meaning behind this notion is much broader today. In the West, workers, foremen, and company directors all belong to the bourgeoisie.

[Rosca-Stanescu] You brought up the idea of separating general elections from the presidential ones. I also think it appropriate to hold separate elections, at least to avoid confusing the electorate. How do you assess your chances in reaching this goal?

[Campeanu] I last dealt with on this issue a few days ago at the Presidential Palace in Cotroceni. Aside from the reason you already mentioned, there is another one, too: to avoid influencing general elections in a negative way. The competition among many political personalities will virtually influence the option of voters. General elections are more important than the presidential ones. The next Parliament—which I very much wish to be balanced—will really lay the foundations of tomorrow's Romania. General elections should not be influenced by any other considerations. Tomorrow's Parliament is the source of power.

[Rosca-Stanescu] Romania now has the chance to reach a balance in Parliament. It will probably happen like that. Yet, the personality of the president representing us is very important for Romania's image in the world. Democratic countries are waiting for a partner with whom they can hold a dialogue. In your assessment, is the opposition able to nominate a single candidate, and who will eventually win?

[Campeanu] This is something we still have to talk about. In fact, I do not consider this to be a problem. In the run-off of the presidential elections there will be two candidates left in the race anyway, one belonging to the opposition and one to the National Salvation Front [FSN]. The question is whether we should nominate a single candidate from the very beginning. No one can offer himself to run as our single candidate. The member parties should decide on this. Until now, two candidates have emerged from among the CD member parties: Mr. Manolescu and Mr. Stancescu.

[Rosca-Stanescu] Mr. Manolescu said that he will comply with all decisions of the CD.

[Campeanu] We will see. Anyway, I will say it again: I do not believe that there should be independent candidates in a democracy. We have not talked about this at all in our party. The Standing Delegation [steering body of PNL] will meet on April 11. We will then make our decision.

[Rosca-Stanescu] I have learned from trade union sources that you held interesting talks with the representatives of the employees. The question could be raised whether this courting of the trade unions by the PNL is

more than a mere political maneuver, whether the promises you make are void of any real basis.

[Campeanu] No. You are right, there is a certain amount of sympathy surrounding us. It is a kind of cherishing. This is the result of our year-long common activity with the trade unions. As a result of this cooperation, we answered some union demands positively. We unconditionally endorsed certain union demands both in the Senate and in the Deputies' Assembly. Of course, we only endorsed the demands we considered fair. Aside from this, there is another basic element: We think that trade unions play a very important role in modern society. In our view, no company can prosper unless its managers take a very keen interest in the well-being of the employees. I have to tell you that the union leaders—and I almost made the acquaintance of them all—seemed to be very well prepared persons. They ponder matters very well; they consider them with a great sense of responsibility.

[Rosca-Stanescu] The liberals' joining the current government turned out to be no mistake; on the contrary, it proved to be an intelligent political gesture that bore fruit. Would the PNL be able to govern alone today? How do you assess the composition of the executive after the next general elections?

[Campeanu] I thank you for your positive assessment. Among other results, correct elections were organized with our contribution. That is what we aim to do during the general elections, too. Without exaggerating, if we also consider the great number of people we have in different counties, especially in the 45-50 age bracket, we could set up two fully manned executive teams. After the next general elections there is not going to be any majority party. This means that during the next four years we will have coalition cabinets. The PNL will certainly play an important role. The new cabinet will have a well-defined program for ruling and developing Romania. We are so sure of this that our teams of experts—setting out from the principles laid down in our party program—have already started designing the future and giving concrete solutions even to such detail issues, like our customs policy.

[Rosca-Stanescu] What other political groups would you like to have join you in this union of the opposition?

[Campeanu] We would welcome any group that wants to associate with us, except for extremists. Perhaps you are hinting at rumors, according to which a more reformist faction of the FSN would like to join the CD, or that they offered us a kind of an alliance, which would have decisive consequences. This problem has not arisen.

[Rosca-Stanescu] Mr. Petre Roman reiterated on 12 March [at the meeting of the FSN Steering Commission] his opinion that the historic parties stand for the archaic right. How would you answer him?

[Campeanu] Mr. Roman is neither well-informed in matters of politics, nor in those of history. This term

"archaic" itself is stupidly polemic. I wonder whether true archaism lives in the act of qualifying others as archaic.

[Rosca-Stanescu] Rumors say that there are certain arrangements between you and Mr. Iliescu, a kind of devil's pact.... More recently even more detailed rumors were heard, according to which Mr. Iliescu will endorse you to become the president of the country, in exchange for which you were said to have promised to protect those "values" Iliescu safeguarded and promoted.

[Campeanu] There have also been rumors saying Iliescu will become president and I will become prime minister. I have no arrangement whatsoever with Mr. Iliescu.

Spiroiu Denies Plans To Remove Gen. Cheler

92P20209A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 18 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by R.C.: "General Cheler Remains"]

[Text] Sources in Parliament have stated that Minister of National Defense Lt. Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu intends to remove General Paul Cheler from the command of the Army of Transylvania. It seems that the attitude of General Cheler, which was very imperious in some tense situations in Transylvania, has not been to the liking of certain political forces in Romania. However, it is believed that such a decision by the minister, to remove General Cheler from the command of the Army of Transylvania, will arouse the discontent of other political parties and of the Romanian population in Transylvania for whom the general "has become almost a symbol." When asked about this, Mr. Nicolae Spiroiu replied that he "does not intend to do such a thing."

Parliament Marks Bessarabia's Anniversary

AU2603142292

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0722 GMT on 26 March carries a live relay from Parliament Hall in Bucharest of a "solemn session to mark the 74th anniversary of the union of Bessarabia with Romania" in 1918. During the session the Professor Radu Ciucianu, historian and vice president of the Deputies' Chamber, reads a paper on the "historical moment of the 1918 union of Bessarabia with Romania."

Ciucianu begins by requesting the parliament members to allow him to present "a brief history of the territories between the Prut and Dneestr Rivers, which are so dear to us."

He recalls the union of Bessarabia with Romania, which "turned the year 1918 into the monument of the homeland's union and of the union of all Romanian provinces, after centuries on end during which the body of the country was torn by the three empires that surrounded our borders." Ciucianu quotes the Romanian poet Mihai Eminescu for defining Russians and its policy prevailing on the eastern part of Bessarabia, as "springing from

Mongolian races that by nature are conquering people and settled on wide steppes whose monotony affects human intelligence, making it lack gentleness and giving it fanatic instincts for ideas of vague greatness. Russia is equally the mother of pride, of fanaticism, and of despotism." Ciucianu recalls the fact that Bessarabia was named after the Moldavian ruler Bessarab I "who conquered the territories north of the Danube after the battles waged with the Tartars, and these territories, conquered from Tartars, were called Bessarabia" and says that thus, as of 14th century Bessarabia's history was part and parcel of Moldova's history.

Ciucianu says that the 18th century was marked by Russia's expansionist policy toward the West and reached Moldova's borders in 1792 at the Dnestr River. He talks further about the conquest of Moldova by Alexander I, and on the agreement reached with Napoleon, in which "the existence of the Romanian state of Moldova on the Left Bank of the Prut River is nullified to justify the act of tearing away a foreign territory by the tsarist empire." In 1912 Turkey gave up this territory to Russia "to which it did not have either political or historical rights."

Ciucianu mentions that "there has never been a moment in Bessarabia's history in which the Romanian population was not the majority." He recalls a 1917 census according to which 80 percent of Bessarabia's population was Romania, which was followed by a Russian population increase. He says that "democratic mutations were due to the exodus of Romanians over the Dnestr River and to the right bank of the Prut River. He also recalls certain measures of Tsar Alexander I to prevent the exodus of people from this region and although the peasants and landowners received certain rights, they were controlled by "top officials appointed by St. Petersburg." During this time, all decisions were taken in both Romanian and Russian languages. When Russian governor replaced Romanian governors, the Russian language started prevailing in administration. He recalls the errors of the Russian administration that brought about the exodus of Romanian ethnics and gives various examples of the "inhuman, barbarian treatment" of Romanians by Russians under Tsars Alexander I and later Tsar Nikolay, after Bessarabia's autonomy was canceled. At that time "Romanian language was banned in all institutions," and the population started becoming increasingly Russian. He names a few Romanian families that "remained faithful to the great national ideals" in that period.

Ciucianu recalls "the process of Russification of indigenous element" in the second half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century and the "movements of national revival" in that period. Ciucianu recalls that in the World War I, 200,000 Romanians in Bessarabia were incorporated into the Russian Army. He enumerates various rallies held by Romanians in that period such as "2-3 May 1917 Chisinau Congress of priests and 20 May 1917 teachers' congress, during which the replacement of Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet was decided."

In the Army, "Romanians set up national unity groups." Ciucianu further speaks of Bessarabia during "the Bolshevik" period and battles waged between Russians and Romanians. He says that the country's Assembly was opened on 4 December 1917 in Chisinau, with 120 delegates attending. On 15 December 1918 the Moldovan Democratic Republic was proclaimed, and Romanians in Tiraspol called for the union of Moldova and Bessarabia. On 6 January 1918 the Bessarabian Government called for the Romanian Government's military assistance. Some Transylvanian units were engaged in this action, however, "Bolshevik troops began the communist terror."

On 27 January 1918 "the Romanian Army entered Bessarabia, the ancient land, and action that was long desired and expected by people and was received enthusiastically throughout the country." On 27 March 1918 the Grand Assembly of the country on Chisinau adopted the declaration of union, which included 11 points. The Soviet State did not accept the union and tried to undermine this act by starting "to recruit Gagauz people." In 1934 diplomatic relations resumed between Romania and Russia and in 1939 the Ribbentrop Molotov act was signed in Moscow. On 22 June 1941 the Romanian Army started the offensive "as an act of historical justice" and "the aggressively torn territories by Russians came back to the motherland."

Ciucianu concludes by saying "any type of return to the barriers that separated brothers for tens and hundreds of years is impossible. Bessarabia does not belong to anybody because it belonged and continues to belong to the Romanian people and because our forefathers and great forefathers were born on its territory, and the sons of the same Romanian nation will be born and live there."

Draft Declaration Read

AU2603103392 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 0755 GMT 26 Mar 92

["Draft Declaration of the Romanian Parliament" read by Senate Vice President Vasile Mois at the joint session of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest on 26 March—live]

[Text] Romania's Parliament, the Senate and the Deputies' Chamber—Solemn declaration of the Romanian Parliament occasioned by the 74th anniversary of the union of Bessarabia with Romania.

The chambers of the Romanian Parliament met in a solemn session on 26 March 1992 on the occasion of the 74th anniversary of the union of Bessarabia with Romania and declared the following:

It has been 74 years since the country's assembly, as a result of the wish of the Romanians and of other ethnic inhabitants of Bessarabia, decided on the union with Romania. This was a historic step toward the completion of the union of all Romanians in a national unitary state, which was achieved on 1 December 1918.

Bessarabia, the historic act reads, within its borders between the Prut, Dnestr, and Danube Rivers and the Black Sea and its old borders with Austria, torn away from the body of the old Moldova by Russia, in accordance with the historical right and the national right and on the basis of the principles that the nations should independently decide their destiny, as of today and forever, is united with the mother country, Romania.

The year 1940 again brought black clouds over Romania. As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Bessarabia was again torn away from the body of the country and entered under Soviet occupation.

For our brothers from beyond the Prut River, the Golgotha [site of Jesus' crucifixion] of all types of suffering and the ordeal of deportation, of population dislocation, and denationalization of Romanians began.

For the Bessarabian Romanians the flame of hope that was faintly flickering for scores of years, started to intensify at the time of the restructuring process in the former USSR and exploded into a flood of light on 27 August 1991, when the Republic of Moldova declared its state independence. The old structures, as well as the hostile forces closely linked to the old regime and the imperial tendencies, could not accept the idea of an independent state, and mostly the prospect of its union with Romania, and started the organization of certain destabilizing actions through the establishment of the so-called independent republics. Currently, we are witnessing bloody actions directed against the peaceful civilian Romanian population, particularly on the left bank of the Dnestr River and against the statal structures of the Republic of Moldova.

At this difficult time, when the national being of the Republic of Moldova is endangered, we declare our unconditioned solidarity with our Bessarabian brothers and we express our confidence that in the nearest future, justice will prevail and appropriate political solutions will be found for the current conflicts. Within this context, we hail the position regarding Moldova adopted in Kiev by the heads of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], an attitude that is in accordance with the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and of the CSCE process and that is an important step on the road of finding political solutions to the dramatic situation in this republic.

We particularly value the energetic measures taken by Ukraine with a view to banning the transit of destabilizing forces over its territory toward the Republic of Moldova, and we express our belief that through joint efforts of the states that succeeded the former USSR, the road toward escalation of interethnic conflicts and interstate conflicts will be barred.

As a representative of the will of the nation, the Romanian Parliament is turning to the parliaments of the European countries, primarily to the Russian Parliament, the United Nations, and to all the other international organizations, calling on them to support the

Republic of Moldova, an independent state and member of the United Nations, with a view to finding solutions to the serious problems it is confronted with and guarantee its security and territorial integrity.

The declaration has been adopted at the solemn session of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament on 26 March 1992.

[Signed] President of the senate, Academician Alexandru Barladeanu, and president of the Deputies Chamber, Dan Martian

Pacifists Urge Aggression Against Moldova Halted

*AU2603184592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1821 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 26/3/1992—The pacifists of Romania call on the pacifists of the International Peace and Conciliation Federation in Moscow to take attitude and put an end to the serious aggression of the Cossack mercenaries against the population of the Republic of Moldova left of the Dnestr, reads an appeal of the Peace Alliance of Romania sent to ROMPRES on Thursday, March 26, for release.

Expressing "full consensus" with the pacifists in the Republic of Moldova who ask that an end be put to aggression, mercenaries be withdrawn and conflicts be solved through negotiations, the Romanian pacifists are of the opinion that "a new Karabakh on the Dnestr is unacceptable" and "demand most imperiously that the hotbed of civil war in the Dnestr region be extinguished," the declaration of the setting up of the Commonwealth of Independent States which proclaims territorial inviolability, respect for the independence and sovereignty of all the signatory countries be observed to the letter.

Nastase Comments on Helsinki CSCE Conference

*AU2603195492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1712 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 26/3/1992—Assessing that the present CSCE conference in Helsinki tries to find an answer to the questions the developments in Europe pose to all the 51 participating countries, Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase stressed that the future European security forum should provide for the continuation of negotiations on questions related to armaments, troops and what is generally called disarmament. In his opinion an economic forum might be launched, an idea promoted by Romania.

As for humanitarian issues the Romanian foreign minister notes a "clear shift from a general approach to human rights to a more specific approach to minorities issues." Adrian Nastase notes that "groups have been formed pursuing the taking out of ethnic minorities questions from the general approach to human rights and turn them into a political issue which leads to the idea that this is an alternative formula for territorial

claims, an attempt being made to focus attention on situations in certain geographic zones." In this context Adrian Nastase referred to the concern of some states for minorities abroad and the tendency to consider that the minorities issue is no longer an internal issue," Adrian Nastase added. In his opinion "this is a big mistake since

this question is first of all internal and only then international within certain limits and under certain circumstances." "It is obvious that the only one able to implement the rights of minorities is the state in the territory of which the respective minorities live," the Romanian foreign minister stressed.

International**Government, UN Agree on Draft Document**

*LD2703000992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2312 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—Agreement between the Government of Yugoslavia and the United Nations on the status of a U.N. protection force (UNPROFOR) will in no way prejudice the future status of Yugoslavia, says a draft document submitted by the Yugoslav Government to the federal parliament today. The document specifies that agreement is exclusively aimed at facilitating the implementation of Resolution No. 743 of the Security Council, which envisages for deploying a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia.

The provisions of the agreement and obligations assumed by the Yugoslav Government will apply throughout the territory of Yugoslavia, it is being set out. The draft agreement specifies that UNPROFOR shall consist of military, police and civilian components, without locally recruited personnel. The military component shall comprise military and civilian personnel provided by the participating states, the police component - police personnel, and the civilian - officials of the United Nations.

UNPROFOR troops and civilians shall refrain from taking actions which are not in accordance with the objective and international nature of their duties. They shall undertake to respect all local laws and regulations.

Under the draft agreement, UNPROFOR personnel and material, bearing the insignia of the U.N., shall enjoy communications facilities. With the consent of the Yugoslav Government, UNPROFOR shall be permitted to mount and use radio transceiver stations, and to use satellite systems and the U.N. global telecommunications network.

UNPROFOR members shall have freedom of movement inside their areas of operation, towards access points to zones of operation, as well as those points which shall subsequently be agreed between the force commander and the Yugoslav Government. Under the draft agreement, the Yugoslav Government shall respect UNPROFOR's right to import equipment, material and foodstuffs for its needs free of customs duty and other restrictions.

The draft agreement envisages also for the Yugoslav Government, in agreement with the UNPROFOR commander, providing free of charge accommodation and office space for the use of UNPROFOR personnel. The cost of the maintenance of the facilities and equipment shall be borne by UNPROFOR.

Kostic Writes to Ghali on Rights Abuses

*LD2703030992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0048 GMT 27 Mar 92*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—Regions of the multi-national Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which Serbs are the majority population and where regular units of the Yugoslav People's Army are located, have lately become the target of an aggression of sorts by Croatian and Moslem armed paramilitary formations, it is said in a letter which Yugoslav State Presidency Vice-President Branko Kostic sent to U.N. Secretary General Butrus Ghali.

According to available information, para-military formations, particularly the Croatian Defence Alliance (HOS—an armed formation of the pro-Fascist Croatian Party of Right) from Croatia are crossing into and taking over certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, bringing in and using heavy artillery against the civilian Serbian population and the Army, it is said in Kostic's letter.

Kostic gave examples: the region of Siroki Brijeg, in western Herzegovina, where forces of breakaway Croatia brought 203 mm howitzers, the region of Mostar, where there are 120 mm mortars and recoilless guns, the region of Bosanski Brod and Travnik, where they brought anti-aircraft guns and other heavy armaments. Kostic informed Ghali that Croatian para-military formations had, in the past few days, provoked many clashes which had caused the loss of life and injuries and extensive material damage.

All this is done with the aim to shift the focus of armed clashes to Bosnia-Herzegovina and create new hot-beds of crisis, which would in turn slow down or frustrate the implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, as Kostic said in his letter.

He informed Ghali that the Yugoslav Presidency and other Federal bodies would undertake all necessary steps to hold the ceasefire and ensure all conditions for the early arrival of the "blue helmets", asking the U.N. secretary general to do everything in his power to "prevent further tragic developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and enable a successful course of the U.N. peacekeeping operation."

Interrepublic**Republics Agree To Abandon Economic Barriers**

*LD2603223792 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2124 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Brussels, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—The representatives of the six Yugoslav Republics to the economic working group of the Brussels Conference on Peace for Yugoslavia agreed in principle to do away with the existing inter-republican economic barriers. It has been

learned here that the officials have coordinated most of the text of a draft economic declaration which will be submitted for debate at a plenary session of the Yugoslavia conference, scheduled for April 1, after the remaining differences have been ironed out.

Under the agreement, the Yugoslav Republics will be invited at the session to scrap the barriers to mutual trade. The draft declaration binds the participants in the conference to refrain from imposing fresh unilateral measures which might restrict mutual trade and to gradually lift, in the shortest possible time, all restrictive measures, especially those imposed since January 1, 1990. The draft declaration specifically refers to all obstacles to trade, both legal and physical, including tariffs and quotas.

The document further provides for a resumption of telecommunication and transport links among the Yugoslav Republics. A special agreement on emergency measures would regulate a resumption of disrupted economic ties, such as deblocking of the electric power system and the oil pipeline, and guarantee a stable legal status to the citizens and [word indistinct].

The draft declaration envisages also for measures which should guarantee the freedom of movement and the refugees' return to their homes. TANJUG learns from well-informed sources here that Serbia's representatives to the working group clearly specified that the declaration will not be implemented until the European Community has guaranteed the participation of all in the conference on an equal footing and until it has lifted the economic sanctions imposed on Serbia on November 23 last.

Serbian-Croatian Mail Services Return to Normal

*LD2503094292 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1842 GMT 24 Mar 92*

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—The Serbian Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) Company today confirmed that the postal service between that Yugoslav republic and the breakaway Republic of Croatia was gradually returning to normal. Letters from Serbia to various destinations in Croatia have so far had to be sent via Ljubljana, Slovenia. At the proposal of the Croatian PTT Company, the Serbian PTT will resume the reception and distribution of mail from Croatia. Telephone communication between Serbia and Croatia has not yet been restored, say officials of the Yugoslav PTT organization. Late last year, Croatia unilaterally decided to sever telephone communication with Serbia. The Yugoslav PTT today informed that officials of the Serbian and Croatian PTT companies would meet in Ljubljana tomorrow to discuss telephone communication between the two republics.

The Croatian PTT today only said it was resuming postal service with Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, disrupted in mid-November last. TANJUG learns that

[word indistinct]-brokered meeting will be held in Belgrade, Zagreb or some other town soon to decide if and when telephone communication between Serbia and Croatia will be resumed. The Yugoslav Railway Federation today said that railway traffic had been resumed between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, across the bridge on the Sava river between the towns of Bosanski Samac, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slavonski Samac, Croatia. Traffic across this only railway bridge between the two republics was disrupted on February 5, after the bridge was damaged in an explosion.

Slovene, Macedonian Air Links Established

*LD2503212392 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 2100 GMT 24 Mar 92*

[Text] Today in Ohrid, Slovenia and Macedonia signed an air traffic agreement stipulating an early direct link between Ljubljana and Skopje. It is the turn of enterprises and organizations to devise their own interest and methods of cooperation between the two states.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

JNA Refuses To Withdraw From Bosanski Brod

*LD2603201292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1928 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Sarajevo, 26 Mar (TANJUG)—In his interview tonight with Sarajevo Television, Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of the Second Army District, rejected the possibility of withdrawing the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) units from Bosanski Brod. Kukanjac emphasized that the Army did not take part in the clashes in Bosanski Brod and that so far it had not fired a single shot, but that it would not withdraw from this town's territory because it was known that the units of the Croatian armed forces often crossed into Bosnia-Herzegovina and that strong Croatian forces existed in Slavonski Brod. In his interview, Kukanjac called on the citizens not to fall for rumors and provoke clashes with the Army because the consequences of such clashes could be very heavy.

Tensions Heighten

*AU2703144992 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Text] The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is increasingly more dramatic. Zivko Savkovic reports on what happened in Bosanski Brod on the evening of 26 March:

[Correspondent Savkovic] There was a tragedy in the suburb of Sijekovac. According to unofficial information, about 10 Serbs were killed and many houses destroyed. The justification for this tragedy is also sad. Local radio has been repeating the communique of the occupational crisis headquarters, which states that Serbs killed and massacred each other. Occupation forces are blatantly lying, claiming that the Zecevcis wanted to

return arms as requested by the crisis headquarters, but because of that, the Bacics and Milosevics attacked them. A group of women and children managed to escape from that area. They claimed the Serbs were massacred. They were killed with the knives of the successors of the criminals who killed about 2,000 Serbs in this area about five decades ago.

Armed attacks on the Serbian territories are not subsiding. Since about mid-day on 27 March, mortar and artillery fire has been intensified from the town and other areas. Tedo Kusnjic, commander of the defense of the Brodsko Polje local community, claims that the east part of this local commune was hit by 205-mm shells last night. Ten or 11 such shells came from Croatia, Kusnjic claims.

Maltreatment and harassment of Serbs and Yugoslav-oriented citizens continues, as does the forced evacuation into Slavonski Brod. In the town of Bosanski Brod, which is held by the Croatian occupation forces, there are now many more occupation soldiers than citizens. The Serbian part of the commune is also being evacuated, but the crisis headquarters in Lijesce claims they will not give their territories to the occupier even if it means losing their lives.

Refugees from the town on 27 March claimed that a large group of soldiers with the sign U on their caps [allusion to Ustashes] arrived from Slavonski Brod early on 27 March. We have also learned from unofficial but reliable sources that oil products from the federal reserves in the Bosanski Brod refinery are being exported to Slavonski Brod. As we said, this has not been confirmed, but it is very probable.

Serbs Criticize Republican Authorities

*AU2603152492 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] At the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Brussels, the Serb representatives will not allow the terms of the agreement that has been reached to be violated. This was the answer to yesterday's statement by the Party of Democratic Action in which the party opposed the division and transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nebojsa Nikolic reports from a news conference at the headquarters of the Serbian Democratic Party:

[Begin Nikolic recording] The communique issued by the Serbian Democratic Party today states that the war psychosis is increasingly prevalent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that it is obvious that the protagonists and advocates of the conflict in this republic are doing everything possible to transfer fighting from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is more than obvious that the paramilitary formations of the HOS [Croatian Defense Union] are assuming control of areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina populated by Croats and that they are causing misunderstandings. They are trying to create ethnically pure regions and

establish Croatian state authorities in some regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, says the communique.

It is high time for the presidency and government to put an end to the HOS paramilitary formations, which are causing conflicts, and take a stand on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina that has been occupied by HOS soldiers. Only in this way can further tensions and conflicts be prevented and the necessary dialogue and functioning of the republican organs ensured, the party stresses.

Dr. Biljana Plavsic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the Committee for the Protection of Constitutional Order, described the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as tense. She expressed the party's view that the tensions are caused by the intentions of the Party of Democratic Action to prevent the transformation of this republic and the arrival of the blue helmets.

The Presidency and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina have not said anything against the arrival of paramilitary formations from Croatia. Dr. Ejup Ganic blames the Army for the situation in Bosanski Brod and the surrounding areas. All of this is resulting in attacks on the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Plavsic said. According to her, the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina are ready to do anything in order to defend their rights and will not allow violation of the agreement reached on the future organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the conference in Brussels on 30-31 March our delegation will insist on further talks, proceeding from the document that was accepted by Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic, and Mate Boban eight days ago, the Serbian Democratic Party said. Asked why Ejup Ganic was substituting for Izetbegovic, Plavsic said that, as far as she knew, Izetbegovic was visiting Saudi Arabia. [end recording]

Demand UN, EC Prevent Aggression

*LD2603193992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1725 GMT 26 Mar 92*

[Text] Sarajevo, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—Serb members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency today called on the United Nations (U.N.) and European Community (E.C.) to prevent an aggression by the armed forces of Croatia on this Yugoslav republic and to make it possible for the resolving of the Yugoslav crisis to continue within the international conference on Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the past fortnight, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the target of coordinated armed aggression from armed Croatian and Moslem paramilitary units, underscored a letter which Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic today sent to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus Ghali, Yugoslavia conference president Lord Carrington, the E.C. ministerial council president, and the president of the Yugoslav Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations.

The aggression comes both from the south (the municipality of Neum) and from the north (Bosanski Brod), and is especially directed on Serb populated towns and villages and regular units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the letter pointed out. In the mentioned parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian and Moslem paramilitary forces have been firing for days at neighbouring Serb-populated villages and JNA units. The letter underscored that "Moslem and Croat members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership are extremely passive" in the face of the fact that a foreign aggressor (Croatia) is carrying out military operations in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while attempts by the Serbs to defend themselves and the JNA to protect its troops have been proclaimed an aggression on this republic.

The Serb people and JNA units in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina are in a highly defensive position regardless of their objective military power since they expect the international community to react in a correct manner, the letter said. Underscoring also the strong offensive by the armed forces of the breakaway Republic of Croatia on the territories where U.N. forces are to be deployed, the letter said that the objective of all these activities was to prevent the deployment of U.N. troops in the crisis areas which are within the former administrative boundaries of Croatia and to prevent the transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on principles agreed on at the international conference on this Yugoslav republic.

The heads of the leading national parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed last week that this republic become a state composed of three constituent units based on an ethnic principle and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria. All the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina are proceeding with full approval of the legal organs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but with open opposition from the minority Serb representatives in the organs of authority, whose stand is disregarded. The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina includes 44 percent Moslems, 32 percent Serbs, and 17 percent Croats. A coalition of three national parties is in power in this republic - Moslem, Serb and Croat. Under the constitution of this multi-ethnic republic, all decisions of vital importance must be adopted through consensus.

Karadzic Insists on Sovereignty of Units

AU2603214892 Belgrade RTB Television Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Mar 92

["Excerpt" from interview with Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Jovan Markovic on 26 March; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Jovanovic] The Brussels round of the talks is awaiting you. What do you personally expect from the talks there?

[Karadzic] I expect pressure. I expect great pressure. That is to say, I do not know what to expect after the

Party of Democratic Action [SDA] has changed its mind. I think that Europe will be astonished, because Europe is not used to something like this, where something is first accepted and then withdrawn.

We shall be very resolute on this occasion, however, very resolute. Because the SDA has betrayed the agreements, we will proclaim our constitution [constitution of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina] on Friday [27 March]. The constitution has already been proposed and adopted and there is absolutely no reason for us not to not proclaim it if the gentlemen from the SDA want to (?weaken our position) by the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the same time wait for someone in Europe to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state. Everyone in this world can recognize it, but if the Serbs, the Serbs who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, do not recognize it, than it does not exist. Bosnia shall be the way its peoples agree for it to be. The decision cannot be imposed by one or two peoples. It must be agreed upon.

First, we will proclaim the constitution tomorrow. Then we shall say in Brussels that there will be no more withdrawal, that we want our sovereign and constituent unit, as sovereignty has already been achieved for the residents of Serb, Croat, and Muslim nationalities and other peoples. This sovereignty will be implemented first in the constituent unit and then in the central organs.

Therefore, constituent units are sovereign state forms of the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim peoples— of the residents and peoples, of course. We will put forward a clear solution to the EC as to what is going on, and we will show them how the SDA has weakened [zamajati] the EC, the Serbian Democratic Party, and Croatian Democratic Community by expecting that someone will give Bosnia-Herzegovina independence. The proclamation of independence means nothing if this state cannot function.

Deputy Premier Rejects Rumors of New Currency

AU2603195592 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 18 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Muhamed Cengic, deputy prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by El. Ka.; place and date not given: "Nothing To Hide"]

[Text] Is Bosnia-Herzegovina going to start issuing its own currency soon? This question has raised a lot of dust recently. The National Bank of Yugoslavia has decreased the deliveries of dinars to this republic due to unofficial announcements on the launching of the Bosnia-Herzegovina currency. For the same reason there has been a temporary disruption in the payment operations with Serbia. We asked Muhamed Cengic, deputy prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what the truth was, and if, as rumors would have it, his government has already printed its own currency.

[Cengic] We are working on a study that will show us if there are ways in which we can protect ourselves against

what is currently happening, and that is an enormous output of dinars with no logic behind it that is ruining Bosnia-Herzegovina's production. Once that study is complete, we will get a clear picture regarding the possibility of issuing our own currency. These rumors that we will secretly and overnight start printing our own money are unfounded. For example, everyone was saying that our currency would come out on 5 March, and, as we can see, they were wrong. If we decide to make such a move, and that will happen if we are still prevented from having control over the Topcider Printing House, then we will make that move publicly. I want all those who claim that they "heard from the horse's mouth" that this money was already being printed in Switzerland, Turkey, and so on, to know that this is not true. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if it decides to introduce its own currency, will promptly inform the other republics when this will happen, what the currency will look like, what it will be called....

[El. Ka.] Another current matter is the announcement from the Federal Institute for Statistics that this year's inflation will be over 10,000 percent. Is your government preparing any anti-inflationary program?

[Cengic] Under these circumstances the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot work on an adequate anti-inflationary program, since it does not depend entirely on us, but also on Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. It is going to remain that way for as long as we have the same currency, and we from Bosnia-Herzegovina have no influence or control over the federal monetary policy. It is very difficult to work on a partial anti-inflationary program, because it will not produce adequate results.

Port of Ploce Rights Considered

92BA0666D Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Dr. Momir Cecez, former adviser in the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "Why Is Bosnia-Herzegovina Silent?"]

[Text] At a time when many important and unimportant questions are being raised and discussed, competent authorities in B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] are silent about the rights of the economy of B-H in the Port of Ploce. The transportation ties to the Port of Ploce of the B-H economy are well-known. In many enterprises, normal production and indeed even maintenance of business activity depend on the possibility of importing and exporting goods and the financial conditions for services in the Port of Ploce. The public learned this during the recent blockade or stoppage of operation in that port, but the public is less aware that the Capljina-Ploce railroad line was financed by the Sarajevo Railroad Transportation Enterprise, that is, by B-H, and it is also less well-known that about 80 percent of the funds to build and equip installations in the Port of Ploce were supplied by enterprises in B-H. Now Croatia is taking over the Metkovic-Ploce railroad line and installations in the

Port of Ploce, although capital of the economy of B-H was invested in them. At the same time, Croatia is demanding from Slovenia that it deliver 50 percent of power from the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant, because that was its share in financing that plant, and it is opposed to plans to shut it down.

Who in B-H is concerned with and protecting the interests of its economy and population in the Port of Ploce, which has vital importance to the economy of B-H? What is the reason for the silence of the bodies of government, the Presidency, and the government of B-H, why are our rights not being brought up at the conference in Brussels? Why are the incumbent political parties quiet, because protection of the vital interests of B-H is the true and authentic struggle for its sovereignty, not empty talk about sovereignty? Finally, what is the reason for the silence of the businessmen who head the Zenica Steel Mill, the Lukavac Coking Plant, "Energo-invest," "Sipad," and others, why is the Economic Chamber of B-H silent; can it be that they do not see the future, can it be that they are not wondering how they will do business the very day after Croatia seeks payments in foreign exchange for port services and transportation services, and if it should also unilaterally set unjustifiably high port costs and fees?

According to the customary and normal laws of a market economy, and indeed according to the principles of practice, enterprises are managed by those who have invested capital, and in this case this was mostly capital from the economy of B-H. It is therefore indispensable that the B-H government and chamber immediately take the necessary steps to exercise rights in management of the Port of Ploce and protect the interests of the B-H economy.

According to international principles and practice, every country whose economy and territory lie in the immediate hinterland of a port, and if that port is a natural outlet to the sea and to the world market, that state and its economy have the right to their own free section of the port. If ever such conditions did obtain, that is the position and importance of the Port of Ploce for B-H. In examination of all the possible questions concerning demarcation and the rights of inheritance from Yugoslavia, then, the B-H Presidency and government must immediately put the question at the international and domestic levels of its natural rights to a free port in the Port of Ploce. This is not an attack at all on anyone's territory or sovereignty, but a normal right and vital interest of the economy of B-H, which built the Port of Ploce for its own needs. I would just mention that had the situation been different, had Yugoslavia not been a unified state, B-H certainly would have built its port in Neum or under contract would have provided protection of its interests in the Port of Ploce before it invested in it.

At the same time, we also point out the interest which the Port of Ploce and the population of that city have in the maintenance and further construction of the Port of Ploce, because it is mainly the economy of B-H that is

interested in this, not the economy of Croatia. It is normal that Croatia, with the help of foreign capital, would maintain and broaden construction of the port at Rijeka and possibly in Split. That is why it is in the interest of that portion of the population of Croatia to arrive at an agreement with B-H so as to guarantee further normal development of that port.

These are historic times, and if the bodies of government of B-H do not demand and secure the rights of B-H and of its economy in the Port of Ploce, they will do immense damage to the economy of B-H and will commit a historic error, for which future generations and history will never forgive them.

Croatia

Serbian Krajina President Hadzic Interviewed

LD2503141392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1049 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, 25 Mar (TANJUG)—There is only one way to talk with the Croats, "like we have talked with them so far," Goran Hadzic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina said in an BORBA interview today.

However, he believes that "we have not spoken with them well enough. We should have spoken with them more sharply in order to be able to speak with them in real terms afterwards. Had we fought our way through up to Zagreb, which we could have done with our tanks and weapons, the issue of borders would have most probably been already settled. Now, we shall have to enter tedious and lengthy negotiations in which primarily European and world factors will participate and help us to start them at all".

"Pre-war storekeeper and driver" and now the "second president of unrecognized Republic of Serbian Krajina, as BORBA calls Hadzic, says that "where the Serbian people liberated its territories, where the Croatian banner never flew and where an Ustasha never set his foot, he will never do so. That will always be the Serbian land, the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Yugoslavia".

Hadzic stressed that the federal state was already in the process of putting border posts marked Yugoslavia along borders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina while the Krajina police controls border crossings. "It should not be feared that we are going to ruin the Serbs, that we shall leave them to Croatia, as some members of the fallen government keep remarking".

He claims he has no contact with the SPS (Serbian Socialist Party) along the party line or anything in common with it, adding: "I have good relations with Slobodan Milosevic. I believe he is the greatest Serbian politician alive today. I appreciate his work, but I do not tie this up with any party work".

With the proviso that "he is reserving his views in connection with the Serbian opposition" and that "the

real Serbian opposition was a group of intellectuals who surfaced a long time ago, especially Professor Ljubomir Tadic," Hadzic said he had close relations with Vojislav Seselj, Mirko Jovic and Milan Paroski because, he explained, they "took part in the liberation struggle of the Serbian people".

Hadzic revealed the fact that the government of Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem, which he headed, banned, one day before Dr. Milan Babic's government did so in Krajina, the activity of Communist organizations. The ban was never made public anywhere. The activity of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia was banned "only because it did not use democratic methods and operated in a stealthy manner and because it was counter-productive during the war and dangerous to the Serbian people."

Answering a question on the army withdrawal from RSK (Republic of Serbian Krajina) Hadzic said that it will not withdraw until "the blue helmets" have secured and totally guaranteed peace. According to him, the army in a section of the republic, the former SAO Krajina (Krajina Serbian Autonomous Region), is the people themselves "who now have to concern themselves with their own affairs, as they did before the war, and have to be prepared in the eventuality of an Ustasha attack".

"In Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem where there are many people who have been mobilized outside (the area in question) ... They will withdraw across the Danube, ready to come and help in the eventuality of an attack on RSK and do what their politicians had promised during that marathon session of the Yugoslav Presidency, to defend the people in Serbian Krajina", Hadzic stressed.

Defense Ministry Protests SFRY Army Command

LD2603200892 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] In connection with the latest enemy attacks, the Croatian Defense Ministry sent today the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces a strongly-worded protest because of the provocations and cease-fire violations which increasingly are turning into open attacks. The Defense Ministry protest says that the cease-fire was broken 272 times in the period between 21 and 25 March. During this period over 8,500 shells were fired on inhabited localities and in the direction of the Croatian army. Military actions were especially prominent on the northeastern section of the front, in the Osijek, Vinkovci, Valpovo, Nova Gradiska, and Pakrac areas. During this period 15 people were killed and 50 people wounded on the territory of the Croatian republic as a result of aggressor-military activity, says the Defense Ministry in its protest to the Yugoslav Army General Staff which was passed on to the Croatian office attached to the EC mission and to the UNPROFOR center in Sarajevo. They were asked to use all the means at their disposal to prevent the aggressor's very dangerous and fateful intentions.

Army Requests Talks on Demilitarization*LD2703030592 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0111 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Text] Herceg Novi, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Army on Thursday asked the Croatian military and civilian authorities in Dubrovnik to hold talks on a demilitarization of this medieval city in Croatia, on the Adriatic coast.

The Army representative at Thursday's negotiations with the Croatian military and civilian authorities in Mokosica, near Dubrovnik, protested against the re-arming of the Croatian forces in Dubrovnik, saying this was a gross violation of the Sarajevo ceasefire agreement, which was signed on January 2, and took effect on January 3. The Army spokesman said there were over 100 artillery weapons in Dubrovnik at the moment, 50 percent more than when the agreement was signed. He also said there were also tanks in Dubrovnik, which had not been there before. The Croatian side said the ceasefire had been grossly violated three times in the past week, between the two rounds of negotiations, adding there had been no casualties.

Army Assailed on 'Evicting' Minorities*LD2503192892 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Mar 92*

[Text] Milan Djukic, head of the Croatian Government Office for Interethnic Relations, sent a letter today to the command of the UN peace-keeping forces and the EC monitoring mission, the Croatian Government, and the Ministry of Information stressing that the increase in evicting the Croatian population and members of the Hungarian, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Slovak and other nationalities, and in burning and destroying their houses in occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, is a continuation of a genocidal policy being implemented by the so-called Yugoslav People's Army and Chetnik groups aiming to establish an ethnically pure territory. These cruel acts reveal the brutality of the enemy, who cares neither about the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement nor about the presence of the UN peace-keeping forces, but is going further in systematically implementing its plans, the letter stresses.

The letter goes on to say that the Croatian Government Office for Interethnic Relations, which was founded in order to protect all ethnic and national communities or minorities and harmonious interethnic relations in the Republic of Croatia, calls on the EC observer mission and the command of the UN peacekeeping forces to do everything to stop these crimes and thwart Serbia's plan of conquest.

Greguric Letter on Rights of Ethnic Serbs*92BA0679C Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 92 p 4*

[Reply of Dr. Franjo Greguric, Croatian prime minister, to the letter of Dr. M. Pupavac, president of the Serbian

Democratic Forum: "Your Proposals Have Already Been Appropriately Dealt With"]

[Text] Zagreb—Dr. Franjo Greguric, prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, has sent a letter to Dr. Milorad Pupavac, president of the Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF), in which he reports to him on implementation of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Liberties and on the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, and in connection with Pupavac's letter dated 18 February 1992.

"Your desire to establish bureaus of the Serbian Democratic Forum in all cities and towns in which Serbs represent a minority in order to see to the physical and legal security of citizens of the Republic of Croatia of Serbian nationality was taken under consideration as part of the solutions concerning the position of ethnic minorities in the Republic of Croatia contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, in the constitutional law referred to, and in other enactments.

"As you are well aware, Article 20 of the constitutional law provides that the government of the Republic of Croatia, in order to implement the constitutional law on the right of ethnic and national communities or minorities to culture, education, access to the public media, and realization of their proportional share in public services and other institutions, has an Office for Interethnic Relations. The Office for Interethnic Relations was established by an order of the government adopted in a meeting on 5 December 1990.

"The Office for Interethnic Relations performs specialized and other functions related to achieving the greatest harmony in interethnic relations in the Republic of Croatia. The office proposes measures for exercising the rights of all nationalities and minorities, monitors the enforcement of international conventions, gathers data and information on the interethnic relations in the republic, and proposes the application of particular models for interethnic relations.

"In addition to what we have said, the constitutional law provides for establishment of district offices for interethnic relations for the district of one or several opcinas in which the number and interest of members of ethnic or national communities or minorities require it.

"Accordingly, it is easy to see that the issues raised in your letter have already been dealt with favorably. The Office for Interethnic Relations, which is headed by Mr. Djukic, has been in operation for more than a year, and that is why there is no need whatsoever for those same tasks to be taken over either by the Serbian Democratic Forum or by any other organization or institution.

"I believe that you are aware that realization of your proposals would mean a derogation of the present system for protecting the rights of ethnic or national minorities in the Republic of Croatia insofar as they pertain to the very organization of the process of protecting the rights and position of ethnic minorities. We feel that no

grounds whatsoever exist for anything of that kind, because the Office for Interethnic Relations has proven in its work so far that it is entirely capable of performing the functions for which it was established. What is more, because it is concerned about the entirety of interethnic relations in the Republic of Croatia, the Office for Interethnic Relations advances relations between the Croatian nationality and all the ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Croatia.

"While we understand your concern for the position of members of the Serbian minority in the Republic of Croatia, we feel that the Serbian Democratic Forum should be much more actively and definitely involved in all forms of defense of the Republic of Croatia and all its citizens against the aggression of Serbia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA].

"This assessment equally applies to the present time, when the elementary security of Croats and other non-Serb citizens on the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia has been so brutally threatened by members of various irregular units from Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian JNA as well as by rebels and terrorists recruited from the ranks of citizens of the Republic of Croatia of Serbian nationality.

"While we regard every idea and proposal for improvement of interethnic relations welcome, we emphasize once again that your proposals have already been appropriately dealt with from the standpoint of legislation, organization, and personnel," Dr. Franjo Greguric concludes the letter.

Tudjman's Foreign Affairs Adviser Interviewed
92BA0689A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
15 Mar 92 p 11

[Interview with Dr. Mario Nobilo by Hido Biscevic; place and date not given: "Europe Has Had Enough of the Balkan Blockade"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] At the peace conference, Europe abandoned any sort of suggestion of a third Yugoslavia. Such a thing is impossible after the war. However, it is logical to expect that the new states will not remain perpetually atomized and that in future cooperation in Europe this region will not remain an "appendix," but rather that the process of European integration will extend to southeastern Europe as well. But the setup of these relations will not rest on supra-state, Yugo-centric constructions, but rather on beneficial interstate cooperation.

The rhythm accompanying the clearing up of the state and political crisis of the former Yugoslavia over the past months, given the dynamics of war, has been continually defined by the gradual maturing of international consciousness concerning the disappearance of a former state. In this sense, the process of internationalizing the crisis, from the very creation of the concept to

its political-diplomatic and negotiation-based realization, is one of the most intriguing aspects of the overall Croatian independence strategy.

Dr. Mario Nobilo, an adviser to the president of the Republic on foreign relations, is one of the direct participants in this process, and as such it is easier for him to identify the overall international context in which Croatian state independence endures. Considering that the recent declaration by the European Community and the United States, following talks between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and his European colleagues in Brussels, is manifoldly significant as a final act in the process of internationalizing and defining the final solution, Dr. Nobilo believes that this also marks the beginning of a new era, in which Croatia must define new strategic goals.

[Biscevic] The political content of the latest declaration by the European Community and the United States leads one to conclude that one era in finding a solution to the Yugoslav crisis is definitively over, that the final "rules of the game" have been established, and that a new, post-Yugoslav chapter has commenced in setting up relations among the six or five future subjects in this region. What is your assessment of the Brussels declaration and what, in your opinion, are its ultimate achievements and meaning?

[Nobilo] It is precisely through this declaration that any theory about a future reconstruction of Yugoslavia has been definitively removed from the agenda. The greatest contribution to this was provided by the changes in U.S. policy that we have sensed in recent weeks. It is essential, however, that this evolution has now been given concrete form in the Brussels declaration, which in fact amounts to an epilogue to the crisis on Yugoslav soil. Moreover, it is especially significant to us in Croatia that this declaration too is based on the principle of reciprocity, for example, with regard to defending minority rights, because we have insisted on that from the beginning. On the whole, this declaration is a sort of requiem for Yugoslavia.

I would say that the change in the U.S. position occurred once the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union took place—naturally, there is still the danger of local crises, like those in the Caucasus. It was then that the conditions were created for the turnaround in U.S. policy towards the area of the former Yugoslavia as well. One must state quite clearly, however, that the events in the Soviet Union alone would not have resulted in this sort of evolution in U.S. policy if it had not been for Croatia's determination to defend itself.

[Biscevic] Since from today's perspective one is impressed by the dissatisfaction voiced not infrequently in Croatia, of all places, with respect to European and U.S. policy, does there not remain a certain degree of anti-European and anti-U.S. psychosis here as well?

[Nobilo] Naturally, to those who have been most directly affected by the war in Croatia, to the hundreds of

thousands of refugees, to the thousands who have lost loved ones, the clearing up of the crisis seemed to come too slowly, and the impression is that Croatian policy in this sense exhibits a great deal of hesitation, inconsistency, etc. But when one evaluates this, one must realize that Croatia could not play with more forces and more cards than that which it actually had in its hand, and this under circumstances that were not at all favorable to Croatia, from the military to the international context. Impatience is understandable, but if one looks today at the beginning, the duration, and now the clear outcome of the crisis, then it is possible to state with confidence that this difficult and bloody road was crossed relatively quickly. With regard to the international situation, one can also say that the evolution of the international community's position, from Europe to the United States, in terms of renouncing Yugoslavia and subjectivizing the republics as states, also transpired over a relatively short period of time. All other international crises of a similar nature have lasted longer. Of course, it was to our advantage that this was ultimately a crisis on European soil and that in terms of its basic parameters it is similar to the situation in the Soviet Union.

[Biscevic] What effect have internal political differences had on Croatia's position in the negotiating process?

[Nobilo] Internal political differences have objectively weakened Croatia's negotiating position, because they have reinforced the wrong impression that Croatia does not believe in the peace process and is not interested in it. I do not wish to deny the fact that the opposition parties and political forces outside the government, through their international activities, also contributed to clearing up the crisis and to Croatia's affirmation on the international stage. This is especially true of the diaspora and of associations that sprang up all over the world. But one must also note that the opposition tried, more or less adroitly, to take advantage of all the dilemmas that came up by necessity during the peace process for their own political benefit. This is partly because it did not have full insight into all the details of that accelerated process of diplomatically resolving the crisis, although it must be honestly acknowledged that we made public the vast majority of the correspondence and documents, something that is quite unusual in diplomatic practice, in an attempt to keep the political public as well-informed as possible. But I have the impression that the opposition was trying to win points for the election campaign, especially around the question of the peacekeeping forces; however, I believe that precisely with the Brussels declaration, these divisions have been eliminated, and that the room for such criticism has now been curtailed radically. Indeed, I believe that it will be curtailed entirely once the entire peace plan begins to actually function, meaning the withdrawal of the armed forces, disarmament, the normalization of trade and life in those areas with the return of the exiles, and the gradual return of Croatian sovereignty to the zones under UN protection.

[Biscevic] If the "Yugoslav file" has now been definitively closed, and if even Washington has joined Europe in accepting the new states in this region, then by necessity the question arises of the setup of new relations between these new subjects in this exceptionally sensitive and strategic region.

[Nobilo] Yes, I think that at the peace conference Europe abandoned any sort of suggestion of a third Yugoslavia. However, it is logical to expect that the new states will not remain perpetually atomized and that in future cooperation in Europe this region will not remain an "appendix," but rather that the process of European integration will extend to southeastern Europe as well.

But the setup of these relations will not rest on supra-state, Yugo-centric constructions, but rather on normal, logical, and thus beneficial inter-state cooperation. This cooperation and its intensity will be characterized by direct relations among the states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but also by the position of these new subjects in the process of European integration.

Thus, through the process of integration—first through associate and then through full membership in the European integration efforts—new perspectives will open up by the end of this decade for all the states that will emerge on Yugoslav soil. The intensity of our reciprocal relations will also not be identical—for example, it is certain that Croatia will be interested in more stabile bilateral, as well as multilateral, relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina and with Slovenia than is the case, according to the logic of the geopolitical situation, with certain other republics.

The idea of establishing a free trade zone in this region seems realistic to me, and I personally think that Croatia must accept this idea. Because this does not constitute a restoration of old relations or the establishment of some sort of supra-state model, but rather a way to allow for the normal flow of goods, services, and people in an economic region that is interdependent, despite all the severed ties. Besides, Europe too is interested in a situation where there are not too many autarchic mini-states in a relatively small region of Europe, and where this atomized region from Central Europe to Asia Minor is "passable."

One must keep in mind here that this region has lost the geopolitical value that it had in a bipolar Europe, but I believe that joining the context of European integration will gradually bring with it a solution to all the problems that seem insurmountable right now, be it the organization of the Croatian zupanijas, regions with territorial autonomy, Bosnia-Herzegovian "constituent entities" or cantons, future borders between states... Europe will "engulf" this relatively small area—the difference between western Herzegovina and its natural link to the sea will be so minor in terms of development that that border will be just as symbolic as the borders between

Scandinavian countries, which will also formally become members of the European Community over the next few years.

The question of emphasis in relation to the region... I would say that the bulk of economic, political, cultural, and all other cooperation is being shifted by Croatia towards Central Europe and the Mediterranean.

Otherwise, the idea of whether we in this region will see the creation of something like "two spheres" of interstate regional cooperation based on the borders of certain historic divisions.... That is a matter of speculation. I personally believe that we will see two "rings" take shape, but that they will not necessarily be antagonistic and they will not necessarily be organized in the forms that existed during the era of a divided Europe.

[Biscevic] In this sense, what are the essential strategic frames of reference in Croatia's foreign policy platform for the coming period—what is the "sequence of steps"?

[Nobilo] In the short term, there will first be the period of "consummation" of U.S. recognition, as the final moment in the entire process of international affirmation of Croatia, whereby the exact moment when Washington deems it opportune to actually declare this publicly is not of critical importance.

All in all, the most important thing over the coming months is the successful conclusion of the Brussels conference. After that, the process of Croatia joining international organizations begins, especially international financial institutions, and then the United Nations as well. In terms of the financial and other needs for rebuilding the country, it would be useful if this process were completed as soon as possible. Next is the long-term process of establishing relations with European organizations. Most of all with the European Community—the initial contacts have already been established, and consideration is already being given to joining Croatia to the European Community.

[Biscevic] Is Croatia taking certain steps towards EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries, as a sort of "first step" towards the European Community?

[Nobilo] Yes, we are immediately interested in using part of the EFTA funding previously approved for Yugoslavia in order to rebuild Croatia. But in the long run, our relations with EFTA should be regarded in terms of the completely expected, gradual merger of the EC and EFTA, who have already created a unified European economic area. Thus, there are no prospects for Croatia joining EFTA.

I think that it is realistic to expect that Croatia will become a full member of the European Community by the end of the century, and thus over the next seven or eight years—the EC will first be engrossed in the gradual integration of EFTA countries, but it seems to me that we, together with the Hungarians, the Poles, and a few other countries, are in the "second circle."

Anyway, we need this period to harmonize all our standards, legislation, regulations, and all sorts of other structures in order that we can participate in these new processes without any "Euro-shock." Exposing ourselves all at once, especially after this war and with the economy that we have inherited, to the obligations and blessings of the European market... that could be too painful. We need a gradual approach, and during that time we must strengthen our cooperation with all programs, funds, and institutions within the European Community in order to complete this process as successfully as possible.

Even today, it is being said, for example, that the European Community could over the next year or two approve \$10 billion in aid for the former Yugoslav republics, which are now new states, through various programs, the majority of which, nearly 60 percent, would go to Croatia. But there are also certain conditions—accelerated privatization, further democratization, political and social stabilization, in short, a return to the reform processes that were later blocked by the impact of the war against Croatia.

Besides this, we will gain full membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe very quickly, and I believe that the door to the Council of Europe is also open to us, for which it will be necessary for the Assembly to adopt a certain "package" of international conventions that have been accepted by members of the Council of Europe, ranging from human rights to ecology, and then to integrate them into our domestic legislation.

[Biscevic] Of the international institutions, the IMF occupies a special position.

[Nobilo] As far as the International Monetary Fund is concerned, we can proceed in two ways. Either by seeking acceptance into those institutions as a new subject under international law... or we can insist—and I think that this is more favorable to Croatia—that the place and deposits of the former Yugoslav state in those institutions be divided according to some quota, which will, I believe, emerge as a final result of the peace process in Brussels. I think that this is the simplest way to transfer the rights and obligations to all the new subjects. Based on the insights gained thus far, one might expect things to move in this very direction.

Indeed, the U.S. and European position in the Brussels declaration of 9 March 1992 clearly states that Serbia and Montenegro can keep the name, but that this does not deprive the others of their right to the inheritance. I think that this is an enormous victory for Croatian policy, because now this has practically ceased to be a political issue, and is being shifted to the realm of "legal technique."

[Biscevic] What are Croatia's prospects for possible future relations in a so-called security complex in this region?

[Nobilo] It is hard to predict whether future relations will result in any concrete ties through some regional organization, but it is essential that such ties be functional, and not of a state-political nature, and especially not antagonistic. Moreover, it is essential that these processes be compatible with the processes of European integration.

Croatia has an interest, as well as a place in broader ties in the so-called "interim Europe." However, I do not believe that some sort of new bloc of countries will emerge here that would be antagonistic to Eastern or Western Europe. With the unification of Germany and after other countries in this region have joined EFTA and the European Community, this simply means that the developmental and political focus of European integration is moving towards the very heart of Europe, to the so-called "interim Europe," which will have special responsibilities and importance with respect to controlled processes of democratization and the gradual integration of this second circle from present-day Europe into the broader process of European integration.

Herein lies Croatia's major challenge and major advantage. It remains to be seen what will happen in the Balkan region. But that depends first and foremost on how the global framework of European security will be created. Still, this will no longer be bipolar. The formation of the Northern Atlantic Council for Cooperation between NATO and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact shows that these processes of full cooperation between all European countries in the area of security have begun, that a new pattern for security is being created in which ultimately the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will probably be like the "software," with the NATO alliance as the "hardware," and with the possibility of subregional security arrangements.

For example, there is the idea of creating some sort of agreement in this region between Italy, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, and Czechoslovakia, which would resolve problems of security in this area, just as consideration is being given to security arrangements between Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia. It is thought here that Bosnia-Herzegovina could remain a neutral area, as a sort of shock absorber, in part because of its ethnic composition. But, I repeat, the most important thing in this concept of "delegating" collective European security to the lowest level is to avoid subregional antagonisms.

[Biscevic] But was it not the very internationalization of the crisis that showed that, in the background of a Europe moving towards integration, there are impulses towards preserving or expanding spheres of interest and zones of influence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia? How do you set up relations among five or six new states located in the key part of the new "strategic transversal" from Germany to Turkey?

[Nobilo] That is probably exactly the place where one should look for the motives behind these ideas about creating two groupings with some sort of security arrangements between them, something that could be called the "Orthodox" and "Central European" spheres. This probably reflects the need to balance out the Turkish influence, which could establish a stronger foothold in the Balkan region across the so-called "green transversal," something that Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, and Romania are certainly not interested in seeing, and which certain political circles in Bosnia could be interested in. But at the same time, this could be an attempt to prevent the spread of German influence from the heart of Europe to Asia Minor and the Middle East.

However, in all of this one must bear in mind that the old geopolitical points of reference no longer hold true today, and that one can no longer think in the geopolitical terminology of military footholds, military presence, and territorial expansion, since influence today is brought to bear more by technological or financial means than by military presence. But it is precisely for this reason that all sensible policy endeavors by small countries must be directed at multiplying and diversifying these influences, in order to have several footholds, both in the structure of foreign capital and in bilateral relations.

[Biscevic] Still, some of the former East Bloc countries believe that security is best ensured by direct membership in the NATO pact. Does Croatia have such ambitions?

[Nobilo] This stance is adopted most often by Catholic countries in the former East, as one of the ways to reintegrate into West Europe, to which they belong in terms of civilization, and as protection not so much against Soviet, or rather Russian, expansion as against the possibility of national strife in East Europe.

I think that Croatia has similar interests, but that in the immediate period it is unrealistic to talk about such variants. Anyway, Croatia can realize its interests as far as security is concerned precisely within the framework of the aforementioned model for new collective security in Europe, where NATO will play the role of "hardware" for the CSCE. All of this within the framework of a new subregional security configuration in Europe, which will quite certainly include key countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Croatia.

That is another reason why Croatia must be actively present in the CSCE right now, because European peacekeeping forces will presumably be formed in order to put out fires in certain crisis regions in Eastern Europe.

[Biscevic] The most potentially dangerous situation for peacekeeping forces such as these could continue to be Serbia, especially if Belgrade rejects the Brussels formula and blocks the execution of the UN peace plan.... If Serbia rejects the new "rules of the game," is there a possibility that NATO forces or some sort of future European units will be deployed in this region?

[Nobilo] The possibility exists, but the probability of intervention is not great. One must recognize that the world is doing everything it can to isolate Serbia politically and economically in order that it finally accept all the conditions outlined in the U.S.-European declaration. In this sense, intervention is always "hanging overhead" as a form of pressure, but also in order to increase the security of the UN peacekeeping forces for as long as their mission here lasts. It is indicative that the commander of the NATO pact, immediately after that declaration was adopted in Brussels, issued a statement indirectly suggesting that the Sixth Fleet would be exerting direct pressure on a resolution of the crisis. Indeed, now that the final outcome of the crisis has been defined even by the United States, there is a greater possibility that a resolution and pacification in this region will be ensured as quickly as possible, even through military pressure. Because Europe is sick and tired of this whole blockade on its southeastern border, and I in fact see no other option than for Serbia to be disciplined—without the use of force, but it is clear that this military factor remains a means of political pressure as well.

[Biscevic] It seems to me that as a Mediterranean state, Croatia should devote an enormous amount of its strategy to that region in particular.... To what extent has the so-called Adriatic orientation found its foreign-policy superstructure?

[Nobilo] The Adriatic orientation is a first step on the domestic level, which was supposed to open up all the channels of communication with the narrower and broader circles of Mediterranean partners on the international level. However, it was obviously necessary for the process of constituting the Croatian state, its international recognition, to be completed before the preconditions for such communication could be created. These channels are now being created gradually, and I believe that in the coming months and years this Croatian Mediterranean policy will be more pronounced.

With the increasing integration of Croatia into Europe, Croatia's Mediterranean policy will develop through the EC's Mediterranean policy. In other words, Croatia must be interested in being an integral part, as soon as possible, of those programs for reviving the Mediterranean, from the ecological to the developmental sense, which the European Community is already pursuing. Moreover, Croatia will be interested in participating in some processes that will logically take place in the Mediterranean region, most of all the stabilization of the eastern Mediterranean, especially the Middle Eastern crisis. In so doing, Croatia will have to foster a balanced approach to Israel and to the Arabs, while at the same time expanding cooperation with the circle of important Croatian partners from the previous period, such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, etc.

[Biscevic] The saturation of internal structures and of the "state of mind" with Croatia's international status has been conspicuous thus far through its position in the

peace process—after the state was achieved, we face the period of its affirmation, a time in which a new form must be filled in with new content. How do you view the prospects of this interrelationship?

[Nobilo] Right now, we face a period of "capillary" ties with Europe and a period in which we will affirm our own state precisely through its "new image." Croatia must have an image of stability, because that guarantees it faster integration into Europe. This will be the hardest part of the job—it will not be "spectacular," nor will it be that attractive to the media. But we must succeed in getting Croatia off the front page of the paper....

[Biscevic] So that the struggle for sovereignty does not become its own end?

[Nobilo] Absolutely. Because Croatia can emerge and exist formally, but it cannot develop without capillary integration into a wider area. It is normal in this sense that Croatia longs for this integration, but with its own identity, and I think that it would be a big mistake if any sort of autarchic model of societal development were to predominate in the postwar period. At the moment, it is not hard to discern reflections of war psychosis, of political tensions, and of social and other pressures that are dictated by the present-day situation. But I believe that the existing frustrations, antagonisms, and negative emotions will be overcome faster than it may seem to us right now. Once foreign aid and investments enter the economic fiber, once Croatia begins rebuilding.... Then, I am convinced, this new situation alone will suppress most of the current negative tensions. Ultimately, there is no other future—problems such as those brought by the war cannot be overcome by negative energy, only by positive energy.

New Croatian Deputy Ministers Profiled

92BA0689B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
15 Mar 92 p 1

[Text] Zagreb—At the recommendation of the government of the Republic of Croatia, the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, has appointed Dr. Miomir Zuzul to the post of deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia, the Office of the President of the Republic announced.

Dr. Zuzul was born in Split in 1955. He graduated from the School of Philosophy in Zagreb. He has held the chair for developmental psychology and was the assistant dean of education at the School of Philosophy in Zagreb. Dr. Zuzul has published several books and is a member of numerous international associations in the field of psychology. Dr. Zuzul arrives at the post of deputy foreign minister from the post of head of the Department of Preventative Psychology and Social Work of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia.

At the recommendation of the government of the Republic of Croatia, the president of the Republic of

Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, has appointed Brigadier General Slobodan Praljak to the post of deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, the Office of the President of the Republic announced.

Praljak was born in 1945 in Capljina. He graduated with a degree in film direction from the Academy of Film Arts in Zagreb, and in sociology and philosophy from the School of Philosophy in Zagreb, and he also graduated from the School of Electrical Engineering in Zagreb. He has worked as a professor of electrical engineering, and has written numerous documentary films. Praljak joined the Croatian Armed Forces at the very beginning of the defensive war, and he arrives at his new post from the post of commander of the Sunja operative sector.

Krajina Leader on Knin, Glina Conflicts

92BA0679D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
12 Mar 92 p 9

[Interview with Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic Krajina (Glina convocation), by Borislav Solesa; place and date not given: "From the Adriatic to the Danube"]

[Text] Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic Krajina (Glina convocation), is for some people the long arm of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the main representative and emissary of Slobodan Milosevic in Krajina, while for others he is merely a Banija fighter, who in the whirlwind of war has grown from a highly skilled mechanic and chauffeur to become a watchful guardian of his people. It is also a fact that Mile Paspalj took up the position of president of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic Krajina [RSK] with the approval of Dr. Milan Babic, who at that time was president of SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina and later president of the Serbian Republic Krajina. In many respects, Paspalj and Babic are now the political fire and water in Krajina.

Replace the Team of Fighters

[Solesa] When could there be elections in Krajina, which, by all appearances, ought to resolve much of this?

[Paspalj] At the present, in Krajina, if we speak in terms of the government, we have a single philosophy or a one-party system. The Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] is in power, and we have no opposition in the opstinas. It is certain that as the situation calms down and the UN peacekeeping forces arrive, new parties, new associations, will come on the scene. Then we will have to have new elections. It is difficult to say when that will be, but just as soon as the judgment is that the situation in Krajina is mature and elections can be peacefully carried out on the territory of the RSK, from Karin Bay to the Danube—we will immediately have elections. I hope that at that time intelligent young and educated people will come to power to lead the Serbian people in the direction of progress and that at that time this team of warriors in power will be replaced. That team of warriors

did in a way win what the people were committed to. But now that has to be consolidated, and a new group of people are needed for that. I think that the people of Krajina have earned the right to have a democratic republic as part of a future Yugoslavia, or however that state might be called.

[Solesa] In free elections, people should emerge who represent both convocations of the government: the "Knin" and the "Glina." Do you think that this will really happen?

[Paspalj] In elections, because they will be multiparty elections, representatives of all parties and interest groups can participate. Whoever wins the confidence of the people, from the deputies in the opstinas to those in the republic, he is the one who will rightly prosper. No one dare have anything against that. In one of my earlier statements, I said that we would also have an election of the president of the republic, whether that election takes place in the Assembly or through a direct election. If at that time Milan Babic himself should run as a candidate, that should not surprise anyone. But at this moment Milan Babic is only president of the Knin SO [Opstina Assembly], and it would be good if he realized that at once, came to his senses, and did not inflict harm on the Serbian people, because he has come very dangerously close to those who at this moment are inflicting damage on the interests of the Serbs.

[Solesa] What do you think about the combat still taking place on the fringes of Krajina? Will this escalate, or will the UN forces be able to resolve that? Will all of this have an adverse effect on the elections that are planned and on the stability of life in Krajina?

There Is No New Army Whatsoever

[Paspalj] You heard what Mr. Vance said when he was here. I think that there is no longer any chance of hindering the peacekeeping forces. The commander of the peacekeeping operation has also come. It is certain that Tudjman and his group want to make certain new moves in order to drag out the peacekeeping process, because they have nevertheless lost a large part of what they imagined was theirs, but that never was theirs. The situation will calm down when the UN troops come, especially in Bosnia, but the very essential thing for us is that the situation in Bosnia be stable.

[Solesa] Is it possible that the political conflicts in Krajina could become armed conflicts, because there is obviously great nervousness between those who were fellow fighters until yesterday and are now political opponents?

[Paspalj] I think that this issue is being exaggerated. At this moment, the RSK is represented by two armed formations, the police and TO [Territorial Defense], along with a part of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] which has incorporated Territorial Defense. These people have had enough of war. They have seen that we should undertake negotiations by peaceful means, to

bring this thing to a definitive conclusion. Individuals who have not had a taste of the front ranks of the trenches, who have no idea what it is to lie 10 or 15 days on the first line of fire in mental tension and everything that comes with it, can talk about some kind of political divisions and struggles and imagine some new army. That new army does not exist. The opposition is very thin even in Knin itself. The thought that that opposition has any mass behind it is overwrought. Another question arises: Why does anyone want to cause incidents here in Krajina?

To cause incidents now, within the Serbian nationality in Krajina, and to have the unrest spread to B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina], and perhaps even to Serbia, is precisely the desire of these people who in a way made suggestions about 9 March, which did not happen. Who do they favor? I am certain that this favors Genscher and the rest, who are not our friends.

Personal Ambitions and Profiteering

[Paspalj] At this point, as far as the military and the police are concerned, we have maximum security. It is certain that people are frightened by the arrival of the peacekeeping forces, because this people has never had anyone else to guard them, but this moment is very important for us because of the specific nature of the way war is waged here. We want people to go back to work, and we want the forces which we will leave to protect Krajina to be well-paid. These two years which have passed in extreme tension have left traces on many people. If this leadership in Knin or the former leadership of SAO Krajina wants to prolong that agony, that is their personal affair, but I would then associate that further with certain personal ambitions, war profiteering. Time will show what motives anyone could have for perpetuating chaos on the territory of Krajina as long as possible. What we need on the territory of Krajina is peace.

[Solesa] Babić's political line for Krajina holds that this new way of waging politics from Glina is a kind of sellout of the interests of Krajina. Vladislav Jovanović says that the Serbs are fighting for a special status in Croatia. In your opinion, will Krajina be in Croatia and have the form of an autonomy, or is it on the way to realizing statehood?

[Paspalj] The way Milan Babić of Knin thinks, this is perhaps quite simple for him. As I see it, from some 30 to 40 km as the crow flies to Zagreb, it comes down to one thing: The Serbs in the RSK, and especially the former SAO Krajina, will never again live in Croatia, even if it has federal relations with the other republics in Yugoslavia. We will build our own status and definitely separate from them. If we are two republics in the same state, we will have a firm distance toward that republic, Croatia.

[Box, p 9]

Private Assemblies

[Paspalj] I have already said that until election of a new government Krajina is an inflated balloon, which was a necessity only to one individual for his personal promotion. That balloon should be brought to earth to become a geographic term, and everyone should do and be responsible for his own job. Nothing should be resolved through the power of an individual, because for 50 years we have lived under the power of one man, and you see where it got us. That can never happen again. I can only announce to you that very soon there will be an assembly of the RSK in Knin, here, but I emphasize that it will consist only of those 112 deputies from SAO Krajina, along with the deputies of Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Only Milan Babić, Risto Matković, and Lazo Macura can allow themselves private assemblies. These were wonderful people until yesterday, but I do not understand what has happened to them. It is probable that fame turned their head or their tail. Otherwise, I do not understand.

[Box, p 9]

Rally in Belgrade

[Paspalj] The demonstrations in Belgrade, especially now in this situation, when things are continuing to boil within Yugoslavia, were not necessary. I am more for a struggle within assemblies than for a struggle in the square, especially the kind of struggle which destroys and tears down everything that is public, as occurred last year. I hope that those who organized this year's demonstrations have understood that.

The departure of our policemen was only in a way to pay back services to the Serbian people which they offered us during our armed struggles. We feel that this is a good move, for the simple reason that I myself attended the talks in which I heard that certain groups of Ustaša terrorists planned to carry out actions of their own during the demonstrations. All those Krajina policemen were trained in Croatia, where our own special forces also trained, and they know each other quite well. The only reason why they went is to be at large in that crowd, so that they can recognize such people in case of incidents. There was no provision for them to participate in anything else, especially not in settling accounts with the opposition.

Macedonia

JNA Withdrawal From Territory Complete

LD2603203892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Skopje, 26 Mar (TANJUG)—Today's meeting in Skopje between the commissions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Macedonia, which

were charged with the transfer of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] military projects and equipment, has marked the end of the departure of the JNA units from Macedonian territory. The JNA thus is no longer in Macedonia and it is expected that this will be confirmed officially by General Nikola Uzelac, commander of the Third Army District, and Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, tomorrow.

In this connection, Major General Milorad Mojsilovic, representative of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, said in Skopje today that despite the attempts by irresponsible individuals on both sides to frustrate this departure from Macedonia, which was an unpleasant and imposed deed for the Army, the withdrawal was carried out successfully and without any serious incidents. According to Mojsilovic, the Macedonian people has not embraced the anti-Army campaign carried out by the public media. Mojsilovic emphasized that, despite the regret on the part of the JNA members about the demolition of Yugoslavia, they cannot do anything else but to wish the Macedonian people, who decided to live on its own, good luck and economic prosperity. [passage omitted]

Macedonian Defense Minister Trajan Gocevski stressed that what the JNA left behind represented the necessary starting basis for the formation of the armed forces of Macedonia. He expressed satisfaction that the transfer was carried out essentially in a civilized manner. He also emphasized that Macedonia is in favor of the European option of solving the problems, including defense. He said that Macedonia did not intend to be inward-looking nor build a system that would threaten anyone. On the contrary, Macedonia will only guarantee the security of its borders and territorial integrity, Gocevski said.

General Arsovski Appointed Chief of Staff

AU2603195992 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
20 Mar 92 p 1

[Report by D.N.: "General Mitar Arsovski Chief of Staff"]

[Text] Skopje—Dr. Trajan Gocevski, Macedonian Minister of Defense, announced that on Sunday, 22 March, the last watchtowers on Macedonia's borders with Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania would be taken over by the members of the Macedonian Territorial Defense. Gocevski said that 90 percent of all military installations in Macedonia are now held by the Macedonian Army. He expects that the remaining installations will also be taken over in the next few days. In the building that used to house the Headquarters of the Third Military District, the staff of the future Macedonian Army is being formed, with Major General Mitar Arsovski as its chief. His deputy is Major General Trajko Postolovski, and his assistant is Colonel Ljubomir Simonovski. Major General Doce Perevski is assistant for morale and legal matters, Colonel Filip Koteli is assistant for planning, development, and finances, and Colonel Blagoja

Gruevski is assistant for organization, mobilization, and personnel. The commanders of the three Army Corps are Colonel Janakije Manasievski, Colonel Pande Petrevski, and Colonel Boris Stojanovski. The first conscripts in the Macedonian Army are expected in mid-May, and new uniforms are already being made.

Structure, Personnel of Armed Forces Detailed

92P20206A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 19 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by Z.P.: "Macedonian Armed Forces To Have Three Corps"—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIJA introduction]

[Text] In addition to the chief of the General Staff, General Arsovski, and his deputies and aides, the commanders of the three corps of the Macedonian Armed Forces have been appointed.

The structure of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Macedonia calls for a Macedonian military consisting of three corps (up to now the Republic has been divided militarily into two corps areas—Bitola and Kumanovo). The commanders have already been named: The first corps will be commanded by Colonel Janakije Manasievski, the second corps by Colonel Pavde Petrovski, and the third corps by Colonel Boris Stojanovski. Moreover, as we have already reported, a presidential decree was issued the day before yesterday, appointing the members of the General Staff of the Macedonian Armed Forces, with Major General Mitar Arsovski as its chief. His deputies are: Major General Trajko Postolovski, who will be in charge of the ground forces; Colonel Ljubomir Siljanovski as assistant for the rear services; Major General Doce Perevski as assistant to the chief for education and legal affairs; Colonel Filip Koteli as assistant for planning, development, and finance; and Colonel Blagoja Gruevski as assistant for organizational mobilization and personnel matters.

The previous assignments of these senior officers, who represent the top leadership of the Macedonian Armed Forces and have until recently held high-ranking positions in the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and in the territorial defense forces, which, according to the Constitution, are the basis for the Macedonian Armed Forces, have also been taken into account in deciding on the current solution. Thus, for example, Gen. Arsovski was the chief of staff of the Third Military District, Gen. Postolovski was chief of staff of the Bitola Corps, Gen. Perevski was assistant for education, Col. Petrovski was in charge of personnel matters in the Third Military District Command, and Col. Manasievski was chief of staff of the Kumanovo Corps. Colonels Siljanovski, Koteli, Gruevski, and Stojanovski were until recently in leading positions in the Republic's territorial defense staff for Macedonia.

Serbia

Milosevic Answers Readers' Questions

AU2503195192 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
23 Mar 92 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Serbia Was Never Bolshevik"]

[Text] Belgrade—Serbia was never Bolshevik, and least of all now. This was stated by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA, answering questions addressed to him by the readers of this weekly.

Commenting on the question that maintained that the Socialist Party of Serbia was considered a Bolshevik party, Milosevic said that "Bolshevism belongs to the past of another nation and to another time," and that this term "without any reason, true only recently, found its way into the vocabulary of some of our mock [novokomponovani] democrats."

"Serbia is now organized as a multiparty parliamentary republic, and such an organization has nothing to do with Bolshevism," Milosevic said, adding that the Socialist Party of Serbia presented its stands on the past at its founding congress in July of 1990. The President of Serbia agrees, however, with the conclusion in one question that "Serbia is turned toward the past too much."

"In the last few years we have been too preoccupied with the past in a defeatist way. We should leave both the past and defeatism behind us if we want to make progress. We should particularly stop 'lamenting' our fate, which everyone else is responsible for except ourselves," Milosevic said.

Answering the question as to why he did not distance himself from all parties and become the president of all Serbs, Milosevic said that he "does behave like the president of all Serbs—impartially toward all," because the job that he performs "could not be performed more fairly and successfully in any other way."

Answering the question on how long the military service will remain extended, 12 plus three months, Milosevic said: "While there is a war danger. I believe for only a short period of time." The President of Serbia also answered the inquisitive readers' questions about his private life.

In a reply to the question whether it bothered him that he was a member of a socialist party, while his wife was a member of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, Milosevic answered briefly: "Yes."

He said that except his wife's family house in Pozarevac he does not have any holiday houses. He spends the entire summer with his family in Pozarevac. His wife tries to "associate with people they met before becoming involved in politics." In their free time the Milosevics visit "their closest friends." They often talk to their

children Marija and Marko. Their children did not go to the war, because as he explained, "young ladies still do not go to armed forces," while his son Marko is still in the third grade of the secondary school.

Answering the question as to why he had purchased the very house that has been adapted for the president of Serbia, Milosevic said that "the house in which he has already been living with his family for three years was neither made, nor adapted for the president of Serbia, nor has it ever had a character of a residence, for what, after all, it is not even suitable."

"The house was built in the late 1960's and has been used all the time as a house that belongs to the housing stock of the City of Belgrade, and therefore, as far as I know, it has never been the property of the republic," Milosevic said.

How does he view the wish of the Karadjordjevic family to return to Serbia, and what kind of status should the family have? Milosevic holds the view that the family can return to Serbia as citizens of Serbia," but, "should not allow themselves to be manipulated by the opposition for the alleged goal of restoring a monarchy."

"Serbia is a republic, and I believe that it will remain so," Milosevic said.

Another question read: Whose help can the Serbian people rely on at present? Milosevic answered:

"I think that a vast majority of countries all over the world and Europe have no reason to behave toward us in a malevolent way. We cannot expect others to be better to us than we are ourselves, nor can we expect them to respect us more than we respect ourselves. With our behavior, we should enable the well-intentioned and our friends, whom there are a few, to help us, rather than to hinder them."

In reply to the question whether he envisaged a turn-about in his strategy for the better, Milosevic said that "the main economic problems of Serbia stem from the unsuccessful policies of the Federal Executive Council," and that "Serbia is now taking the fate of its economy into its own hands, something that will enable it to significantly change the economic policy and find a way out of the crisis."

"Overcoming the crisis primarily requires peace and a reduction of Serbia's huge costs of keeping refugees and help to Serbs outside Serbia with which Serbia has been burdened over the last few years. The lifting of the EC sanctions is also an important precondition for a turnaround in the economy," Serbian President Milosevic said answering readers' questions in ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA.

[Boxed passage]

Seselj—Most Respected

[BORBA] Which opposition leader do you respect most, hold in the highest esteem?

[Milosevic] I respect Seselj most, because I think that his party is not financially dependent on foreign sources, and because he is consistent in expressing his political views. He does not oscillate in his views like some of his colleagues from the opposition, who say saying one thing today and another tomorrow."

Who Do the People Not Want

With regard to the possible independence of Macedonia, Milosevic said that Serbia has a "clear stand" in this respect.

"If the citizens of Macedonia decide to live independently, outside Yugoslavia, Serbia will respect that. I do not think that it was Serbia that provided Macedonia with a nation and a republic," Milosevic said.

"I am not aware of any case of corruption among the politicians that I work with, because neither my associates nor I could tolerate this. Regarding the question of who the "people do not want," an appropriate answer "is given at free, secret, and democratic elections."

Serbs and Montenegrins—Two Nations

In a reply to the question whether there was a secret agreement with Tudjman concerning the territories on which Serbs live within the existing borders of Croatia, Milosevic answered: "There is not."

In a reply to the question whether he ever had a dilemma about Serbs and Montenegrins being two nations, he said that he did not think that it "was disputable that they were two nations," but "two very close nations."

Zimmerman "Punished"

Could relations with Germany be normalized? Milosevic answered: "They could, provided Germany has good intentions and does not interfere in our affairs." Commenting on the question—is it true that the U.S. ambassador was waiting for months for Milosevic to receive him, because he was allegedly angry with his statements, the President of Serbia answered:

"It is true, but not because I was angry. I thought that by refusing to attend the ceremony at Gazimestan he made an impermissible personal gesture, especially because the ceremony was attended by the entire Yugoslav leadership of that time and the majority of the diplomatic corps."

Poll Shows Strong Support for Milosevic

LD2603182192 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1012 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—Nearly the absolute majority of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia

would reject the proposal that republican President Slobodan Milosevic resigns, as was shown by the public opinion poll conducted by the Belgrade Institute for Political Studies, ie, its center for public opinion and marketing "Medium".

The Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES today publishes the results of the opinion poll, which show that 49 percent of the citizens would not and only 26 percent would support the demand for Milosevic's resignation. The Belgrade Institute for Political Studies polled 1,320 citizens of Serbia.

"Confidence in the current Serbian president has not changed significantly since the multi-party elections (in December 1990)", the daily concludes. POLITIKA EKSPRES says that "Milosevic then won 51.6 percent of the votes in such an opinion poll" and that, last November, "48.5 percent lent Milosevic confidence and 28 percent did not".

Prime Minister Bozovic Comments on Goals

LD2603135992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2306 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—Prime minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Radoman Bozovic assessed as realistic expectations that the "new Yugoslav federal organs will take office" in early June this year.

In an interview to the Italian journal for businessmen GLOBO ORE, Bozovic specified that the drafting of the new constitution of Yugoslavia was under way and that elections for federal organs would be organized in late May. Bozovic explained that the republics of Serbia and Montenegro had opted to maintain Yugoslavia in the resolving of the Yugoslav crisis. The other four Yugoslav republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have declared themselves for independence. Serbia today is economically, socially and politically the most stable part of Yugoslavia, Bozovic said. Even when the federal state is falling apart and under pressure from hundreds of thousands of refugees, Serbia has managed to maintain its financial condition more or less stable, he said.

The Serbian prime minister assessed that the attempt by the opposition to win power through extraparlimentary means did not win any serious support in the Serbian public. The aggressiveness of part of the opposition did not harm the political and social stability of Serbia, he said, specifying that the democratic will of the others expressed in a parliamentary manner is the only legal and acceptable way to win and hold power. Bozovic believes that, in the current situation, all forces should be directed at strengthening the economic position and the development of democratic relations in Serbia.

We believe, Bozovic said, that it is in the interest of the Italian democratic public that relations between Italy and Serbia develop on the principles of sovereignty and mutual respect. He mentioned that Serbia expects Italy

to urge the lifting of economic sanctions against Serbia in the European Community (E.C.)

General Details Changes in Armed Forces

LD2603161492 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1220 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—The Army of the common state of Serbia and Montenegro would be bereft of ideology and politics, enjoy rational organization and have modern equipment and arms, stated Yugoslav Army's youngest general, Maj. Gen. Vuk Obradovic, in an interview to the Belgrade daily POLITIKA.

It is understood that the decisive role in forming the profile of the army in the making would be played by the political institutions of the new state, said Gen. Obradovic, who at one time was the spokesman for the Yugoslav Defense Ministry, and is now head of the "moral education" department.

Considerable part of this army would be made up of professionals, while the military service would predominantly be carried out according to the territorial principle and would be between six and eight months long. Gen. Obradovic said the Army in conditions of multiparty system must be developed as a typical state institution which would in no way meddle in the political life and party confrontations. Gen. Obradovic announced rejuvenation of the officer staff and noted that several thousand officers and non-commissioned officers and civilians working in the army would have to be pensioned off. He set out that Serbia and Montenegro would in the future have fewer men in uniform "than at any time in its history" and that the army potential of these two republics would be used to boost economic development of the new common state.

Gen. Obradovic said the Army would in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina respect any decision reached through the accord of all three nations living there (Moslems account for 43.77 percent, Serbs for 31.46 and Croats for 17.34). He recalled that the Army units stationed there were "filled primarily with men from that region" and said that "no-one can and should dare force them to leave their homeland."

He assessed that a confederal model of Bosnia-Herzegovina "would by nature of things be most suitable for each constituent unit to have its own military formations which would be directed and coordinated by a competent joint body at republican level."

Speaking about the war, which was being represented in the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Croatia by its military and political leadership as victorious, Gen. Obradovic said the Croatian leadership was left with nothing more than to deceive its own people. Under their leadership, Croatia was divided politically and economically, and militarily "thrown out" from a third of the territory within its administrative borders, said Gen. Obradovic.

He set out that the stories about the privileges in the army were unfounded, but were partly due to "dishonorable conduct of individuals". In this context, Gen. Obradovic mentioned also former Defense Minister Admiral Branko Mamula and said "he caused great harm to the army and its members."

Kosovo

Reaction to Gligorov-Rugova Talks

AU2603194792 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
19 Mar 92 p 8

[Report by M. Antic: "Swapping Somebody Else's Territories?"]

[Text] Pristina—The news about the meeting in Skopje between Kiro Gligorov and Ibrahim Rugova and what they said to each other as statesmen was received with mixed feelings in Kosmet [Kosovo]. Some believed that it was a matter of an imprecise and pretentious interpretation of the meeting and waited for a refutation, while others read "more than politics" into it, or, to be more precise, Macedonia's recognition of the "Republic of Kosovo" and Rugova as its president.

Since days passed and no refutation came from Macedonia of what had happened at the meeting as reported by the Information Center of Rugova's Democratic Alliance, the only feeling that remained among the Albanians was that of surprise: How, and to what end, did Rugova manage to establish an alliance with the "eternal enemies of Albanians—the Bulgarians," and then with the leader of Macedonians, who is still oppressing Albanians in western Macedonia, and, finally, who authorized him to play the role of the president of all Kosmet Albanians.

On the other hand, among the Kosmet Serbs the meeting between the "crowned" Gligorov and "uncrowned" Rugova was seen as "the vilest blow to Serbia" and "negotiating its territories" without its having a say in the matter. As for Rugova's part in the meeting, "it surprised no one here," but "Gligorov made his plans and aspirations clear with this move," and "particularly his anti-Serbian syndrome, since he sided with those who openly tell him that he has designs on the whole of western Macedonia."

Among these ascertainties, others could also be heard on the Serbian side, and these were reported yesterday by JEDINSTVO and Radio Pristina. According to JEDINSTVO, Gligorov and Rugova are negotiating Serbian territories, "because the Macedonian official authorities have long been after Trgoviste, Presevo, Kacanik, Bujanovac, and the 'Pohor Peinjski' monastery," but the Albanian separatists have also had their eye on these places and others in Macedonia that are inhabited by Albanians.

Radio Pristina leaves Rugova aside, but informs Gligorov that "he has opened the southern front with this meeting" and asks him "what right he has to meddle in the competence and internal affairs of another state." It concludes "what Macedonia decides to do with its Albanians is its own business," and that "Gligorov can auction Macedonian territories if the Macedonian people allow him to do so. Kosmet, fortunately, is in neither his nor Rugova's jurisdiction."

Many believe that the real snag behind these stories, particularly the one about borders, is the construction of the Skopje-Tirana-Albanian coastline motorway in which Macedonia would invest heavily.

Rugova Demands Peacekeepers in Republic

AU2603091292 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
21 Mar 92 p 6

[M.V. report: "Rugova Invites Generals to Negotiations"]

[Text] Pristina, 20 Mar—Today's news conference of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK] followed the pattern of the previous ones by opening with condemnations of "repression that is characterized by acts of eviction from workplaces and homes, house searches, and convictions of crimes." Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the DSK and all Albanians, as he likes to call himself, gave an example of some delegate in some assembly in Kosovska Kamenica, who was apparently sentenced to "one to two years in prison." However, Rugova failed to mention why and when this delegate was convicted.

Today the leader of the DSK repeated his demand for the deployment of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo-Metohija, saying they were needed "as a preventive against bloodshed." He requested recognition of "Kosovo Republic" from the European Community, the United States, and other world powers. He invited General Blagoje Adzic and other generals to come to Pristina for talks on the withdrawal of the Army, and asked the Serbian authorities "to withdraw from the region for the benefit of the whole population of the province."

In the style of a great statesman, Rugova turned to that aspect as well. During his visit to Bulgaria, where he spoke to the representatives of the Democratic Party, the largest and most influential party in Bulgaria, according to him, there were talks on "establishing contacts and cooperation." He also judged the meeting with Macedonia's President Kiro Gligorov as very significant. "We spoke like neighbors, as man to man, and agreed on further cooperation," said Rugova.

Asked about the border between Macedonia and Albania, Rugova said that he wanted an open border between Macedonia and Kosmet, but that the Serbian police was preventing it.

Turning to the forthcoming elections in Albania, the leader of the DSK said that his party would support the Democratic Party of Sadik Berisha. His victory would, according to Rugova, establish democracy in Albania, and thus raise that country's standing in the world.

Rugova gave his views on the cantonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also spoke of preparations for free multi-party elections in Kosmet. At the news conference Rugova expressed his conviction that a "Kosovo Republic" would be recognized not only by Albania and Macedonia, but by other states as well.

Asked to comment on Albanian press articles on the division of Kosmet, Rugova said that any kind of a division was unacceptable to Albanians, and that the division into regions was "an attempt by the Serbian authorities to fragment Kosmet." Albanians would only agree to sharing the property of Yugoslavia, and for that purpose a delegation would be formed by "the assembly or the government of the Republic of Kosovo."

Slovenia

Special EC Envoy To Address Secession Issue

AU2503182892 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Report on news conference by Lord Peter Carrington, chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, by Radio Ljubljana correspondent Barbara Kramzar in Ljubljana on 25 Mar; Carrington speaks in English with superimposed Slovene translation—recorded]

[Text] [Kramzar] What is Lord Carrington's opinion of the events the former Yugoslavian territory after he has been Europe's most important mediator between the warring sides for six months?

[Carrington] The things are moving along, and I am more hopeful than I was two or three months ago. To say that we will soon resolve all the problems, however, would be an exaggeration.

[Kramzar] The European mediators learned quite a while ago that the situation has changed between the first conference's plenary session in September and the last plenary session in March.

[Carrington] The original idea of the conference was that all the issues would be resolved at the conference. The republics would function then as independent states.

[Kramzar] With the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, there are fewer and fewer matters of interest to all sides. Slovenia is no longer directly involved in the issues of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and that is why Carrington is sending special envoys there to try to find common ground between those involved in disputes. One of the important issues of interest to everyone is the succession to the former Yugoslavia, and that is what Carrington discussed with

[Slovene] President Milan Kucan last night and today. The EC position, which presented at today's news conference, is now clear.

[Carrington] The EC Arbitration Committee concluded several months ago that Yugoslavia is in a process of disintegration. Therefore, Serbia and Montenegro cannot be the successors of Yugoslavia.

[Kramzar] How long will the succession process last?

[Carrington] Well, unfortunately I have not brought my crystal ball with me to answer this question. [laughter] It most likely will not be a quick process.

[Kramzar] Carrington appointed the Portuguese diplomat (?Doval) to deal with the succession issue and Kucan will draw up a list of priorities for him. As the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Krajina is escalating again, Carrington will talk this over before the next 11th session of the Brussels conference with the Croatian and Serbian presidents [Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic] and ask them to settle their disputes. The Serbs who live in Croatia will simply have to accept that Europe will not agree to any forceful change of borders. Just as Serbia will have to take care of its Albanians, Zagreb also will have to grant special protection and human rights to the Serbs living in Croatia. Finally, did Lord Carrington like Slovenia?

[Carrington] You would be absolutely astonished if I said no [laughter]—the answer is yes.

Kucan Addresses Lions Clubs in Ljubljana

LD2703102192 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 2100 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] There is no need to think about the prospects of Slovenia after its international recognition as a state neighboring on west-European countries but as a state which lies in the direction of their strategic penetration of the East [as received]. This was emphasized among other things by Slovene President Milan Kucan at the meeting of three Slovene Lions Clubs in Ljubljana. The Lions Clubs are an important international organization which has a consultative status in the United Nations. There are some 40,000 such clubs in the world. Report by Sandi Frelih:

[Frelih] Tonight, in the Hotel Lev, Milan Kucan first described Slovenia's struggle for independence and then spoke above all about the present processes in Europe and the world, and about the Conference on Yugoslavia. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, bloc division still exists but it is now an economic one with a different understanding of democracy and revanchism. The economic backwardness of Eastern Europe is forcing the West to extend economic aid to prevent the danger of spontaneity [stihija]. Slovenia must exploit its position on the border between the East and the West, Kucan emphasized.

Speaking about the Hague conference on Yugoslavia, President Kucan said that the succession to Yugoslavia is now the central question. The discussion on succession is the main problem because the conference does not know how to counter Serbia's blackmail. Milan Kucan emphasized that the international recognition by 60 countries and the membership in the CSCE represent a good sign for an early admission of Slovenia to the United Nations. In the past, to a large extent, others used to make decisions about us, while now we are doing this to a great extent ourselves.

'Constructive Vote of No-Confidence' Filed

AU2503180192 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] A group of parties that took part in the meetings of the so-called coalition of the center during last few weeks filed a constructive vote of no-confidence in the government a little over an hour ago. It is worth mentioning that the group includes: the Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and the Club of Independent Deputies, but not the Slovene Farmers' Alliance—Peoples' Party and the Liberal Democratic Party.

These groups proposed Igor Bavcar as prime minister-designate to the center coalition. We have already reported that the Liberal Democratic Party also proposed its prime minister-designate—Dr. Janez Drnovsek. As Sandi Frelih reports, the Assembly President Dr. France Bucar has already informed the deputies of all three chambers about this new constructive vote of no confidence.

[Begin Frelih recording] The Liberal Democrats decided to announce candidacy of Janez Drnovsek after they had learned with surprise that an inner circle group of the representatives of the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Democrats, and the Socialists, has been meeting recently. Yesterday this group agreed that Igor Bavcar will be their joint candidate for new prime minister.

Therefore, it could happen that the assembly deputies will simultaneously be presented with two proposals for new prime minister-designate. The Liberal Democratic Party will formally submit its proposal at tomorrow's coordination meeting. However, it is another matter whether there is any point in holding tomorrow's meeting after President of the Democrats Igor Bavcar told us that a group of deputies has already filed a constructive vote of no-confidence in the cabinet of Lojze Peterle.

This vote of no-confidence has already been read to the deputies of all three chambers. Bavcar's candidature was supposedly agreed upon at yesterday's meeting, attended by the representatives of the Social Democrats, the Democrats, the Greens, and the Socialists. It is not known why the Liberal Democrats were not invited to this meeting.

The Liberal Democratic Party learned of the decision on Bavcar's candidacy at midday, therefore, the party assessed this as an attempt to keep them out of any possible coalition and as an attempt that some parties retain their ministers' seats. Namely, in the former talks of the parties of the center, the question of the prime minister designate was left to later negotiations while the number of ministers' post was supposed to be discussed on the basis of the number of deputies that parties hold in the parliament.

From the names of the deputies who signed the constructive vote of no-confidence it is evident that the Peoples' Party is not represented in this group, while the document was signed by the representatives of the Club of Independent Deputies. [end recording]

No-Confidence Vote Postponed

AU2603181392 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Text] Dr. Janez Drnovsek, president of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDS], today informed Dr. France Bucar, president of the Slovene Assembly, that the LDS will not file the constructive vote of no-confidence in the government yet.

It has been learned in the club of deputies of this party that the LDS does not want to put its constructive vote of no-confidence to the vote in the parliament at the same time as the deputies will take a vote in Igor Bavcar, proposed candidate for premier-designate. This decision by the LDS does not mean that in case the no-confidence motion in the present government is not passed, this party will not propose its own candidate—Dr. Janez Drnovsek—to the parties.

The parties of the so-called center coalition were expected to meet this morning according to the original schedule, but, according to the latest information, they met in the afternoon. Igor Bavcar, candidate for new premier designate Igor Bavcar who is supported by four parties of the so-called center coalition and the Club of Independent Deputies, also invited Dr. Janez Drnovsek to the afternoon meeting.

Reduced Budget Proposal Sent to Parliament

92BA0664B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 10 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by Marjan Lacic: "171.4 Billion Tolars"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] The new draft budget for 1992 is smaller in real terms than the rejected one; the funds for the defense system have been reduced from 9.5 to 8 billion tolars.

Ljubljana, 10 Mar—The government has prepared a new draft republic budget for this year and sent it to the Assembly. The new draft budget "weighs" 171.4 billion tolars, which is a full 20 percent less in real terms than the rejected draft, based on January prices. As stated by Deputy

Republic Finance Minister Alenka Markic, before preparing the new draft they prepared a budget framework, so that they realistically estimated all the tax sources and the projected deficit. The draft now proposed will thus possibly be more satisfactory to those deputies who advocated curbing public spending, but the budget's beneficiaries will be considerably less enthusiastic.

According to Alenka Martic, in preparing the new draft budget of the Republic of Slovenia for 1992, they took the parliamentary discussion into account to the greatest possible extent. According to the new draft, the financial volume of the budget, including the financial settlement for the opstinas, should now be about 32.3 percent of the social product, calculated according to the old methodology. Of course, it would be good if it could perhaps be stated quite clearly in the further discussions in parliament what the distribution ratios should be in the budget. In explaining the budget, the Finance Ministry also prepared a separate section on special tasks that the budget is taking over, primarily state functions—some defense tasks and protection of the southern border.

In spite of these new items, the Defense and Interior Ministries have had a real reduction in the volume of budgetary funds in comparison with the previous draft. In the new draft, only the funds intended for wages have been revalued, and the funds for building the defense system, for instance, have been reduced even in nominal terms from 9.5 to 8 billion Slovene tolars [SLT]. Consequently, the Defense and Interior Ministries will also have to prepare substantial changes in their programs. The volume of funds has also been curtailed in other areas, however, since, for instance, material costs have been revalued using the growth of wages (not inflation); the elementary school program has also been added to the budget, and the addition of the tax services is also planned. The Ministry of Industry, for example, would receive substantially less for interventions in the economy. In the future these problems are to be solved by having the state provide only certain guarantees.

A significant innovation in the new draft budget is the construction of a system of diplomatic representations. We can also include among the innovations the funds provided for establishing a bank to insure export transactions and the funds for compensation for agricultural production, which the federation financed from the primary issuance. The new draft budget does not provide funds to cover public debt under the heading of foreign exchange savings. Let us also note in conclusion that for the time being, SLT18.1 million in outlays has not been covered yet, and this is the planned budget deficit. One-third of it is to be obtained soon as a credit for the construction of roads, and consequently road builders also have a better position in the new draft budget than in the old one.

Minister Rupel on Interrepublic Relations

92BA0666A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
10 Mar 92 p 13

[Interview with Dimitrije Rupel, Slovene foreign minister, by Dragisa Draskovic; place and date not given: "We Have Been Waiting a Long Time and Have Gone Slowly"]

[Text] In his last major interview with BORBA, published on 10 and 11 October 1990, Dr. Dimitrije Rupel, Slovene foreign minister, said that "he would not talk at all about Slovenia's secession, because Slovenia had no intention nor interest in seceding." Also that "Slovenia is not the one that wants to leave Yugoslavia, nor is it the one that is destroying Yugoslavia."

[Draskovic] Today, now that things do not square with those words, the question remains: Were you, as Dr. Pucnik has said, temporizing at that time in order to calm the Yugoslav public, while in actuality you were doing something else?

[Rupel] We did not secede, and we never considered our relation to the other republics secession. This was not secession, but a process of disassociation. As is well-known, for an entire year we proposed to the other Yugoslav republics and federal authorities that we arrive at an agreement concerning our future community. It is also well-known that we insisted the whole time on disassociation. The essential thing is whether it is secession or the state simply disintegrated. The European Community, that is, its Arbitration Commission, headed by Badenteri, which concluded that Yugoslavia is in a process of disintegration, demonstrates that it is the latter that occurred. Some, above all in Serbia, would impute to us that we are secessionists. But we are not.

[Draskovic] But another detail from the old interview and your statement at that time. That is, you said that you had no "great conflicts or major disagreements with the SIP [Secretariat for Foreign Affairs]." In different "company," at the same time, you declared: "Slovenia has been terrorized by Yugoslav foreign policy." And you add, "we are going to KEBS [Conference on European Security and Cooperation] in order to prepare the world and Europe for our departure." You did that on a grand scale in Paris. Is that a dual policy?

[Rupel] The matter is quite simple. For a time, we believed that we could arrive at an understanding, and I was the one who proposed to Loncar and the SIP that we arrive at some confederal principle. More accurately, I proposed that we adopt the institution of the Council of Ministers, in precisely the way they have it in the EC. That was a very sincere proposal of ours in order to prevent a complete collapse, which was to come later, so that we would arrive at the new situation through some gentler transition. Unfortunately, there was no understanding in the SIP or on the part of Loncar, because he intended to preserve Yugoslavia as it was. And second—war occurred in the midst of everything. In the attack on

Slovenia, the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was operating under instructions from the federal administration, and at that point all the gentler possibilities were dropped.

What Was Jansa's Plan

[Draskovic] There are those who think that it all could have ended without so much drama and blood if Slovenia had not selfishly forced the pace which suited it. Finally, aside from the fact that there would not have been so much bloodshed by the other parties, Slovenia would not have found itself in such an unenviable economic situation.

[Rupel] This is the first time that I have heard that hypothesis. Slovenia waited for a very long time and went very slowly. When we came to power in 1990, that is, in May, we said—we want a free Slovenia. At that time, we were still talking about a confederation, which at that time was a possible and very good form. The whole time we were communicating with Markovic, with Loncar, with all possible factors, and we were announcing everything, the plebiscite and the rest. Perhaps they did not take us seriously, and then, we had to prove that we were thinking seriously. But when we were attacked, then no other solution was left to us. But we did not want to threaten anyone. Jansa had a plan for the army to remain another year or two in Slovenia and for everything to be dismantled slowly.

[Draskovic] Certain foreigners who have been observers of the situation here for many years, such as the Englishwoman Nora Belof, say that in spite of everything even those now in conflict will in a time be turned back toward one another. Slovenia is already making great efforts to reestablish economic contacts with the rest.

[Rupel] I have said several times that those who live in this part of the world must have relations of some kind. We would be willing to recognize Serbia and its independence. Above all, it is normal for us to have good economic relations. Is it urgently necessary that we have such relations with Yugoslavia? In answer to that question, we must say that that depends on the other side. If Serbia, if Bosnia, if Macedonia are interested in that, then by God, we will make those relations. We have signed trade agreements with Croatia and Macedonia, which, in spite of the difficulties, is a good beginning. We hope that we will soon have such relations with the others as well.

[Draskovic] Not only in this region, but even in Europe, there has been the idea that perhaps we should think about a customs union on the soil of the former Yugoslavia.

[Rupel] I hope, as far as Slovenia is concerned, that we will make some kind of free trade zone on the soil of the former Yugoslavia. We are very much interested in a free trade zone, but we are resolutely opposed to a customs union. If the other side is against that, we will have to turn elsewhere. But it is a fact that traditionally these

economic relations have been good and that the enterprises are ready to continue this. Serbia is the biggest problem in this area. We are now waiting for Serbia's move.

Serbia Is Appropriating Community Property

[Draskovic] Are there indications that Serbia might recognize Slovenia at the international level?

[Rupel] Serbia will first have to work out its own status—is it Serbia or is it Yugoslavia? This is a topic of discussion at the Conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels. But I think that international recognition will come sooner or later. We are communicating even now with the Serbian Foreign Ministry at the level of notes. Mainly these are protest notes, or a demarche concerning a violation of our airspace. I hope that we will move on from demarches to normal diplomatic relations. There are no prejudices on our side, and I think that the interests exist.

[Draskovic] Slovenia has a vital interest in beginning debate on the division of assets as soon as possible. In this connection, it wants the succession and treaties to be debated at the highest level of the conference. Serbia and Montenegro want discussion at the expert level.

[Rupel] Even before 15 January, we proposed to Carrington that the conference discuss succession, division of property and debts in a plenary session. Carrington said that we should wait for 15 January to see what would happen. In the meantime, two new states have come into being, and the conference must take this into account. For the moment, everything is standing pat. We have proposed a new working group. It has not been created, although Carrington emphasized that we would discuss this.

[Draskovic] How much is all this influenced by the new events in B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina]?

[Rupel] I am afraid that aggravation of the situation in Bosnia is turning attention elsewhere. The question of succession and property should be resolved as soon as possible, because very important things are happening. Serbia, or the former Yugoslavia, is trying to appropriate the community property of Yugoslavia—they are selling pictures, furniture, houses, and embassies. In some states, we have managed to have that property frozen.

[Draskovic] In which countries have such transactions, as you call them, occurred?

[Rupel] Well, I have heard that they are attempting to sell real estate in Japan. I know of attempts in Italy. At the moment, things are well-arranged in Switzerland, in Austria, in Germany.... I assume that they will attempt this in other places. And this should be stopped.

We Have a Right to an Open Sea

[Draskovic] Judging by what is written in the press and also the recent statement by Dr. Ocirk, Slovene deputy prime minister, there are very large problems with Croatia.

[Rupel] Slovenia and Croatia are doomed to live together, because they have a long common border. I am certain that we will resolve those problems, because this is in the interest of both Slovenia and Croatia. Finally, all roads to the West cross the territory of Slovenia. Croatia also has an interest in good relations if it wants its goods carried to Austria, Italy, and beyond. We assume that the Croats will look sympathetically on our problems at sea. I think that there is no fundamental problem, because Slovenia, one way or another, has the right to an outlet to the open sea under the common law.

[Draskovic] There are some who think differently about Savudrija?

[Rupel] My answer to certain demands which have cropped up to the effect that Slovenia should obtain certain territorial adjustments is this: That is not Slovenia's official position. I will never advocate, nor do I concur in demands for any kind of territorial adjustments. Certain geodetic adjustments are another matter. For example, when a border runs through a farmyard. The principle there will be for life to go on normally.

[Draskovic] Italy is demanding that property be returned to Italians driven out of Istria, that is, that they be paid compensation. On that topic, when it had to do with members of the German minority who once lived in Slovenia, Genscher's reply was: That was not discussed.

[Rupel] The problem of those who left Slovenia in the postwar period was settled in the Osimo Agreement. Yugoslavia committed itself to giving some money, and this was compensated with highway affairs and economic cooperation. In principle, the problem of that property was settled. Insofar as individual blame is concerned, we will try to regulate this through regular court proceedings. As you know, there is no German minority in Slovenia. In this case, we are talking about property matters which will be dealt with case by case.

[Draskovic] In that context, there is the inevitable question of the status of the Slovene minority in Italy and Austria. According to many people, that position is more difficult than in previous years.

[Rupel] To some extent, the Slovene minority in Italy has a problematical situation. The same applies to the Slovene minority in Austria, and we will attempt to work out that position in normal bilateral talks. If elections were not taking place in Italy at the moment, we would make a constructive move. Finally, I have guarantees from De Michelis that Italy will work out the problem of the Slovene minority in keeping with the European principles.

[Box, p 13]

We Will Enter the United Nations

[Draskovic] How much closer is Slovenia to the United Nations after your visits to Beijing, Tokyo, and back to Rome?

[Rupel] We will soon be making formal application for membership in the United Nations. But we first want to regulate things with America. China is very important to us as a permanent member of the United Nations. But I do not see any particular problems about joining the United Nations. My visits to China and Japan persuaded me that there will be no opposition on China's part to Slovenia's entering the United Nations.

[Draskovic] How do you stand with the nonaligned on this question? You have said that they are traditional supporters of Yugoslavia.

[Rupel] We are planning contacts with the nonaligned quite soon. We want to be observers in the Nonaligned Movement, which we look on favorably. We do not want to be members.

[Box, p 13]

We Are Shaking Off Our Military Goggles

[Rupel] Recently, I have hardly been reading the Serbian press at all. I would like my personal relations with certain Belgrade intellectuals to be repaired after all these things which have happened. I believe that we are also separated to some extent by politics, but I do not see why those relations should not be normalized once again.

And not only when it comes to intellectuals. I want an appropriate dialogue on the broadest political base, I want to see an end to wartime and the beginning of a time of diplomacy. This presupposes that the time of conflicts cease and a time of normal life begin. And that in turn presupposes normal economic relations. Shaking off military goggles and stereotyped views as soon as possible in our life and beginning to talk like Europeans. I desire this on behalf of the Slovenes, the Serbs, and all the other nationalities of the former Yugoslavia. We have gone through a very stressful period of our life together. I think that we are at the end of that dramatic period, and that a period of productive cooperation lies ahead of us.

Candidate for Prime Minister Presents Views

92BA0686A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
11 Mar 92 p 4

[Interview with Dr. Peter Tancig, minister of science and technology, by Meta Roglic: "New Name for Prime Minister?"]

[Excerpts] Ljubljana, 11 Mar—The Greens of Slovenia did not support the proposal by Prime Minister Lojze

Peterle to replace the three ministers from the Democratic Party. Furthermore, they specified a date by which the electoral legislation had to be passed, and stated that otherwise they would strive for a new prime minister. Two possible names appeared: Dr. Janez Drnovsek and Dr. Peter Tancig. It seems that at this time the second candidate has reached first place. Will the Greens consequently propose a new prime minister soon? And what are the possibilities, however, of achieving positive results in the present crisis? We spoke about this with Dr. Peter Tancig, a member of the Greens of Slovenia and the present minister of science and technology. [passage omitted]

[Roglic] The previous proposal for replacing the prime minister and electing Marko Voljc was supported by the opposition. Do you expect that your candidacy would also be supported by the opposition, which would be joined by the Greens as well?

[Tancig] I think that it would be a mistake. I am trying to find a certain niche above the parties (outside the parties, common to all parties), as Dr. Drnovsek has already attempted. In my opinion, this is the only way that we can talk about a much broader starting point, whatever we call it—a government of national salvation, a transitional government, or an administrative government. In the given circumstances, this is the only sensible thing, since it ought to be a professional government that ought to act with such unity that its work would not be crippled by taking the current political situation into account. We must be aware that we are "making" a government for six to at most nine months, and consequently it is necessary to deal with this differently than a clearly political government, in which all the parties are counting on their own quite legitimate influences and advantages.

[Roglic] Consequently, you will not agree to some party's supporting you if you accept such and such a number of its ministers in the government?

[Tancig] That probably cannot be completely avoided, since the awareness of this crisis is still not strong enough for the prime minister to be given a free hand. These are real limitations of the system, and one should not deceive oneself about it. I do not oppose this either, but the kind of prime minister that I envision must have the ability to say that he does not want a certain person in the government because he simply is not competent.

[Roglic] The new government, then, would function for six to nine months. How much can even be done during this period, do you think?

[Tancig] This is really the question. A condition for this, however, is that whatever we undertake, we must undertake it with some unified policy and unified vision, which implies that we must find people with approximately the same conceptual level and the same frame of reference, and not least of all, people who are approximately equally industrious and persistent. It should be noted that the present government is quite diverse, both

ideologically and in terms of the basic concepts in understanding what any modern state administration should do and how. It includes people who would leave everything to the market, and also people who are complete interventionists. At any rate, a new government would have to achieve this conceptual unity if it really were to try to do something in this short time. Furthermore, I think that we would have to set an exact date for the elections. Now let us take a look at what things the new government would have to deal with first of all. I am intentionally not bringing up macroeconomic stabilization, the scope and consequences of which we will have to adjust very delicately to the depth of our economic crisis. It is a real "squaring of the circle" between stabilizing prices and reviving production, which in any case requires very intensive treatment. Unemployment is becoming the biggest problem. It will be necessary to take several quite specific steps. A completely neglected sector is the gray economy, which we ought to give more recognition and some sort of indulgence, and take into account the fact that it is a strong shock absorber, as a result of which the picture indicated by the number of people unemployed is just not that terrible. One of the possibilities for helping people to overcome the difficulties of subsistence is also part-time employment. It would also be necessary to look into ways to incorporate the very diverse foreign assistance in the programs, and help people to help themselves. One of the basic problems is also how to undertake the financial rehabilitation of banks. It is not possible to obtain any sort of normal amount of money for several good entrepreneurial programs and projects, and we in our ministry perceive the extreme frustration of people who would like to work, and who have good plans and promises for exports. In this case, I think that it would be necessary to take care of a few loans, but it would also be necessary to obtain an opinion on this and assistance from "outside" people, such as Voljc, for example. We are also all aware of the necessity of

privatization, but I would not advocate the position that the lack of privatization is completely preventing people from being motivated. Several projects, which I call active development, are taking place through our ministry; the state cofinances some institute or school so that it can use its intellectual resources to participate in rebuilding the economy. I was surprised by the enthusiasm and success with which people at Mebel, Lipa... undertook the rebuilding of the furniture industry, even with the ownership undefined. One should consequently be aware of how much a factory means to people in a small country.

[Roglic] Probably one of the central tasks that is necessary at this time is also reorganization of the government?

[Tancig] Of course, but not just a reorganization in name alone, so that the number of ministers would only be reduced from 23 to 13. In this case the six economic ministries would be put into some mega-economic agency, but unless we agree at the same time what this conceptually simplified government should do and how, we have not accomplished anything. We would have to agree on what the role of this mega-economic agency is like, i.e., that it is not just putting out fires at individual enterprises, even though in some cases it has to do that as well. I am in favor of not calling that agency a ministry for the economy, but rather either for economic relations, the economic system, or economic affairs. It just needs to be emphasized, therefore, that in this area the government is creating a system, and not dealing with individual issues.

[Roglic] After two years, you know your colleagues in the government well. Are there also people in it whom you would keep in your possible government?

[Tancig] There are several of them, certainly. [passage omitted]